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“No Man...can be more sensible than I am to the abuses to which the maxim that private interest 
should give way to public, is liable…as if the public were made up of anything but individuals” 
(Bentham, 1981: 472) 
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Abstract 
This thesis considers two separate areas of debate in Bentham scholarship and political theory to 
discern what the latter might learn from the former. 
 
The concept of “public reason” has been developed largely by contemporary deliberative democrats 
(Habermas, 1997). These thinkers commonly believe that talking between voters holds a special value 
because it allows citizens to engage with one another in a particular way. This mode of participation 
or “deliberation” is often designed to provoke individuals to move beyond their “mere” self-interest, 
and instead consider what is best for the community before they vote. Rawls (1997), for example, 
believes that this type of talking between citizens should be subject to certain constraints: citizens 
should appeal only to shared or “public” reasons when justifying arguments on fundamentally 
important matters. This basic idea has many different formulations, with different implications for 
how public reasoning within democracy is viewed. In contrast, aggregative democratic theorists are 
generally thought to contribute less to this debate. They insist that individuals’ basic preferences are 
fixed, and do not transform during discussion.  
 
I aim to establish how existing—“conventional” and “participatory”—interpretations of Bentham fit 
into this debate, and to argue that there is an alternative. This alternative “hybrid” view reflects 
Bentham’s work on publicity and official aptitude. It casts public reasoning as a way of securing the 
public against the misconduct of officials. This interpretation clarifies our understanding of Bentham 
in relation to contemporary writing on public reason. It strengthens the view that aggregative and 
deliberative democracy should be seen as compatible, rather than opposing approaches. Further, it 
does not expect or require consensus and is based on participants’ self-interest. As a result, it is less 
susceptible than contemporary Rawlsian and Habermasian views to critiques based on false consensus 
and exclusion.  
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Introduction 
This thesis considers two separate areas of debate in Bentham scholarship and political theory to discern 
what the latter might learn from the former. In doing so, it considers both interpretive and normative 
questions. The former concern whether different interpretations accurately explain Bentham’s views. The 
latter query whether those accounts tell us more about how citizens should reason together before voting.  
 
In contemporary democratic theory, the concept of “public reason” has been developed largely by 
proponents of deliberative democracy. These thinkers commonly believe that talking between voters holds 
a special value because it allows citizens to engage with one another in a particular way (Habermas, 
1997). This mode of participation or “deliberation” is often designed to provoke individuals to move 
beyond their “mere” self-interest, and instead consider what is best for the community before they vote. 
Rawls (1997), for example, believes that this type of talking between citizens should be subject to certain 
constraints. Citizens should appeal only to shared or “public” reasons when justifying arguments on 
fundamentally important matters.  
 
This basic idea has many different formulations, with different implications for how we view public 
reasoning within democracy. In Chapter 1, I explore an existing distinction from the public reasoning 
literature to contrast “deliberative” and “aggregative” approaches. The deliberative approach to public 
reasoning appeals to some shared sense of how justifiable or generalizable arguments and reasons are in 
public discussion. These theories commonly ask citizens to focus on something beyond self-interest. They 
often suggest that deliberating can transform—rather than merely correct or clarify—preferences. Often, 
this type of deliberation is held to have a particular status because it reflects, creates or constitutes 
important democratic, even moral, norms. Deliberation is also often expected to create a particular type of 
agreement, or consensus, between citizens. 
 
These accounts are often contrasted with aggregative views. These may encourage citizens to focus on 
either their own self-interest, or wider concerns. They insist that individuals’ basic preferences are fixed, 
and do not transform during discussion. Usually, aggregationists grant pre-voting discussion no particular 
moral, or democratic, status. They usually see consensus as unnecessary. In their view, good decisions can 
be reached by counting votes rather than the products of discussion. 
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One way to understand the differences between aggregative and deliberative theories is to examine how 
they respond to particular challenges. Two of these are outlined in Chapter 1. The first challenge is an 
accusation often made against aggregative theory by proponents of deliberative democracy. It is to 
provide a plausible explanation of why discussion before voting should be considered more than a “mere 
preliminary” to choosing at the ballot box (Barber, 2003:198). Deliberative theories tend to provide a 
convincing response to this challenge. They explain in detail both the nature of “valuable” discussion 
before voting, and the democratic benefits it is expected to create. In contrast, aggregative views often 
struggle to answer this challenge. They fundamentally assume that discussion cannot “transform” 
preferences in the way that deliberative democrats suppose. This curtails the extent to which aggregative 
accounts may explain the role of public reasoning. 
 
The second challenge is sometimes levelled against deliberative democracy by aggregative theorists. It is 
to explain how discussion before voting can be protected against manipulation by elites. In this thesis, an 
elite is considered an individual , or group, which has influence over discussion that is not merited by its 
expertise, or number. Manipulation may happen when deliberating citizens are induced to hold opinions 
that they would not have held given the opportunity to consider relevant information fully themselves 
(Zaller in Shapiro, 1998:514). Aggregative theories are in a relatively strong position to answer this 
challenge. Since they give public reasoning a less ambitious (transformative) role, aggregative 
conceptions of pre-voting discussion are less likely to produce both deliberative benefits, and manipulated 
harm for citizens. In contrast, the more ambitious role given to pre-voting discussion by deliberative 
theorists potentially creates more opportunities for manipulated outcomes. These two challenges therefore 
illustrate strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to public reasoning. 
 
In this context, Bentham’s political theory is particularly interesting. It shows the potential for a middle 
way between aggregative and deliberative democracy. Bentham is often considered to be an aggregative 
democrat with little to say about the value of public reasoning. I believe that re-examination of his views 
suggests that he had far more to say about the value of pre-voting discussion than often assumed. 
Admittedly, the contemporary relevance of these Benthamite views will depend on the viability of some 
key assumptions. These include the possibility of reaching the public interest through an aggregation of 
self-interested votes. The validity of those assumptions—which relate to matters other than public 
reasoning itself—will not be in the scope of this thesis. 
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How exactly might Bentham fit into this debate? Our understanding of his views on publicity and public 
opinion has matured in recent years. New evidence and sophisticated analysis have emerged in the shape 
of re-edited texts (Bentham, 1983b) and acute contributions to the secondary literature (Rosen, 1983; ed. 
Zhai, & Quinn, 2014). Despite advances1 in both fields, however, there has not been a concerted effort to 
understand how Bentham’s views might fit into this contemporary debate. On the one hand, Bentham 
scholars principally analyse texts in terms of their place in the history of political thought. These 
contributions rarely consider the terms and questions considered relevant to debates in normative theory. 
On the other hand, many contemporary normative theorists overlook Bentham: they often assume that he 
was an aggregative theorist with little to contribute. This thesis addresses this by showing that public 
reasoning can be understood in relation to principles that emerge from Bentham’s work on publicity and 
aptitude. I term this “public aptitude”; a quality among the public which is fostered by a particular type of 
reasoning between and among citizens. This reasoning is part of a “hybrid” interpretation of Bentham, 
which I draw in contrast to “conventional” and “participatory” views.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses on a “simple” or “conventional” view of Bentham as an archetypally aggregative 
theorist. That interpretation suggests that there is little, if any, significant role for public reasoning in 
Benthamite democracy. This is because the public interest is reflected through an aggregation of self-
interested votes rather than public-spirited discussion. That conclusion follows from some other 
assumptions of Bentham’s work. Three of these are particularly important. First, the belief that Bentham 
defines utility as the satisfaction of “raw” preferences suggests that discussion cannot hold value in light 
of its ability to “reform” those preferences. Second, Bentham’s quantitative utilitarianism suggests that 
public reasoning cannot be valuable in light of its ability to stimulate qualitative improvements in 
citizens’ preferences. Third, Bentham’s aggregative definition of the public interest—which Postema 
(1986) refers to as his “individualism”—means that aggregation without deliberation is, in any case, 
sufficient to reach decisions that reflect the public interest. Clearly, this suggests that the conventional 
view could leave little room for a plausible account of the value of pre-voting discussion. 
 
                                                          
1 There has been a great deal of fruitful Bentham scholarship in recent years, often sparked on by the publication of re-edited editions of 
Bentham’s works. Amongst other things, this evolving literature has produced a comprehensive clarification of Bentham’s views on 
democracy (Rosen, 1983), and the story of how and why he became a democrat (Schofield, 2006); analysis of how he believed legislators 
should use measures beyond legislation to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number (Brunon-Ernst, 2012); and explanation of 
how he believed officials should develop the skills needed to create good legislation (Bozzo-Rey, 2010). Similarly, the distributive 
implications of Bentham’s utilitarianism have been reappraised as scholars have explored the implications of the “subordinate ends” he 
suggested to legislators (Quinn, 2008). Often, this scholarship has corrected misapprehensions about Bentham’s views and, in doing so, 
presented Benthamite responses to normative questions when some observers had assumed there was none. The foundational assumptions 
behind Bentham’s ethics and political theory have also not been immune to reinterpretation, with varying degrees of success. Lyons (1973), 
for instance, suggested that Bentham intended the principle of utility to apply in two different ways to private ethics and public government.  
To take just one example, many contemporary theorists had assumed that Bentham offered little by way of an account of rights until Paul 
Kelly (1990) and others had corrected that misapprehension by analysing the importance of security to Bentham’s political theory. 
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In contrast, participatory readings—outlined in Chapter 3—suggest that public reasoning has a more 
important role to play in Bentham’s democratic theory. I draw participatory approaches from a number of 
scholars. Some of these—including Niesen and Crimmins—imply that we should reject the assumption 
that Bentham wished citizens to consider and vote according to their own self-interest. I believe that this 
would be a mistake. A self-interested view of pre-voting discussion sits more comfortably with 
Bentham’s analysis of language and epistemology, and with his argument for the secret ballot. Relatedly, 
I do not think that Bentham should be read as a deliberative democrat; contrary to arguments proposed by 
Ben-Dor. There is little to suggest that he espoused the kind of public-spirited preference transformation 
and full consensus championed by Habermas and his contemporaries. As one delegate at a recent 
conference said of Ben-Dor’s reinterpretation: “it’s beautiful…but it’s not Bentham”. In relation to public 
reasoning, at least, I agree with that verdict. Other participatory views do reflect Bentham’s focus on self-
interest. Often, however, they do not directly address central questions in the debate on public reasoning. 
 
In general, and for different reasons, these more “participatory” views of Bentham do not provide grounds 
for a reading of Bentham which answers both of the challenges outlined in Chapter 1. Some fail to 
provide plausible grounds for an interpretation of Bentham’s views (Crimmins, 2011; Ben-Dor, 2000; 
Niesen, 2011). Other accounts do provide a convincing examination of Bentham’s views, but do not 
consider questions that are directly relevant to the contemporary normative debate. Participatory views 
thus do not provide the resources we need to understand Bentham’s views and respond to the two 
normative challenges presented. 
 
In Chapter 4, I aim to outline a reading of Bentham which is consistent with the trends in his writing. This 
begins with a summary of Bentham’s logic for democracy, which was not founded on an inalienable 
public right to democratic participation. Rather, Bentham became a democrat because he came to believe 
that democracy was necessary to counter the “immediate cause of all mischief of mis-rule… [which 
was]that the men acting as representatives of the people have a private and sinister interest…producing a 
constant sacrifice of the interest of the people” (Bentham, 1818a:24).  
 
Put simply, particular interests were “sinister” when the public interest was sacrificed in their pursuit 
(Bentham, 1821a:80). Officials would only serve the public interest if they had the right kind of aptitude. 
Bentham believed that this “official aptitude” had three aspects: moral, intellectual, and active. 
Intellectual aptitude meant having the capacity to analyse and understand measures that would promote 
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the public interest (Schofield, 2006: 274). Active aptitude was the physical activity of performing one’s 
duty, rather than simply understanding it in the abstract (1989:87). 
 
Moral aptitude was most important to the role of public reasoning. It was a negative quality: the absence 
of a motivation—generally found in man—to act in one’s own interest at the expense of all other interests. 
It was not innate to the character of virtuous men. Rather, moral aptitude was to be created and 
encouraged by the environment officials found themselves in (Bentham, 1989:14-5). Low levels of moral 
aptitude were a feature of situations where officials could pursue sinister interests with little chance of 
suffering as a result. In those situations, the divergence between rulers’ particular interests and the public 
interest exposed them to great (sinister) temptation. In contrast, official—particularly moral—aptitude 
was encouraged when officials were made dependent on the public they served (Bentham, 1818a:24). 
This was essential to democracy, and central to public reasoning.  
 
That was where public opinion, and public reasoning came to the fore. Rulers were to be dependent on the 
public through elections and constitutional reform; but also through the complementary operation of 
public opinion: formalised through what Bentham called the “Public Opinion Tribunal” (POT). The POT 
was a fictitious entity that Bentham used in his constitutional writing to explain the role of public opinion. 
As Rosen states, “Bentham’s conception of the POT, on which reform depends, is not altogether clear” 
(Rosen, 1983:39). Nonetheless, the POT had some distinct features. It could speak for the public and 
serve the public interest. In particular, it performed a “censorial” function over the conduct of public 
officials. It rewarded them for good conduct, with approval; and punished them for bad conduct, with 
disapproval. In doing so, the POT created incentives for officials to serve the public interest rather than 
sinister interests. By definition, this increased their moral aptitude, on which the goodness of government 
itself depended (Bentham, 1989:4).  
 
The POT could only cultivate official aptitude, however, when it was generated by the right kind of 
participation from members of the public. In Chapter 4, I refer to this as “public aptitude”, and explore 
some of its features by drawing on a variety of different strands of Bentham’s thought. The features of 
public aptitude indicate the kind of public reasoning that Bentham valued. It is critical of—rather than 
acquiescent to—authority. It focuses on citizens’ own self-interest rather than the public interest. It 
examines language to test its relation to pleasures and pains, and expects to reach decisions through 
majority voting rather than deliberative consensus. Public reasoning of this sort both requires and 
cultivates the reasoning capacities that members of the public need to hold their officials to account. The 
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aim of this form of public reasoning is to furnish individuals with a “correct” conception of their own 
interests, and to scrutinise the conduct of officials in line with that conception: both through voting and 
the judgements of public opinion (Bentham, 1989:68). This requires scrutiny of language to militate 
against the delusions and fallacies that Bentham believed caused citizens to misunderstand their own 
interests. This view of public reasoning asks citizens to be critical of claims made by putative authority. It 
focuses on the self-interest of citizens, and analyses and reflects on the language used in discourse. 
“Public aptitude” engenders official aptitude. It is the hallmark of what Rosen calls “educated critical 
opinion” (Rosen, 2003:243). This view suggests that public participation in a form of pre-voting 
discussion is vital, but that discussion is different from the Habermasian or Rawlsian ideals. Participation 
directed toward “public aptitude” is focused on clarifying individuals’ perceptions of their particular 
interests rather than transforming them; it holds no intrinsic moral or democratic status independent of the 
benefits it confers on decision-making; and happens with no expectation of full consensus between 
participants.  
 
In Chapter 5, I examine the contemporary relevance—and limitations—of the hybrid view of Bentham by 
considering some potential objections. At an interpretive level, the “hybrid” account corrects some 
misunderstandings about Bentham’s own views. It also has some implications for contemporary theory. It 
illustrates just how much common ground there is between deliberative and aggregative democratic 
approaches. That conclusion should cause us to question some of the critiques of respective theories 
levelled by writers from these competing approaches. 
 
Principles of participation which foster public aptitude are not entirely “aggregative” (i.e. reliant solely on 
the aggregation of votes). Rather, they inhabit territory between aggregative and deliberative 
contemporary theories. Like some aggregative theories, the hybrid view is focused on the self-interest of 
participants rather than the public interest, and reflects existing preferences rather than transforming them. 
Like some deliberative theories, the hybrid view provides an account of how citizens should interact with 
one another and reflect before voting. This view therefore illustrates that there is far more common 
ground between aggregative and deliberative democratic theory than proponents of each view often 
suppose. Aggregative democrats often deride deliberationists as naïve believers in a set of ideal discursive 
conditions which may never obtain (Posner, 2003). Similarly, deliberationists can claim that their 
perspective is essential to understanding all but the thinnest conceptions of democratic procedure (Barber, 
2003:198; Fishkin, 2008). Many of those critiques are oversimplifications. We should not approach public 
reasoning by assuming that all deliberative theories must believe in the full consensus espoused by 
Habermas. Nor should we assume that aggregative theories necessarily assume the self-interest of 
participants (List & Goodin, 2001); what Habermas himself called the “egocentric viewpoint” (Habermas, 
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1989:45). Rejecting that binary distinction allows us to acknowledge views like the hybrid Benthamite 
account. 
 
This final chapter considers separately Bentham’s views, and wider Benthamite principles which can take 
inspiration from him. Bentham’s views could meet a number of objections from contemporary theorists. 
In Chapter 5, I consider four of these: the free rider problem, the danger of sinister interests within the 
Public Opinion Tribunal, questions over Bentham’s optimism about public opinion; and a challenge of 
how to deal with what Dworkin (1978) called “external preferences”. On many occasions, the nuances of 
Bentham’s views provide convincing responses to these objections. Consider the “free rider” problem. 
Some critics suggest that an account of public reasoning premised on the self-interest of participants 
would allow some participants to gain the benefits of public reasoning without the costs of participating. 
However, Bentham’s understanding of self-interest was expansive enough to mitigate that concern. It is 
likely that participation in public reasoning could create benefits for citizens which could only be 
experienced first-hand; not through free-riding. Other challenges are more difficult to counter. For 
example, Bentham did not give any comprehensive explanation of how the press—on which the POT 
depended—could itself be protected from corruption by sinister interests. This is an important, though 
surmountable, shortcoming. 
 
Chapter 5 also considers some critiques of the hybrid Benthamite view which follows broad principles 
outlined by Bentham. Three particular objections are considered, regarding: power structures, the 
aggregative mechanism, and potential for a tyranny of the majority. There is a convincing Benthamite 
response to some of these. For instance, it has been suggested that aggregative views which reflect rather 
than transforming individuals’ preferences reinforce existing power structures (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2004). However, the kind of inclusive and critical dialogue that Bentham wanted to promote would 
encourage citizens to question existing power structures, so should counter this concern. 
 
Further, the way that aggregative and deliberative principles are reconciled in the hybrid Benthamite 
approach is itself distinctive. Contemporary deliberative views often rely on contested notions of the 
public interest, or reasonable agreement. The hybrid Benthamite view, in contrast, merely encourages 
citizens to clarify and understand their own self-interests before voting. I believe that this has some 
advantages. Given the common liberal assumption that individuals should be considered the best available 
judge of their own interests—the “best judge principle” (Goodin, 1995:127)—it may be more difficult to 
manipulate citizens engaging in discussion about their own self-interest than those deliberating on wider 
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ideas. It should be more difficult to suggest that citizens have misunderstood their own preferences than to 
imply they have misconstrued the public interest, for example. Consequently, the hybrid Benthamite view 
is less susceptible to creating false consensus than many—particularly Habermasian—deliberative views. 
 
The Benthamite view is also less susceptible to important critiques levelled against Rawlsian accounts of 
public reasoning. For instance, Phillips (1995) and others have contended that Rawslian public reason is 
exclusionary. Definitions of “reasonable persons” and “public reasons” may in fact reflect existing 
orthodoxies and power structures. In turn, this means that discussion may not be open to the breadth of 
input from members of the community that it should be. It is therefore an advantage of the Benthamite 
account that it relies on no such notions. Rather, the POT was open to any individual with an interest in 
the matter being discussed. Further, it allowed a wide variety of modes of communication and 
participation. 
 
This “hybrid” interpretation thus clarifies our understanding of Bentham in relation to contemporary 
writing on public reasoning, and strengthens the view that aggregative and deliberative democracy should 
be seen as compatible, rather than opposing types of approach. This view has been championed by 
contemporary theorists like Dryzek and List (2003). 
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Chapter 1. Two challenges for an account of public reasoning 
In the coming chapters, we will explore some alternative accounts of how citizens should engage and 
communicate with one another before voting on important questions. I will refer to this general question 
as the debate on “public reasoning”. It concerns the way that members of the public, rather than 
politicians or designated experts, should reason and communicate with one another before they vote. 
 
This chapter outlines two challenges for an account of public reasoning: effective discussion, and 
preventing manipulation by elites. These two challenges are not a comprehensive list of everything that 
we might demand from a theory. They are however of particular interest. This is because they illustrate 
some key aspects of how the contrast between aggregative and deliberative political theory is often set up 
by contemporary theorists. Implicitly and explicitly, it is common to find deliberative theories which 
suggest that mere aggregation ignores essential features of democratic procedure. Similarly, aggregative 
theorists sometimes allege that deliberation is associated with a set of paternalistic assumptions, which 
can be manipulated. On this view, some deliberative theory carries with it the insinuation that citizens 
reach the “wrong” conclusions in the real world because of their deliberative failings; or those of their 
environment (Posner, 2004). As that distinction is often defined, I believe that fundamental assumptions 
made by some aggregative theories reduce their ability to explain the value of effective discussion. 
Conversely, deliberative assumptions allow a convincing explanation of the value of effective discussion 
but also create opportunities for the manipulation of outcomes by elites in doing so. Freeman provides an 
excellent summary of why aggregative views may struggle to explain pre-voting discussion: 
“individuals vote their private preferences and group interests . . . in effect they act like economic 
agents removed to a different forum. What point could there be in public discussion of their self-
seeking and competing group purposes with others who have opposing interests?” (Freeman 
2000, 373) 
 
At one end of this spectrum, a purely aggregative view would understand democracy purely as a way of 
counting the preferences that individuals already have, rather than changing them through discussion. 
Clearly, a view of this sort leaves little work to be done by discussion between citizens before voting. 
Self-interested preferences, associated with some aggregative views, are thus often associated with 
counting votes rather than persuasion through deliberation. The fact of someone else’s preference is rarely 
considered a reason to change my own, particularly when theirs is a self-interested preference. It is often 
thought that self-interested preferences lack persuasive force in the same way that someone else’s 
preference for one type of ice-cream over another lacks the ability to persuade me to change my own 
preferences for different flavours of ice-cream. 
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At the opposite extreme, an account which makes very ambitious claims about the transformation of 
preferences that can be achieved through deliberation before voting may create more opportunities for 
outcomes to be manipulated through discussion. To explain this divergence, I will examine some potential 
views of public reasoning from different approaches to democratic theory. In particular, some of the 
differences between theories commonly thought of as ‘aggregative’ and ‘deliberative’ illustrate the 
tensions between providing a plausible account of discussion and mitigating opportunities for manipulated 
discursive outcomes. Of course both aggregative and deliberative approaches are diverse and complex; it 
is important to acknowledge that complexity. Nonetheless, the debate between these two approaches is 
common in the contemporary literature on pre-voting discussion. In particular, the accusation made 
against aggregative theories by deliberationists should cause us to consider whether an aggregative 
response is possible. Similarly, the accusation—made by Posner—that deliberative theories imply a kind 
of paternalism that may lend itself to elite manipulation should prompt investigation of deliberative 
replies.  
 
A contrast between aggregative and deliberative democratic theories 
Contemporary democratic theories all endorse the idea that citizens should talk to one another, and vote. 
In explaining these ideas, however, different approaches endorse different configurations of these two 
concepts and emphasise different aspects to different degrees. In broad terms, theories are often thought of 
as falling into two broad approaches: deliberative and aggregative. Simply put, deliberative theories 
primarily emphasise the importance of talking (under certain important conditions) between citizens 
before voting; aggregative theories instead emphasise the importance of counting votes to reflect 
individuals’ interests. This distinction is, of course, somewhat stylized because democratic theories are 
usually nuanced rather than exclusively aggregative or exclusively deliberative. Nonetheless, there are 
some important differences between these types of approach, and the use of this distinction is strikingly 
common in the contemporary literature.  
 
Contemporary theorists often contrast aggregative and deliberative approaches by claiming that they wish 
citizens to vote according to different objectives. Freeman suggests that this is perhaps the clearest 
dividing line between the two approaches: 
“...the relevant distinction…concerns the object about which citizens deliberate and vote and the 
kinds of reasons that they take into account in coming to their collective decision. Whereas an 
aggregative view counsels voting one’s informed preferences regarding one’s own good or partial 
group interests…deliberative democracy counsels voting one’s deliberated judgments (or 
informed preferences) for the common good” Freeman (2000: 337). 
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The object of voting is, however, just one of a number of dimensions over which accounts of public 
reasoning differ. More fundamentally, deliberation is often “intended to change the preferences on the 
basis of which people decide how to” vote (Przeworski, 1998: 140). In many cases, its aim is to enable 
citizens to approach consensus on what serves the public interest. In contrast, aggregative theories hold 
that laws should reflect individuals’ preferences, rather than being the product of a prior process of 
deliberation that changes them. Sometimes, but not always, this reflects Freeman’s distinction above: self-
interested preferences are not held to have the same persuasive power as reasons presented during 
deliberation. Deliberative democracy holds the view that aggregation alone provides an inadequate or 
incomplete account of democracy. As Dewey said, the “counting of heads compels prior recourse to 
methods of discussion, consultation and persuasion” (ft. 2 in Knight and Johnson, 1994). Counting alone 
misses out the benefits of learning through persuasion between peers. 
 
In many ways, some aggregative and deliberative democrats approach public reasoning from 
fundamentally different perspectives; the implications of this are far reaching. Beneath these broad 
differences, however, aggregationists and deliberative theorists disagree on more specific questions. 
Below, I illustrate this distinction by explaining four of these questions. Given the breadth and diversity of 
deliberative theory, I also distinguish between “stronger” and “weaker” deliberative views to 
acknowledge that responses to each of these questions vary significantly within each approach. As we 
proceed to investigate the details of different accounts, we will discover more varieties of both 
approaches, and perhaps more common ground between them. Broadly speaking, however, the 
aggregative view suggests that it is essential for public decisions to be “positively responsive to the 
interests [preferences] of each person” (Cohen, 1999: 186), usually construed as their preferences as 
expressed at the ballot box. Particular theories across the boundaries explained above vary in respect to 
the focus, transformative power, status, and output of public reasoning. Some responses to these questions 
from different theories are outlined below to illustrate. 
 
First, consider the focus of public reasoning: what are citizens asked to reason and vote according to? 
Deliberative democracy is usually defined in opposition to expressions of self-interest, power relations 
and bargaining between participants. It typically demands that democratic processes “are oriented around 
discussing [the] common good rather than competing for the promotion of the private good of each” 
(Young, 1996:120-1). Many deliberative theories thus demand that citizens should vote according to what 
they believe will best serve the “public interest”, which may be defined in a number of ways: 
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“Usually, ‘the public interest’ is taken is taken to describe a good that is common to an entire 
society, rather than to some particular section of it” (O’Flynn, 2010:300) 
 
In order to cast their vote in this way, citizens need to deliberate together before voting in order to 
understand the common interest and what it requires. These approaches therefore ask citizens to learn 
about the public interest. This may be defined in a number of different ways, but is always more than 
“mere” self-interest. Deliberative theories thus often hold that “instead of reasoning from the point of 
view of the private utility maximiser, through public deliberation, citizens transform their preferences 
according to public-minded ends” (Young, 1996: 120-1). This is reflected by the fact that “public 
spiritedness” is commonly an important condition of deliberation. We reach an understanding of the 
public interest through talking together, with something of a shared perspective, rather than simply the 
counting of votes.  
 
Different deliberative accounts expect different degrees of commitment to public orientation from 
participants. Some deliberative theorists explicitly acknowledge that citizens may be motivated to 
deliberate by their own interests (Manin, 1987). Others hold that a public focus from citizens is part of the 
definition of properly conducted deliberation, meaning that partial or self-interested claims should not 
make it into the deliberative forum. This public focus is a common part of the type of public justification 
of arguments, in front of one’s peers, that many contemporary democrats believe is essential to good 
deliberation (Goodin, 1995: 143). The benefits of deliberation are held to depend on a variety of 
conditions, of which a move beyond the mere self-interest of participants is one. Habermas—and the 
deliberative tradition he inspired—distinguished his own approach from aggregative theory by contrasting 
self-interests and objectives beyond them. 
 
Habermas argued that when the ideal terms of deliberation obtain, participants move from strategic action, 
aiming merely at “success”, to communicative action, which is the cooperative search for mutual 
understanding. The latter aims at an agreement that is justifiable by reasons in light of the generalisable 
interests of all relevant parties, expressed through their agreement. One of the conditions for this kind of 
interaction is discursive equality: each participant is given an equal opportunity to introduce or question 
any assertion and to express attitudes, desires, and needs (Habermas, 1990:89, 1996: 305-306, 308, 2001: 
34). The aim of this kind of deliberation is the generalisable interests of individuals, reached through 
discursive consensus rather than the aggregation of individual interests through voting. It is a precondition 
of Habermasian deliberation that participants must overcome their “egocentric viewpoint” (Habermas, 
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1989: 45). I will refer to Habermasian deliberation as a “stronger” deliberative view, in part, because it 
firmly requires a public-spirited—rather than self-interested— participation from citizens. 
Of course, there are important variations between different conceptions of deliberative democracy. Some 
deliberative views place much less stringent requirements on participants to reflect generalisable interests. 
I will mark these out as “weaker deliberative” views. Take Gutmann and Thompson, for example, who 
argue that one of the purposes of deliberation is to “encourage public spirited perspectives on public 
issues... by encouraging participants to take a broader perspective on questions of common interest” 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004:10-11). These authors value deliberation in part for its public orientation, 
but they also acknowledge its ability to express and clarify self-interested and other claims. For them, 
deliberation is valuable both because it can produce decisions which better reflect the public interest, but 
also because it acknowledges something more basic: a duty of reciprocity between citizens. Although 
intended to encourage a public-orientation amongst participants, this kind of deliberation also leaves room 
for citizens to express self-interested claims so long as the reasons presented to justify them are public and 
accessible to others (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004: 4-5). “Weaker” deliberative views leave more space 
for the inclusion, consideration and expression of self-interest before voting. In this vein, Mansbridge has 
also made similar, and convincing, modifications to the deliberative project in a series of influential recent 
works. In 2010, she joined other renowned deliberative democrats to argue that a new approach was 
required towards the role of self-interest in deliberation. Rather than seeing self-interested claims as 
inimical to properly functioning deliberation, deliberative democrats should agree that self-interest, 
“suitably constrained, ought to be part of the deliberation that eventuates in a democratic decision”. 
Expressions of constrained self-interest during deliberation should thus feature prominently in a 
reformulation of “the regulative standard to which real deliberations should aspire” (Mansbridge et al, 
2010: 64). “Weaker deliberative” views of this sort still intend deliberation to produce decisions which 
reflect more than the mere self-interest of those involved. But they tend to stipulate appropriate conditions 
for the expression of self-interested claims during deliberation rather than encouraging participants to 
overcome an egocentric viewpoint.  
 
At one end of the deliberative spectrum, we thus have stronger theories. These have been modified by 
“weaker” views, more accepting of an appropriately constrained role for self-interest during deliberation. 
We therefore see a diversity of deliberative views in respect to orientation. Partly for this reason, a 
distinction between aggregative and theories, like Freeman’s, which is based on orientation alone cannot 
tell the whole story.  Traditionally, the benefits of deliberation have been associated with over-coming 
mere self-interest, particularly by those following the “stronger” Habermasian view. “Weaker” 
deliberative democrats like Mansbridge, and Gutmann & Thompson have, however, amended that view. 
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Indeed, aggregative theories do not necessarily require self-interested participation from citizens. 
Consider the (aggregative) social choice tradition. A fundamental assumption, and the fourth of Arrow’s 
conditions, of this approach “expresses fully the idea that social choices are determined by individual 
desires [citizen sovereignty]” (Arrow, 1963:29). Those desires may be collective or personal, depending 
on the details of a particular theory. These details vary, so there is a great diversity of aggregative 
approaches. I shall attempt to acknowledge this by considering two broad categories. “Rational choice” 
aggregative theories assume that self-interested preferences should be aggregated through a social 
decision mechanism. In contrast, “social choice” aggregative theories may assume either than preferences 
are self-interested, or reflect some wider considerations. This distinction also requires a caveat. Some 
rational choice theorists (Downs, 1957) endorse an ordinal view of preferences. This means that 
preferences can be considered simply individuals’ orderings of possible states of affairs. Views of this 
kind may be ambivalent about the basis on which individuals rank possible states of affairs. 
 
What aggregative views do have in common, however, is that they do not begin with an exogenous 
account of the public interest, and assess individual preferences by reference to it. For Arrow, doing this 
would require us “to assume, with traditional social philosophy of the Platonist realist variety…an 
objective social good” (Arrow, 1963:22). Instead, we should trust individuals’ preferences as a reflection 
of the interests in question. On a deliberative account, of course, valuable preferences must be the result 
of a transformation during deliberation under the right conditions, with the right information available. 
They must result from the right kind of procedure, or have the right kind of justification in underlying 
reasons. These kinds of conditions are traditionally absent from aggregative views. 
 
Among aggregative theories, the “egocentric viewpoint” criticised by Habermas is often received with far 
less, if any, opposition. Consequently, aggregative views are often also less committed to demands for 
public-spirited deliberation. Riker (1982), for example, models democratic choices in terms of the actions 
of self-interested individual utility maximisers. In doing so, he never suggests that the individuals 
involved in collective decisions should move beyond their own interests and towards the public interest. 
Similarly, rational choice theory starts from an assumption that “individual behaviour is motivated by 
self-interest, utility maximisation, or, simply put, goal fulfilment” (Petracca, 1991: 289).2 Using these 
assumptions, it then seeks to understand how individuals’ pursuit of their own goals plays out in different 
strategic situations. Two assumptions are central to this kind of analysis. First, methodological 
individualism implies that outcomes can be understood in terms of the preferences, motivations and 
                                                          
2 Again, a caveat applies here regarding rational choice theorists who espouse an ordinal conception of utility. 
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actions of individuals rather than groups or communities. Second, individuals are assumed to be rational 
in pursuit of their goals: 
“We assume that every individual, though rational, is also selfish... Throughout our model, we 
assume that every agent acts in accordance with this view of human nature. Thus, whenever we 
speak of rational behaviour, we always mean rational behaviour directed primarily towards 
selfish ends” (Downs, 1957: 27, in Petracca 1991: 294-5) 
 
Despite the diversity of aggregative and deliberative views, a basic contrast here is clear. “Weaker” 
deliberationists like Gutmann & Thompson are more permissive to self-interested arguments and 
reasoning than Habermasian counterparts. Even they, however, nonetheless stipulate that arguments 
presented must assume a “moral point of view”, so “presuppose a disinterested perspective” (2004:72) to 
be suitable for the public forum. This condition is similar to the "stronger deliberative" Habermasian view 
in that it asks deliberators to move beyond self-interest. Unlike Habermas, however, they do not expect 
that even ideally conducted deliberation should produce full consensus. They are more accepting of 
lingering disagreement after deliberation; as well as self-interested claims before it. Gutmann & 
Thompson's "weaker deliberative" view thus accepts that there will be persistent fundamental 
disagreements in society owing to epistemic factors similar to Rawlsian "burdens of judgment" (2005: 
54). We will return to this point below.  
 
The shared assumption behind both "stronger" and "weaker" deliberative approaches is “epistemic 
moralised” deliberation: that discussion is valuable partly because it encourages citizens to consider the 
questions impartially, rather than reflecting mere self-interest. The importance of public-spiritedness in 
deliberative theories is reflected by the kinds of conditions they stipulate for ideal deliberation. In turn, 
these reflect what is necessary for a full transition from “mere” interests, to deliberative “reasons”. The 
presentation of these reasons has the capacity to persuade fellow citizens and change their preferences 
rather than merely informing or clarifying them. Public orientation is thus integral to epistemic moralised 
discourse, and the potential consensus it is expected to achieve. 
 
The use of a self-interested orientation in rational choice analysis has led to a perception amongst some 
commentators that aggregative theories necessarily understand citizens’ democratic behavior in self-
interested terms. In reality, aggregative democracy is not quite so simple. Whilst some rational choice 
models may assume self-interest, aggregative models for understanding democratic decisions need not do 
so. For example, Hylland acknowledges that, according to social choice theory, “preferences can be based 
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on egoistic concentration on private consumption, on altruism, on ideal principles of ethics, or on any 
combination of these factors” (Hylland in Elster, 1986:53). More recently, Dryzek and List (2003: 2) have 
emphasized this point. They reaffirm that there is a clear distinction between conducting a logical and 
normative analysis of aggregation mechanisms (social choice) and any behavioural assumptions about 
individual beliefs or preferences. One may model the aggregation of preferences without necessarily 
making particular assumptions about the individual behaviour or motivation which produces them. Social 
choice is a group of models for understanding how the democratic inputs provided by individuals, which 
might be preferences, votes, or something else, are aggregated to produce collective decisions.  
 
It follows from these distinctions that discussion before voting under rational choice models (with the 
caveat that some are ordinal) will be geared towards informing voters’ self-interested preferences rather 
than the public interest. In contrast, aggregative theories that depart from the assumption of self-interest 
need not conceive of pre-voting discussion in such self-interested terms. The orientation of broadly 
aggregative theories lends itself to information sharing to inform how existing preferences cause citizens 
to vote. The orientation assumed by many deliberative theories, in contrast, lends itself to persuasion, 
using reasons, in a particular way. Orientation therefore implies something about whether preferences can, 
or should be transformed before voting. This takes us to the second dimension in which public reasoning 
accounts vary: transformative power.  
 
The differences between aggregative and deliberative theories are particularly clear-cut when it comes to 
views put forward about the transformative power of deliberation before voting. We have already seen 
that some deliberative theories require a more public orientation from individuals than aggregative 
counterparts do. This also implies the possibility of expressed preferences changing during deliberation in 
response to the reasons and arguments presented. On most deliberative views, this change, or 
transformation, is essential because the exchange of reasons in justification of arguments presented before 
voting is valuable in part because it can provoke citizens to reconsider their prior views and judgments 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004: 13). Many contemporary deliberative accounts place preference change at 
the centre of democratic theory. For Knight & Johnson, for example, deliberation is marked out from 
other types of communication precisely by its capacity to transform “the substance of participants’ 
preferences” (1994: 282). The idea of preference change is so fundamental to contemporary conceptions 
of deliberation that a democratic view could scarcely be called “deliberative” without it. Similarly, 
Dryzek states that deliberation “as a social process is distinguished from other kinds of communication in 
that deliberators are amenable to changing their judgements, preferences, and views during the course of 
their interactions, which involve persuasion rather than coercion, manipulation, or deception.” (Dryzek, 
2002: 3) 
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In part, preference change flows from a public-orientation demanded from citizens. It follows that since 
individuals are required to vote on the public interest—or at least something beyond informed self-
interest—they benefit from learning more about it through deliberation before voting. “Epistemic 
moralised” deliberation is required: to have due regard to the interests of my nation, I must learn from 
fellow citizens and move beyond my merely self-interested “raw” preferences. In some accounts, this 
entails that citizens have a duty to appeal only to certain types of reasons when deliberating together on 
important questions. The appropriate conditions for deliberation are thus understood to limit the content 
of how citizens may justify arguments in their attempts to persuade others while deliberating. Theories of 
this type rely on an assumption that there is a “set of public reasons that ought in principle to be shared by 
all” (Bellamy, 2009: 103). Rawls suggests that citizens have a duty to refer only to “public reasons” when 
debating “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice” (2005:214). These reasons are “public” in 
the sense that reasonable persons can affirm them from within their own “reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines” (2005:58). The Rawlsian duty of public reason thus clearly prescribes some conditions for pre-
voting discussion. Constraints of this sort can be justified either in reference to the reciprocal duties that 
citizens owe one another, or in terms of the improvements they produce in the quality of decision making 
by a community. Gutmann & Thompson, for example, appeal to both intrinsic and instrumental reasons in 
defence of their formulation of deliberation (2004: 79).  
 
Public orientation and preference transformation go hand-in-hand. For many deliberative theorists, part of 
what makes deliberation valuable is that norms associated with it promote a “concern...for the public 
interest” among citizens (Sunstein, 1993:246). Conversely, a departure from the first of these claims 
accompanies a move away from the second in many aggregative views. Preference change through 
deliberation is thus essential to deliberative democracy, but inimical to traditional aggregative democratic 
approaches. We have already briefly touched on social choice theory as a family of models to understand 
how individual preferences or votes should be combined to produce collective decisions. Accounts of this 
kind analyse ways of aggregating individual interests, or preferences, into social outcomes rather than 
explaining how they should transform before voting (Knight & Johnson, 1994: 279). Indeed, modelling 
the aggregation of preferences would be extremely difficult if those preferences were considered 
something of a “moving target” rather than fixed inputs. 
 
The lesser emphasis placed on aggregation by deliberative theorists means they positively wish this 
“target” to move. This reflects a reorientation, to some degree at least, of the individual away from her 
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own mere self-interest, and towards the community interest, Like Sunstein, Fishkin—a leading 
deliberative democrat—cites this as a key benefit of deliberation: 
“when citizens discuss public problems together they come to place greater value upon the 
interests of the broader community” (Fishkin, 2009:103). 
 
Of course, preference transformation also implies that preferences can be “improved” in some sense. The 
transformation of preferences during deliberation thus reflects the deliberative theorist’s willingness to 
step back from and evaluate individuals’ preferences. The claim that a post-deliberative preference A>B 
is "superior" to pre-deliberative preference A<B cannot be explained simply by reference to preferences 
themselves: that would be circular. Instead, deliberation causes an individual to hold a preference that is 
superior, or preferable in some way. This superiority can be explained either in (substantive) terms of the 
public interest, or by the discursive terms that produced it, because epistemic moralised deliberation was 
conducted in the “right way”. So, here again, the public interest plays a pivotal role in many accounts of 
deliberation: it provides one measure by which the value of preferences can be assessed. A deliberative 
democrat may claim that discussion has worked because participants have arrived at a preference that 
better serves the public interest; for example, A>B. Theoretically, at least, individual votes can thus be 
assessed as good or bad reflections of the public interest. The value of deliberation can be explained by its 
ability to improve preferences and promote convergence on measures that benefit all, rather than just 
some individuals or groups. An “epistemic moralised” conception is thus often thought necessary to 
explaining discussion’s importance to democracy, and preference change. 
 
In contrast, aggregative theorists model preferences by assuming that “…agents are... endowed with 
preferences that are…given and not subject to change in the course of the political process” (Elster, 
1986:105). Without some fixed or defined set of preferences to model, it would be difficult to explain and 
understand different ways in which they can be aggregated to produce collective decisions. Democracy is 
thus considered more of a “marketplace”, where citizens express their preferences through votes; like 
consumers purchasing products. These “consumers” may research the products on offer, but will not 
fundamentally change their preferences. 
 
Views on orientation and transformation tend to complement one another. Accounts that demand voting 
on the public interest demand more learning by voters, and greater potential for learning, through 
preference change. The converse is true of accounts that ask citizens to vote on self-interest. If, as some 
deliberative views contend, the public interest requires equal regard for the interests of all members of the 
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community, then it is plausible to assume that individual voters can learn from one another. Unlike 
aggregative citizens, deliberators will search for more than mere information on how different policies or 
priorities affect their existing preferences. Those preferences may or may not be self-interested; 
depending on the type of aggregative or deliberative account espoused. Deliberators will learn from other 
citizens’ experiences, changing irrational views in light of their contributions to debate. The act of 
presenting reasons, and justifying expressed preferences is thus essential to most deliberative accounts, 
but peripheral to aggregative views. Instead, aggregationists conceive of pre-voting talk as a way of 
informing existing preferences. Talk between citizens has an immense, transformative power for 
deliberative democrats. It can change their judgements, values, and world view. For many aggregative 
theorists it is, at best, a source of information for agents already endowed with their preferences. The 
transformation of preferences is made possible by the presentation of reasons that persuade others to 
change their minds. In contrast, aggregation may model the exchange of information between citizens, but 
not transformations in their fundamental underlying preferences. This leads us to the third way in which 
public reasoning accounts vary: status. 
 
As we have seen, most views of public reasoning claim that there are some benefits from discussion 
before voting. Aggregative theories generally identify some instrumental benefits that are created when 
individuals are given better information before they express their preferences. Most deliberative 
democrats also cite instrumental gains. These may include the further benefits of preference change as 
citizens reflect on their own views in light of the new arguments and evidence presented to them. For 
differing reasons, therefore, and in slightly different ways, ascribing an instrumental importance to this 
kind of discussion is a common feature of most democratic theory, whether theorists understand 
democracy in broadly aggregative or deliberative terms. Whilst a belief in the instrumental value of 
discourse is common to most democratic views, deliberative theory goes further than this. It often ascribes 
an important intrinsic value to the right kind of deliberation.3  
 
Individual aggregative and deliberative theories vary significantly on whether discussion has a further 
“moralised” value beyond its ability to improve outcomes. It is clear that aggregative theories take a 
functional approach. They usually understand the value of discussion exclusively in terms of the 
improvements it creates to decisions through increased information. Epistemic democrats like Estlund, for 
example, argue that participation in democratic deliberation is valuable primarily because of its ability to 
create better decisions (Estlund, 2008:23). For them, the central question is the instrumental efficacy of 
particular ways of making collective decisions rather than the character of the discursive procedures used 
                                                          
3 Rawls (2005) provides an intrinsic view: public reason is what reasonable persons owe one another in debate. For a contrasting 
instrumental view see Arnseon (2004). Gutmann and Thompson (2004) combine intrinsic and instrumental arguments for deliberation. 
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(Coleman, 1989:196). Similarly, Ober, for example, suggests that the value of discussion resides in the 
part it plays in “the organization of knowledge (accurate information and true beliefs) rather than simply 
preferences or interests” (2011:1).  
 
In contrast, some deliberative views ascribe different, non-instrumental, value to public reasoning. This 
can take a number of different forms. In many theories, these types of value may overlap, coincide or 
complement one another. Specifically, deliberation can be said to reflect, create, or constitute democratic 
values. Consider the first of these: the reflection of democratic values. Rawls’ (1997) theory of public 
reason has come to define much contemporary debate on this question. He suggests that citizens hold a 
duty towards one another to appeal only to reasons that are justifiable to all reasonable persons. On this 
view, the right kind of deliberation between citizens has intrinsic value: it reflects what reasonable 
persons owe one another. What Rawls calls the “natural duty of respect” is reflected by there being a 
shared basis for determining the principles that it will uphold. In line with this, citizens respect one 
another as individuals when they take account of one another’s claims and interests and act on reasons 
which they are “prepared to explain to them in the light of mutually acceptable principles” (2003: 373; see 
Rawls, 1997:156). Mutual respect is, therefore, a good that can be achieved only through the principles of 
justice that meet the reciprocity condition being publicised and understood by those individuals subject 
them. This argument goes far beyond merely asserting that well conducted deliberation produces better 
results; it ascribes a further, “moralised” value for the right kind of deliberation between citizens. 
Rawlsian public reason is intimately related to a wider, and very ambitious, normative project in political 
theory. 
 
The idea that reasoning together on democratic questions reflects duties that citizens owe one another is 
not unique to Rawls. As we have seen, Gutmann & Thompson suggest that deliberation fulfills a similar 
principle of reciprocity. That “core principle of democracy” implies that “citizens owe one another 
justifications for the mutually binding laws and public policies they collectively enact” (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004: 98). Deliberation thus acknowledges important duties between citizens. Taking 
collective decisions without appropriate deliberation would be to neglect what citizens are owed by one 
another and their community. As well as reflecting democratic values, public reasoning may also be held 
to create them. 
 
On this view, a deliberative process of reason-giving, as well acknowledging duties, is also required for 
laws to be legitimate and just (Ibid:101). Properly conducted deliberation therefore grounds two of the 
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most significant values to be found in a democracy; it both reflects duties between citizens and creates 
new ones by generating laws that are binding. This idea, that appropriate deliberation is required for 
democratic legitimacy is common to many deliberative theories. Goodin has thus gone so far as to 
generalise that deliberative theories “suppose that outcomes will be democratically legitimate only so far 
as they emerge through [an] external-collective processes of deliberation involving a free and equal 
exchange” (Goodin, 2000: 82). Similarly D’Agostino—like countless other contemporary theorists—
considers a variety of different models of public reasoning to examine whether they can provide an 
account of how, and whether political regimes are justified to their citizens (D’Agostino, 1996:57). 
Alongside this notion of justification and legitimacy, other deliberative democrats claim that deliberation 
has the capacity to cultivate and improve an “excellence of character” amongst those involved; a quality 
amongst the citizenry which “permits a democracy to flourish” (Gutmann & Thompson 2004:79). I do not 
wish to suggest that every deliberative theory does, or must, see political legitimacy in terms of particular 
type of public reasoning before voting; many do not. It is clear, however, that this kind of moralised claim 
is common to many deliberative views and goes far beyond the more functional value attributed to pre-
voting discussion by aggregative theorists. 
 
In addition to creating or reflecting a particular kind of democratic value, public reasoning is also 
sometimes held to constitute a democratic value itself. Habermas, for example, argues that the value of 
deliberation is only fully realised when certain ideal conditions obtain. These are premised on the 
demanding view that ideal deliberation takes place “Only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has 
emerged from the confines of class…and exploitation” (1997:308).4 This implies that the results of 
deliberation enjoy a particular legitimacy or value, but also that this kind of discussion between citizens 
itself actually constitutes what is valuable about democratic governance. For Habermas, appropriate 
discourse between citizens generates legitimate outcomes because norms owe their legitimacy to a kind of 
recognition that is only found in rationally motivated agreement (1999:940). These norms could not be 
generated or defined without the right kind of participation from citizens. By stipulating discursive 
conditions of this sort, deliberationists like Habermas buttress their claim that deliberation serves an 
important moral function. Decisions reached under ideal deliberative conditions are thus thought to enjoy 
a special legitimacy or value, by definition. This “status” is often tied up with the type of agreement 
expected from deliberation. This brings us to the final dimension of public reasoning accounts.  
 
Views of public reasoning also vary in the degree to which they expect citizens to reach consensus 
following discussion. Broadly, there are two general approaches to this question: consensus and 
                                                          
4 The assessment of a difficult claim like this is hardly likely to be uncontentious in any real world democracy. 
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convergence. Some views orientate discussion around the public interest (O’Flynn, 2010:300) or 
generalisable interests whilst others are directed towards the self-interest of participants. Alongside these 
variations, theories also vary in their view on the reasons that individual citizens can, or should, have for 
agreeing to principles for collective decisions. To illustrate, let us consider thinkers who examine 
deliberation in reference to wider normative questions in political theory. Consensus and convergence can 
be understood in relation to these normative questions—see above—or in isolation from them. What 
matters for our immediate purpose is the type of reasons that citizens are expected to have for agreement, 
rather than the normative implications of their doing so. 
 
Consensus views generally wish and expect deliberators to reach shared conclusions for the same, shared 
reasons. As we have seen above, Habermas, for example, argues that “insofar as norms [created by 
discourse] express generalizable interests, they are based on a rational consensus” (Habermas, ft. 71 in 
D’Agostino, 1996: 49). Aspects of Rawlsian public reason also suggest a consensus view of deliberation 
because, on constitutional essentials and matters of justice at least, it aims to secure agreement between 
citizens based on shared, public reasons. Rawls defines this kind of shared public reasoning in contrast 
with alternatives through which citizens could reach agreement for different reasons, for example merely 
“as the result of political compromise” (Rawls, 2005: 218). 
 
In contrast, convergence views of public reasoning expect agreement, when it does emerge, to be reached 
by different citizens for different reasons. Ackerman, for instance, argues “justification is to be found in 
the web of talk that converges upon it from every direction” (Ackerman, quoted in D’Agostino, 1996: 49). 
Similarly, many commentators assume that a utilitarian view of pre-voting discussion would also allow 
participants to agree for different reasons. Generally, utilitarianism suggests that actions and processes are 
right insofar as they promote happiness; often construed as the satisfaction of preferences. After all, it 
seems plausible that a utilitarian perspective should be interested in the fact that citizens reach agreement, 
and the effects of this agreement, rather than the character of their reasons for doing so. Of course, we 
shall return to details of a possible utilitarian response to public reasoning in subsequent chapters.  
So accounts of public reasoning vary in regard to the reasons they expect individuals to have for reaching 
agreement through pre-voting discussion. They also vary in the degree to which they expect agreement to 
emerge when deliberation is done in the right way. In some cases, public-spirited deliberation is expected 
to cause citizens to reach agreement as more people realise what “truly” reflects the public interest. This 
view of deliberation combines the dimensions we have considered. It suggests that reasoning together 
provokes public-spiritedness (orientation) and preference change (transformative power) because it makes 
unacceptably partial or biased preferences give way to “those that can form the basis of a public 
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consensus” (Gaus, 2003:148). Historically, an expectation of consensus of this sort has been expressed by 
great Enlightenment political philosophers.5 It reflects a view that there are reasons which are 
discoverable to all through rational discourse. Views of this sort tend to also be perfectionist in nature; 
they spell “out a set of controversial metaphysical and ethical doctrines concerning the nature of value and 
the good life... then recommend[s] political principles built upon these” (Nussbaum, 2011: 3). The shared, 
discoverable reasons, available to all, are thus those which reflect these principles. 
 
Many contemporary theorists reject the idea that discussion should be understood in these perfectionist 
terms. This rejection is perhaps most clear in Rawls’ work on public reason which makes a conscious and 
explicit effort to depart from an historic approach, which conceives of “people in a standard, or canonical 
fashion so that they might all accept the same kind of reasons” (Rawls, 2003:368). In other cases, the 
rejection of perfectionism by deliberative theories takes place through an insistence that deliberation 
should be understood in terms of its procedural rather than substantive value. 
 
Despite these significant differences, contemporary deliberative democracy does sometimes share with 
Enlightenment liberalism an expectation that properly conducted discussion before voting should yield 
agreement. Often, these views imply that deliberation will cause citizens’ judgments to align on particular 
answers that best represent the public interest, however defined. As Gaus (2003:144) notes, some 
deliberative theories hold that we should reach “full consensus” on key questions through deliberation, 
and that this should take place under the right discursive conditions. The term “consensus” comes from 
the Latin verb “consentire”, which means “agreed”. It implies that a collective decision is reached through 
agreement, rather than closed off by through voting.6 In contemporary use, it has also come to take on 
wider meanings. For example, Rawlsian “overlapping consensus” entails agreement for the same reasons 
(1997). Following the themes mentioned above, I will refer to those deliberative views which expect 
deliberation to produce consensus on important decisions “stronger deliberative” accounts. They make 
more extensive claims on behalf of deliberation, including the expectation of full consensus between 
participants, as well as giving deliberation a greater normative role and, often, permitting less of a role for 
self-interest in pre-voting discussion. 
“Stronger” deliberation before voting, therefore, plays an important role. Part of this is to allow citizens to 
approach consensus, which itself generates, reflects, or constitutes important democratic norms in many 
theories. Since we all deliberate together regarding the same question—what is best for society?—this 
kind of consensus may seem plausible. I may enter a process of deliberation with a selfish preference for 
                                                          
5 Gaus (2003) provides an interesting analysis of how convergence conceptions of public reasoning have developed over this longer period, 
and how they contrast with contemporary equivalents. 
6 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/consensus  
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building a new opera house in my home city; based on the fact that I personally enjoy opera more than 
football. I may finish deliberation understanding that a new football stadium better serves the public 
interest because more people will enjoy it, or it produces greater economic benefits for the community.  
 
"Stronger deliberative" accounts thus broadly follow the work of Habermas in respect to consensus as 
well as orientation. In contrast, “weaker deliberative” views (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004) are more 
ready to accept that even well conducted deliberation may not yield full consensus. Of course, I am 
conscious that the different dimensions we have outlined are differently configured and emphasised in 
every individual account of public reasoning. A deliberative theorist may thus be “stronger” in respect to 
orientation, but “weaker” in regard to consensus. Nonetheless, while acknowledging this complexity we 
need to make some generalisations in order to identify important trends in the literature. 
 
In that vein, let us turn to consider aggregative views, and how they regard consensus. Those aggregative 
theories which accept the behavioural assumptions of rational choice theory may ask voters to vote 
according to what they believe is good for them as individuals.7 Since the “public interest” is taken to be 
merely the aggregate of individuals’ interests, voting in this way better reflects the public interest than any 
other mechanism. The aggregation of individuals’ interests, expressed through voting, thus takes us to the 
public interest, without requiring voters to consider anything more than what is good for them. Public 
interest decisions are reached by counting votes, not talking. Logically, this makes agreement before 
voting unnecessary. An “epistemic prudential” conception of pre-voting discussion is thus implied: 
individuals should learn about their own interest before voting, rather than the “public interest” or 
interests of all. This is illustrated by a paradigm case of aggregative democratic theory: social choice. 
Here, various ways of aggregating individuals’ preferences—taken to represent their interests—are 
modeled. Unlike deliberative theories, the emphasis is on how individual preferences can be aggregated to 
produce a collective decision rather than a process of deliberation that provokes citizens to agree or before 
they vote, on a shared understanding of what serves the public interest (List, 2006). There is little 
consideration of consensus in this view because aggregation resolves disagreement. For example, some 
writers have focused on the “miracle of aggregation”, which means that good decisions can be reached 
through weight of numbers; even if many electors have mistaken views before voting (Page & Shapiro, 
1993).  
 
                                                          
7 It is possible for a theory to focus on the aggregation of “public spirited” preferences, but for clarity I focus on the idea of aggregating self-
interested preferences. This follows the caveat that aggregation may refer to ordinal preferences. 
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To sumarise, I have tried to identify some trends found across a wide variety of writing on public 
reasoning while also acknowledging the degree to which individual accounts depart from these. Broadly, 
aggregative and deliberative views differ in how they respond to four important questions: focus, 
transformative power, status, and output. Each account is different, and has its own configuration of 
positions on these dimensions. Consequently, a degree of judgement is inevitably necessary to determine 
which category best characterises a given account. Different judgments could be made. Though imperfect, 
these categories allow us to focus on some important trends and contrasts in contemporary writing on 
public reasoning. I summarise these below, in  
Table 1. Broadly, “rational choice” aggregative theories assume a self-interested orientation from citizens. 
They reflect preferences rather than transforming them; do not ascribe a special status to discussion; and 
do not expect consensus before voting. “social choice” aggregative theorists vary in respect to orientation. 
They more readily model preferences that are not self-interested because they do not necessarily make 
assumptions about the values citizens use to order states of affairs to produce preferences. 
 
On the deliberative side, “weaker” deliberative theorists are relatively permissive of self-interested 
arguments during deliberation and voting. They see the clarification of citizens’ existing positions as a 
key part of deliberation, as well as the transformation of preferences. They may or may not expect full 
consensus, or believe that deliberation has a particular and special normative value. Finally, “stronger” 
deliberative views do expect consensus before voting; and for it to be realised through transformation of 
preferences during a kind of deliberation that moves well beyond citizens’ mere self-interest. Often, they 
ascribe to that kind of deliberation a particular normative value.  
 
While imperfect, this taxonomy allows us to look across some of the terrain on which the contemporary 
debate takes place, while acknowledging that differences across categories can often be those of emphasis 
rather than absolute opposition. In the next section, we shall move on to explore some normative 
implications of these distinctions. 
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Table 1. Contemporary accounts of public reasoning 
 “Rational 
choice” 
aggregative 
“Social choice” 
aggregative  
“Weak 
deliberative”  
“Strong 
deliberative”  
(a) Focus 
(what are citizens 
asked to vote 
according to?) 
Self-interest Either self-interest 
or public interest 
Self-interest or 
public interest 
Public interest 
(b) Transformative 
power 
(does discussion 
before voting 
transform or reflect 
preferences?) 
Reflect Reflect.  Reflect and/or 
transform. 
Transform. 
(c) Status 
(Does discussion play 
a moralised role?) 
No. No.  Often moralised  Moralised 
(d) Output 
(Is consensus 
expected?) 
No. No Only sometimes. Yes 
     
Examples Riker, 
rational 
choice  
List, social choice  Gutmann & 
Thompson, Fishkin, 
List 
Habermas, 
Dryzek. 
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Two diverging challenges: discussion and avoiding manipulation 
Let us consider how other examples of public reasoning accounts could fit into this structure. Using the 
categories above, we can see some important variations. In turn, these variations have significant 
implications for how well particular theories can respond to a variety of normative questions. I want to 
focus on two of these normative challenges in particular: providing a plausible understanding of the value 
of pre-voting discussion; and limiting opportunities for the outcomes of discourse to be manipulated. 
These questions are at the centre of the contemporary debate. So often, deliberative theorists dismiss 
aggregation because it underplays the role, status, or value of pre-voting discussion. Conversely, 
aggregationists can be dismissive of deliberation. They sometimes suspect that the notions used to explain 
the deliberative ideal can be a veil for theorists’ desire to achieve particular outcomes. Underlying this 
criticism is the suspicion that accounts of deliberation may mask an underlying paternalism about how 
citizens’ preferences should be “improved”. 
Having surveyed a variety of contemporary public reasoning accounts, I believe that accounts which: 
focus more on the public interest; espouse transformative deliberation; give discussion a moralised role; 
and expect it to achieve consensus are better placed to provide a convincing account of what constitutes 
effective discussion before voting. This is largely because they give that discussion a more important 
normative role in democracy. The theorist who bases justice, legitimacy, or other important values on a 
foundation of democratic deliberation should have a convincing response when asked: “why is public 
reasoning important?” This holds even if the basis for her views on those critical values is subsequently 
rejected. In contrast, theories which deny those premises by directing discussion towards: self-interest; 
information rather than preference transformation; a functional rather than moralised role; and have no 
expectation of achieving agreement through discussion have fewer responses to the same question. If 
aggregation achieves good outcomes, why devote too much effort to talking beforehand? 
Deliberative theories have a more defined view of what discussion “should” be. They often describe what 
it should produce (consensus), and how it should work. Sometimes, this more defined view is also linked 
to specific outcomes. For example, Gutmann & Thompson argue that a “deliberative deficit” helps to 
explain society’s failure to reach conclusions they advocate on matters like healthcare and welfare (2004: 
12). I believe that arguments like this leave deliberative theorists open to a charge of elitism and 
paternalism. Where theorists establish “ideal” conditions of deliberation, and link these to substantive 
conclusions they themselves endorse, this seems to imply that other would agree: if only they deliberated 
“properly”. I believe that views of this sort leave citizens more susceptible to manipulation because they 
establish—sometimes quite prescriptive—expectations around the way that citizens should engage with 
one another. In contrast, aggregative theorists are generally more willing to simply trust the preferences 
that individuals express as a reflection of relevant interests. Some of the normative claims made by 
theories to explain the importance of deliberation also create opportunities for outcomes to be 
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manipulated. In general terms, accounts are less susceptible to allowing discussion to be manipulated 
when they: espouse self-interested discussion before voting; see the value of that discussion 
predominantly in non-transformative terms; do not believe it holds a special value; and do not expect 
consensus. A less ambitious account of pre-voting discussion may be flawed in other ways, but it has the 
advantage of offering less scope for manipulation of preferences during discussion. In contrast, accounts 
create more potential opportunities for outcomes to be manipulated when they give deliberation an 
important public-interest-focused role, through preference transformation achieved on moralised terms, 
which should reach full consensus.  
 
In short, stronger deliberative theories are good at accounting for the value of discussion before voting but 
can be vulnerable to manipulation. Aggregative theories are often poor at accounting for the value of 
discussion but provide fewer opportunities for manipulation. These two challenges therefore provide an 
interesting insight into the range of available theories: neither the stronger deliberative nor traditional 
“rational choice” aggregative can adequately answer both. Exploring accounts of discussion and 
manipulation may therefore teach us more about the distinction between aggregative and deliberative 
theory which is so commonly sketched out by contributors to the literature on public reasoning. Let us 
focus on the first of our challenges: effective discussion. Why might aggregation be considered to provide 
an inadequate account of the value of pre-voting discussion? 
Our first challenge is the principal deficiency identified in aggregative democracy by its deliberative 
critics. An accusation commonly leveled at aggregative theories is that they fail to provide a plausible 
account of the importance of discussion before voting. Barber makes this criticism when claiming that:  
“Talk to these thinkers is little more than a... preliminary to…choosing…to limit democracy to 
selection among preferences and to think of efficient decision-making as its sole measure is to 
ignore all but the thinnest features of democracy” (Barber, 2003:198). 
 
The concern here is that aggregation demotes the task of pre-voting discussion to that of informing pre-
existing, fixed preferences rather than transforming them. By doing so, Barber suggests, aggregative 
theorists ill-equip themselves to explain the importance of citizens’ interaction before voting. The 
"stronger deliberative" view responds to this concern in detail. It stipulates conditions for the just 
formation of preferences amongst individuals. These conditions themselves take on great normative 
importance in a Habermasian democracy, for example. They are held to produce full consensus in ideal 
conditions. “Weaker” deliberative views (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; 2004) also stipulate equivalent 
conditions; but with fewer claims about the subsequent agreement, and norms, they will create.  
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In contrast, some aggregative theories are believed to suggest that the aggregation of pre-deliberative 
preferences is sufficient to produce appropriate democratic decisions: no particular discursive conditions 
are necessary for them to be of value. At the root of this criticism is the fact that many aggregative 
theories suggest that the public interest is reached through aggregation of self-interested votes rather than 
enunciation of the public interest through deliberation. Further, some aggregationists like Riker (1982) 
and Downs (1957) incorporate from rational choice theory the assumption that individuals will act to 
further their self-interest rather than wider interests in the community when participating in pre-voting 
discussion. 
 
Thus, aggregative democrats are often read as failing to address the importance of discussion. Counting 
(votes) is critical to good decisions; not talking. An emphasis on self-interested voting seems to leave 
little space for citizens to transform their preferences, and learn about the public interest, through 
discussion, in the way that deliberative democrats demand. Many social choice accounts do not assume 
the self-interest of citizens at the ballot box. Nonetheless, they are wedded to the idea that preferences are 
fixed through the democratic process, and that discourse must be functional and informational, rather than 
moralised, as a result. 
Consequently, neither self-interest nor non-self-interest aggregationists can claim, as Elster does, that 
deliberation in public causes arguments to move from bargaining using interests towards the exchange of 
reasons: 
“ the effect of an audience is to replace the language of interest by the language of reason and to 
replace impartial motives by passionate ones” (Elster, 1998: 111) 
 
This seems like a fundamental difference. The absence of “public reasons”, and persuasion using them, 
makes it difficult for aggregationists to explain the value of discussion. Indeed, aggregative theories in 
general do not want citizens to move beyond interests, but instead to reflect them when voting. This idea 
is prominent in Habermas’ own characterisation of the interest-based, what he calls “liberal view”, 
theories that he seeks to move beyond. In “Beyond Facts and Norms” he captures this concept by 
explaining that the “liberal view” treats individuals as independent variables in the democratic equation, 
and conceives the “democratic process...exclusively in the form of compromises among interests” 
(Habermas, 1997: 296). Under ideal Habermasian deliberation, “participants question and transcend 
whatever their initial preferences may have been” (Habermas, 1997: 449). Exchanging arguments with 
others, under the right conditions, can thus move a citizen “beyond” her initial preferences. Without these 
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ideal conditions of deliberation, it is alleged that aggregative democracy fails to provide a plausible 
account of pre-voting discussion. It lacks an account of appropriate persuasion using reasons rather than 
merely information-sharing to inform existing preferences. Of course, the idea of persuasion using reasons 
relates to other deliberative assumptions like the capacity of pre-voting discussion to transform (not just 
inform) preferences before citizens vote; and to create consensus between participants.  
 
Under a self-interested view of aggregative democracy, an “aggregative citizen” will reason, discussing 
her vote with others to seek out the information necessary to understand how her preferences translate into 
voting intentions. She will ask how proposed policies are likely to affect her job, community, healthcare, 
and so on. She will not, however, revise her fundamental preferences—whether they are assumed to be 
self-interested, public-interested, or motivated by something else—in light of the reasons presented to her 
by fellow citizens. This is precluded by a foundational assumption of much aggregative theory: the 
independence of voters. 
 
To understand that assumption, consider a thinker who is often thought to be the father of aggregative 
democracy: Condorcet (1785). He modeled outcomes for a group of jurors facing a binary choice between 
two simple alternatives. Assuming that there is a single “correct” answer, he argued that the majority of 
members of a jury is more likely to be correct than any individual juror. This follows, assuming that each 
has an equal and independent—better than random but worse than perfect—chance of being correct. He 
reached this conclusion by multiplying out the probability that each individual juror has of reaching a 
correct decision. Doing so, however, requires that the chance of any individual juror being correct is 
independent of the chance of any others being correct (Estlund, 1994:131). This assumption explicitly 
precludes one juror, or voter, spreading a correct opinion to others through persuasion or deliberation. If 
we assume that each voter, or juror, has a better than half chance of being correct, it follows that 
increasing their number also makes a correct collective decision more likely: 
“... 250 voters at competence of 0.51 have a group competence of 0.62, while a group of 10,000 
at the same competence have a group competence of 0.98” (Estlund, 1994: 231) 
 
For Condorcet, and his followers, voting thus increases the chance of a “correct” decision through 
multiplication rather than deliberation. The assumption of voters’ independence rules out preference 
change through persuasion within a group of voters. Aggregative democrats rely on weight of numbers 
rather than persuasion to produce good decisions. To that end, an aggregative citizen listens to others to 
unearth information that informs views on how her preference(s) will be satisfied (Fearon, 1998: 45-47). 
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Aggregative theories with a self-interest orientation suggest that, in gathering information on all of these 
matters, however, she will remain focused on her own interests; and select among available options to 
serve them as best she can. After collecting information, her vote should reflect her best judgment of what 
should serve her own interests, given all of the information gathered. In other words, the task of pre-
voting discussion is to inform existing (self-interested) preferences, not to transform them. It is the way 
that our votes combine at the ballot box that increases the likelihood of good decisions rather than modes 
of talking before that. Following Condorcet, the individual voter may try to improve his competence from 
0.51 to 0.52; but not to persuade his peers to change their minds. 
 
Aggregative voters should thus focus on interests rather than deliberative reasons. The interests they 
concentrate on may either their own, or wider than this, depending on assumptions made by a particular 
aggregative theory. Thus, it is usually assumed that a type of instrumental reasoning, associated with 
aggregative approaches, is incompatible with preference change because it involves the collection of 
information rather than the transformation of preferences.8 For the deliberative theorist, this is—at best—
an impoverished view of pre-voting discussion. For Barber and others, pre-voting discussion should do 
more than merely better inform the self-interested preferences of individuals; a theory that fails to take 
account of this neglects part of the value of the democratic process. This accusation is often associated 
with a sense that mere aggregation allows “raw” or unrefined preferences to feed directly into democratic 
decisions (Fishkin, 2009). This is a common accusation, to which we shall return in Chapter 2.  
 
We may understand “raw preferences” simply as pre-deliberative: those which have not been transformed 
as a result of a process of deliberation. Deliberative theories thus have a ready response to the challenge of 
presenting a plausible account of what constitutes effective discussion between citizens before voting. 
What makes discussion vital is that it allows citizens to move beyond their raw preferences; to learn about 
the public interest from one another, and to acknowledge shared reasons about what is in the interests of 
the community. In doing so, they will sometimes be expected to reach consensus.  
 
Aggregative theorists, however, do not usually stipulate conditions for the formation of valuable 
preferences. Instead, following Arrow’s condition, the expressed or “raw” preferences of individuals are 
held to determine social choices. The aggregative democrat cannot step outside those preferences to assess 
how “valuable” or “correct” they are. Rather, preferences are taken to represent individuals’ interests, and 
these, aggregated via voting, serve the public interest. On this view, the focus of democratic theory must 
                                                          
8 Of course, if we assume that “preference change” must be defined as transformation along deliberative lines, by reference to an “epistemic 
moralised” standard, this will be true by definition. 
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be on translating individual preferences into social decisions; not assessing preferences by reference to an 
exogenous account of what collective decisions should achieve. Consequently, this suggests a form of 
prudential reasoning applies either in reference to self-interest (on “rational choice” aggregative views) or 
wider interests (on some “social choice” aggregative views). An aggregative democratic theory thus 
emphasises counting (votes) and subsequently risks having too little to say about the value of talking. 
Without a moralised conception to call upon, aggregationists are unable to conceive of the value of talking 
in terms of preference change, or the presentation of reasons, and persuasion using arguments, that are 
justified to one’s peers.  
Relatedly, in the absence of a deliberative account of the conditions under which preferences should be 
formed and revised, aggregative theories allegedly have too little to say about the context in which 
preferences should be formed (Christiano, 2002:32). Without an exogenous, public interest or procedural, 
measure of the "value" of preferences, aggregationists struggle to repel this critique, other than to simply 
assert the importance of individual preferences. Reaching the public interest through aggregation, rather 
than enlightening deliberation risks leaving us without a plausible account of why pre-voting discussion 
should matter, or take place at all.  
 
How might aggregative theories respond? “Rational choice” aggregative theories demand that individuals 
vote merely according to their own interests, which are taken to be reflected by expressed preferences. For 
these views, the range of potential responses is limited. Using Arrow’s fourth condition (citizen 
sovereignty) implies that they cannot evaluate preferences by an imposed external standard. Clearly, the 
public interest would also be an inappropriate measure by which to assess individuals’ preferences if our 
democratic theory suggests that individuals should vote on the basis of self-interest. Some “social choice” 
aggregative theories are, of course, not committed to the assumption of self-interest. They could posit that 
voters gain a better understanding of the public interest through discussion. Nonetheless, they reject the 
idea of preference change so may explain the value of this discussion only in the functional terms of 
information sharing. 
 
Consequently, aggregative views of pre-voting discussion have been thought impoverished. Without 
public-interest (or discursive) criteria for the assessment of preferences, the aggregative theorist seems 
obliged to accept the dictates of whatever expressed preferences individuals happen to form, no matter 
how unpalatable they appear. It is in this context that deliberative democrats often make passing reference 
to Bentham. Theorists like Gutmann & Thompson thus assert that: 
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“In the classical utilitarianism of Bentham, any end that anyone pursues counts as a kind  of 
utility” (1996:169) 
 
Without a plausible account of discussion, aggregative theories are bound to blindly aggregate and follow 
preferences: they cannot account for how discussion should improve them. 
 
So, while deliberative democrats can explain that pre-voting discussion is vital because it enables the 
improvement of preferences towards consensus on the public interest, aggregative democrats can offer no 
equivalent response since: 
“...they retain the “fundamental premise that there exists no procedure-independent fact of the 
matter as to what the best or right social outcome is [outside individuals’ preferences]” (List & 
Goodin, 2001:5) 
 
The implications of this premise are extensive, and have been expounded in numerous ways. An example 
of an aggregative theory and social reform is illustrative. Despite his progressive work on women’s rights, 
J.S. Mill’s (1970) democratic theory has received criticism from feminists who accuse him of a reluctance 
to criticise “raw” preferences (Annas, 1977). Without an independent standard by which to evaluate 
expressed preferences; or stipulated conditions for their just formation, Annas claims that Mill is 
committed merely to satisfying the preferences that individuals happen to hold at present, rather than 
improving them.  
 
This has pronounced effects for Mill’s writing on the emancipation of women. His commitment to a form 
of “utilitarianism” thus puts unjust, patriarchal preferences on a par with others because it appeals merely: 
“to the satisfaction of desires that people actually have, not those they would have in some ideal 
condition” (Annas, 1977:181)  
 
Annas accepts that there are other conflicting aspects to Mill’s thought. She insists, however, that the 
aggregative—or “utilitarian” as she terms it—impulse n his writing relies on this premise. This implies 
that a Millian utilitarian is bound to accept the expressed preferences of subjugated women to continue to 
be denied equal property rights as a reason to deny them this freedom. Without some moralised 
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conception of discussion, aggregative theorists are unable to explain why the “legitimate” desires of 18th 
Century women to hold property should be satisfied; but their “illegitimate” desires not to have this right 
should not be. 
 
Note the obvious answer that deliberative democrats have to this challenge. The aggreationist is 
supposedly committed to counting the “illegitimate” preferences on a par with “legitimate” preferences 
because he rejects moralised deliberation. In contrast, deliberative theorists may deem subjugated 
women’s preferences for continuing subjugation illegitimate: either on moralised grounds that they do not 
represent relevant interests, or because they were not formed under the right discursive conditions. Indeed, 
in historic conditions where women’s education was skewed towards reinforcing patriarchal norms, 
Annas herself suggests that existing preferences are illegitimate for this reason: 
“…women would collectively complain about the position of men if their education were not 
aimed at getting them to think of themselves as dependants with subservience to men as their 
natural goal.” (Annas, 1977:182)  
 
Arguments presented by Sunstein illuminate other aspects of this challenge (Sunstein, 1993:245). He 
raises the possibility that individuals’ preferences and beliefs may “adapt” to an unjust status quo; 
particularly in reference to environmental policy. If citizens’ preferences do adapt to unjust situations, 
then it is difficult to understand why expressed preferences deserve the respect afforded to them by 
aggregationists. The aggregative democratic theory of Bentham is thought, by contemporary critics like 
Richardson, to suffer from the same problem. It appears to acknowledge the preferences of all people as 
holding equal value, even in apparently unjust situations (Richardson, 2003:43). Without a response to the 
challenge of explaining the value of discussion, aggregative theories seem powerless to control the 
implications of individuals’ expressed preferences. Aggregative democracy requires such a response in 
order to challenge the contention that it must satisfy whatever preferences individuals have. 
 
It is not easy, however, to see how aggregative theories could provide such a response, without accepting 
some quasi-deliberative claims. These include: public orientation; transformative power; moralised status; 
or a consensus-generating view of pre-voting discussion. Unlike Fishkin (2009), they cannot argue that 
deliberation about the public interest, in concert with other citizens, causes us to move away from a self-
interested preference for a new opera house, to a more public-spirited preference for a new football 
stadium. Unlike Habermas (1997), aggregationists cannot say that deliberation under the right (ideal) 
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conditions prompts us to better understand the public interest. Rather, aggregative theory relies on weight 
of numbers at the ballot box to achieve that goal, not persuasive (deliberative) reasons. 
 
The aggregationist cannot assume, as Gutmann and Thompson (1996) do, that pre-voting discussion 
moves individuals beyond mere self-interest; helping them to understand the public interest through 
reason-exchange among equals. Another alternative is the “intrinsic” view that deliberation is, in itself, 
valuable. Deliberation could be seen as an acknowledgement of what reasonable persons owe one another; 
of a “value of fair cooperation among citizens on an equal footing of mutual respect” (Cohen, 1994:1505). 
This kind of claim may form part of the "weaker deliberative" argument,9 but this too is unavailable to 
aggregationists. The argument that deliberation embodies a duty of reciprocity between citizens (Gutmann 
& Thompson, 1996:52) is clearly exogenous to citizens’ preferences. It cannot be imported into an 
aggregative thesis without implying an epistemic moralised conception of deliberation; thus transgressing 
citizen sovereignty. More fundamentally, the very idea of persuasion using shared reasons while 
deliberating, is inimical to the aggregative assumption that voters are independent of one another before 
they vote.  
 
Given these constraints, an aggregative theory must provide the following in order to answer the 
challenge of effective discussion: 
 a.  some epistemic prudential, not epistemic moralised, criteria for the assessment of 
preferences which can explain how one preference held by an individual may be “superior” to 
another preference held 
 b.  an explanation of how discussion amongst citizens before voting can “improve” 
expressed preferences held without relying on deliberative assumptions. 
 
To recap; this challenge reflect the idea that discussion takes a back seat, or perhaps even becomes 
unnecessary altogether, once the main normative work within a democratic theory is being done by the 
counting of votes rather than discussion between citizens. Answering this concern could assuage some of 
the fears held by deliberative democrats about the aggregative tradition. The question remains: can an 
account which denies the importance of public spirited “deliberation”, and persuasion using shared 
reasons, nonetheless explain why discussion is important? What role remains for discussion in a theory 
                                                          
9 The different dimensions of public reasoning accounts examined sometimes pull in different directions. I have considered deliberative 
theorists who reject or amend full consensus, but endorse the intrinsic value of participation as “weaker” deliberationists. In doing so, I 
accept that could be considered otherwise in light of their views on other dimensions. 
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which supposedly endorses “mere aggregation, through majority vote, of existing, unreflective, 
presumably selfish preferences” (Posner, 2003:131)?  
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Preventing manipulation  
We have examined the principal accusation levelled against aggregative theory by its deliberative critics. 
Now let us turn to a principal criticism of deliberative theory, put forward by aggregationists. A second 
challenge for accounts of public reasoning is to explain how discussion before voting can be protected 
against domination by elites, particularly through their manipulation of the outcomes it produces. This is 
related to a particular concern about the deliberative project.  
 
Deliberative theorists like Gutmann & Thompson have specifically implied that citizens should reach 
different substantive conclusions if they deliberate better (2004:12). Thus, Posner (2004) suggests that 
providing an account of ideal deliberative conditions implies the expectation that others may agree with 
my own substantive views; if only they deliberate properly. There is a concerning potential for 
paternalism, and elitism is some strands of deliberative democracy. Providing more substantive 
explanations of the “improvement” in preferences explains the value of pre-voting discussion. It also, 
however, potentially establishes the expectation that ordinary voters can be thought to have simply failed 
in their deliberative duties, and reached inadequate conclusions as a result. The aggregative theorist’s 
suspicion is that perhaps “…what motivates many deliberative democrats is… a desire to change specific 
political outcomes, which they believe they could do through argument, if only anyone could be 
persuaded to listen, because they are masters of argumentation” (Posner, 2004). 
 
This concern is related to the idea that deliberative norms might become manipulative if they are coupled 
with a belief that citizens have reached the “wrong” conclusions. A number of interpretations of 
“manipulation” have been put forward. These generally hold that a deliberating citizen is manipulated 
when placed in "a situation in which elites induce citizens to hold opinions that they would not hold if 
aware of the best available information and analysis" (Zaller in Shapiro, 1998:514). Similarly, Klemp 
defines manipulation in terms of two necessary and sufficient conditions: 
Agent B is said to have been manipulated where “agent A uses hidden or irrational force” to 
affect B’s choices and “agent A acts intentionally” (Klemp, 2011: 60) 
 
This definition has several elements. Klemp’s view of manipulation involves two agents, and requires that 
one agent influences an outcome through the use of force over another. The manipulated party is thus 
somehow made to play his part in that outcome because his choices are affected rather than freely chosen, 
and independently determined. It is because B’s choices are affected by A; rather than consciously and 
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independently determined in an informed way, that the means of manipulation is hidden. It does not 
engage B’s capacity to make an informed choice. The force exerted may alternatively be irrational, 
because it does not reflect the appropriate consideration of relevant reasons that B would ideally give to 
the question at hand. Political scientists have identified and studied a number of different ways in which 
deliberators may be manipulated (Druckman & Nelson, 2003). These include the use of framing effects to 
make a particular outcomes more likely. While considering whether an extremist political group should be 
allowed to protest, for example, describing the question in terms of free speech, or in terms of public 
safety may make opposite results more likely (Druckman & Nelson, 2003:731). Critics have identified 
this as a danger of deliberation, since “elites shape citizens’ views on matters of public concern by 
framing them in persuasive ways” (Stokes, 1998: 124-6). 
 
It is important to be specific about the kind of manipulation we are concerned about here. There is an 
extensive literature on agenda manipulation: how the order of choosing between options affects how 
preferences translate into decisions.10 This is not, however, our focus. Agenda manipulation is a danger 
for all democratic accounts which require voting, so tells us little about different conceptions of pre-
voting discussion. Rather, our focus is on the process of participation before voting; how preferences 
might be manipulated during this; and how well accounts of public reasoning conceptualise, and combat, 
that danger. 
 
There are two broad ways of explaining why manipulated outcomes are undesirable. First, we may object 
that manipulation does not respect the autonomy and dignity of the individual being manipulated. Perhaps 
there is something intrinsically wrong about not allowing individuals to make choices in an informed way 
which allows them the opportunity to make up their own mind rather than, perhaps inadvertently, 
mirroring the views of others. Effectively controlling the decisions made by another person does not 
respect their autonomy to make that decision for themselves. It could also be argued that manipulation 
entails failing to treat the subject of manipulation with the respect they deserve (Sunstein, 2015:7). These 
objections suppose a particular type of ethical view: they object to the character of manipulation, and the 
fact that it fails to afford individuals what they have a right to, rather than its consequences. The 
deontological objection to manipulation is that it fails to observe the right of deliberators to take a 
decision themselves.  
 
                                                          
10 See, for example, (Dietrich & List, 2007). 
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Alternatively, manipulation could be wrong because it leads to worse outcomes than available 
alternatives: it fails to serve the good of those concerned. This “welfarist” objection plausibly supposes 
that the outcomes of manipulated agreement or action will not serve the interests of individuals involved 
as well as their own informed and independent decision-making could. This relies on something 
approaching the “best judge principle.”11. It rests on the assumption that, under the right conditions, 
individuals themselves are better at assessing what will serve their interests, than potential manipulators 
can be. Under the right conditions, therefore, her choices further her welfare more effectively than theirs 
would do. 
 
The welfarist objection might not condemn every instance of manipulation in every circumstance. It is 
conceivable that some sufficiently wise and informed manipulator might be justified in some unusual 
situation in producing a particular outcome.12 It is likely, however, to condemn manipulation of most 
kinds in most contexts. The welfarist view is evident in many contemporary instances of regulation where 
practices which resemble manipulation are permitted in light of the benefits they are believed to confer. 
For instance, behavioural economists like Laibson and Choi (Choi et al, 2003) have shown that consumers 
tend to follow default pathways of action when presented with complex choices. Here, the default is 
defined as a course of action to which the individual will remain committed unless she incurs some cost 
by actively choosing to opt out (Ibid:2). The costs involved may simply be the minor decision costs of 
opt-out. In part, this is explained by a tendency to procrastinate when faced with long term decisions. In 
cases like this, the choices made by consumers, even when they are given the time and information 
needed to assess their options, often do not reflect their best interests: “people may decline to change from 
the status quo even if the costs of change are low and the benefits substantial” (Sunstein, 2011: 1351). 
Behavioural insights like these have been summarised by the Thaler and Sunstein in “Nudge: Improving 
decisions about health, wealth, and happiness” (2009) 
 
Research of this sort has led to regulatory changes in a number of countries to re-orientate defaults for 
consumers to provide better outcomes. In the UK, for example, legislation passed in 2008 and 
implemented from 2012 was used to switch the default option for UK workers from not saving for 
retirement to saving into a plan provided by their employer.13 Whilst these workers are offered the option 
to opt out, very few choose to do so (HMG, 2013). Debatably, the right to opt out could render this an 
                                                          
11 For an explanation of the implications of this principle, see (Goodin, 1995:127) 
12 As we will see in subsequent chapters, Bentham interestingly presented arguments of this kind himself in his early career. Whilst he never 
departed from the view that the rightful end of political decisions was the public utility, the early Bentham sought that end by offering 
evidence, advice and information to a benevolent dictator, who could effectively manipulate his subjects through indirect legislation; the 
ability to shape their incentives and perceptions.  As Schofield (2006) and others have illustrated, it was only later in his career, from around 
1803, that Bentham conclusively became a democrat and argued that voting by citizens rather than simply decision making for them was 
essential to public utility.   
13 For a brief overview, see The Behavioural Insights Team, 2014. 
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active choice for some consumers. In reality, the effect of consumer inertia rather than active, deliberative 
decision making has been that over 90% of those automatically enrolled since October 2012 have 
continued to save rather than opting out of doing so. That policy received widespread support on 
essentially welfarist grounds: there was strong evidence that regulating to shift this default would benefit 
consumers in the long-term by increasing participation in retirement saving.14 Exceptions like this, where 
apparent manipulation is accepted on clearly welfarist grounds are, however, rare. Both the welfarist and 
intrinsic perspectives provide strong reasons to object to voters being manipulated during pre-voting 
discussion. It is important that an account of public reasoning responds to this danger, and mitigates the 
opportunities for manipulation to take place during pre-voting discussion. 
Responses to the danger of manipulation often follow the four dimensions outlined above: orientation; 
transformative power; status and expectation of consensus. Deliberative democrats usually claim that 
manipulative influence is precluded by the conditions which define properly-conducted deliberation. 
James Fishkin has extended that argument by arguing that we cannot even understand what manipulation 
is, much less counter its threat, without some conception of deliberation. In “When the People Speak 
(2009), Fishkin provides a wide-ranging, and compelling account the benefits of deliberation between 
citizens before they vote on questions which are important to their community. The book contains detailed 
analysis of how deliberation in carefully designed public forums can lead to better decision-making.  
 
For Fishkin, part of what makes decisions from these forums better than the outcome of what he calls 
“raw public opinion” is that it produces a more developed and mature response to the facts, which cannot 
so easily be swayed or manipulated. In contrast, “[r]aw public opinion is vulnerable to manipulation 
because it is volatile, based on low information levels, susceptible to misinformation, strategically 
incomplete information, and priming. In the setting of a deliberative microcosm, a scientific sample of 
ordinary citizens should become thoughtfully empowered rather than manipulated.” (Fishkin, 2009: 125). 
This research suggests, therefore, that it is a central quality of well conducted deliberation that participants 
move beyond their initial views which can be easily changed by suggestion and the framing of 
information and towards a stable and reliable set of views which cannot be changed so easily to reflect the 
interests of others. Deliberation immunises against manipulation. To do so, however, it must fulfil some 
important conditions. The quality of deliberation, according to Fishkin, depends on five important 
characteristics which essentially distinguish deliberation from much ordinary conversation: information, 
substantive balance, diversity, conscientiousness, and equal consideration (2009:34). 
 
                                                          
14 For an overview, see: (DWP, 2010). 
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The first of these conditions requires that participants should be given access to “reasonably accurate 
information that they believe to be relevant” (Ibid). Substantive balance requires that arguments presented 
from one side or perspective should be answered by considerations offered by those who hold other 
perspectives. Diversity implies that discussions should be broadly representative: that “major positions in 
the public are represented by participants”. Participants will fulfil the need for conscientiousness to the 
extent that they sincerely weigh the merits of arguments presented. Finally, equal consideration ensures 
that the arguments presented by different participants are considered on their merits; irrespective of who 
has presented them. 
 
Together, these conditions are meant to imply that a deliberating group reaches decisions in the right way. 
For the group, they provide the equivalent of an individual’s informed consent before a medical 
procedure. They assure that a significant level of understanding, reflection and intent was present for 
decisions on policies, for which “we all have to live with the results” (Ibid). High quality deliberation is 
thus likely to secure the benefits of better decision-making and reflect a more balanced and informed set 
of judgements in response to relevant facts (Fishkin in ed. Cheminant, 2011:34). Conscientious 
deliberators meet to listen to opposing arguments and assess the reasons used to justify them. They do not 
simply proceed with fixed preferences and reason instrumentally about the best ways available to satisfy 
them. This is often said to be a key dividing line between deliberative and non-deliberative democratic 
views. Phillips, for instance, claims that the “common core” of deliberative theories is a sense that 
political engagement can “change initial statements of preferences and interest”. The alternative, she 
suggests, is to conceive of “political activity primarily in terms of instrumental rationality” and 
“government as engaged in aggregation” (Phillips, 1995:149).  
 
Conversely, the absence of these conditions diminishes the quality of deliberation and is likely to erode 
the quality of the judgements it produces. For instance, an imbalance in the information presented is likely 
to skew resulting decisions. Good quality deliberation thus, by definition, does not allow participants to be 
significantly misinformed or imbalanced in their collective decision making. It also has a further 
important characteristic, beyond this. Quality deliberation, as Fishkin describes it, has the ability to 
immunise participants against manipulation. It moves them forward in their own thinking on a particular 
question to a point where they are less liable to be unduly influenced by imbalanced or manipulative 
arguments which do not reflect the public interest. As a consequence, “Imbalance in the argument pool... 
has little effect on those who become more informed” (2009: 127) in this way.  
Part of the aim of this deliberation is thus to protect participants against being misled by an imbalanced 
set of information in future. Imbalance in the pool of arguments presented may happen by accident. It 
46 
 
could also be the result of deliberate, perhaps self-interested, intervention. It is only where intentional 
intervention of this kind takes place that Klemp’s (2011:60) definition of manipulation will be satisfied. 
Like Fishkin, Sunstein also describes manipulation in contrast with deliberation. For Sunstein, the 
“problem of manipulation arises when choosers justly complain that because of the actions of a 
manipulator, they have not, in a sense, had a fair chance to make a decision on their own” (Sunstein, 
2015:6). There is therefore a distinct contrast between deliberative choices, made in an informed and 
reflective way, and manipulated ones which have been skewed by influences which do not appeal to 
participants’ capacity for rational and informed reflection.15  
 
Whether on intrinsic or welfarist grounds, the danger of manipulated outcomes has some likely 
implications for a view of how citizens should reason before they vote. Manipulated reasoning before 
voting will fail to respect the autonomy or dignity of voters on the former view, and will produce worse 
decisions on the latter. In this context, we have seen that Fishkin argues good quality deliberation both 
rules out manipulative influences by definition and immunises participants against manipulative 
influences when they take important decisions. He also goes on to make a stronger claim; that some form 
of deliberative democratic view is not only potent at countering manipulation but essential to 
understanding what it is. 
 
Thus deliberation reflects the appropriately informed and considered views of all participants, reflected 
through the fairness of the conditions in which they engage with one another and the sincere, committed 
spirit in which they do so. In contrast, manipulation denies citizens the ability to reach decisions in that 
way. Deliberative democrats therefore provide a starting point for understanding manipulation. They 
begin to outline the conditions or circumstances whose absence defines, or at least facilitates, the 
manipulator’s success. These deliberative conditions are vital because they are the background against 
which voters form preferences which are then counted at the ballot box. A deliberative account therefore 
provides a description of appropriate conditions for preference formation. It is in distinction to this notion 
of appropriate discourse before voting that a definition of, and antidote to, manipulation is found. That 
definition usually focuses on the information, consideration, and legitimate influence, that citizens should 
be subject to before they vote.  
 
                                                          
15 Unlike manipulation, coercion is transparent to all concerned. A coerced agent may face a threat associated with noncompliance, but he 
will be aware of this threat. To illustrate this difference, imagine a strong opponent of abortion considering how to vote in a forthcoming 
U.S. election.  If I wanted that person to vote Democrat, I could prevent him finding out that many Democratic candidates are pro-choice. 
Concealing information in this way is, Klemp contends, a paradigm case of manipulation; it takes effect without the victim being aware: 
“When I get you to vote Democratic by depriving you of information, I take away your choice as to whether to comply with my wishes...I 
simply change your actions invisibly, without your knowledge, choice, or consent” (Klemp, 2011: 62). 
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An example might illustrate why manipulation is such a concern. Consider occasions in history when 
voters have received misleading information. For example, the Zinoviev Letter, was published four days 
before the UK’s 1924 General Election.16 It is widely thought to have given British voters a misleading 
view of the degree of likely integration between UK Communist Party, the Labour Party, and the wider 
international communist movement. Estimates vary as to how significant its subsequent effects were on 
the electoral fortunes of the nation’s first Labour government. There is, however, little doubt that some 
voters were given misleading information by the press—in 1924—when the letter was reported as 
genuine. Later claims by newspaper proprietor Lord Rothermere to have won a hundred seats in that 
election17 corroborate suspicions the story was deliberately manipulative rather than merely accidentally 
misleading. Fishkin’s view implies that in order to define or understand what is wrong about instances of 
manipulation like these, one needs an account of the appropriate conditions for preference formation. 
Without a view on what the right conditions for voters to make their decision in 1924 were, we are unable 
to say what was wrong about the provision of misleading information, manipulation or imbalance in the 
pool of arguments expressed through the media. If we want to object to cases like these—Fishkin 
implies—an account of deliberation is required to understand what goes wrong when voters are 
manipulated. The acknowledgement that there is something wrong about individuals being misled or 
manipulated before they make important decisions thus inevitably leads to a deliberative view of decision 
making. For Fishkin, this is because: 
“Once the issue of preference formation is highlighted, then there are grounds for demanding that 
people get good information, have access to arguments on competing sides, and have the chance 
to weigh the merits of those arguments—in short that they deliberate to some degree” (Fishkin, 
2009: 37).  
 
Conversely, this argument has implications for non-deliberative views. These accounts, since they do not 
attend to the importance of the conditions for preference formation, must instead focus on the ways in 
which preferences are aggregated. This would be problematic if it meant that a view of public reasoning 
was, for example, content to simply aggregate the preferences expressed at the end of a set of misleading 
discussions based on incorrect information and manipulation. Elsewhere, Fishkin equates these alternative 
approaches with what he calls “competitive democracy”, a view of voting which is more concerned with 
the process of counting votes and competition between governing elites, than reflecting the will of “we the 
people” through decisions. (Fishkin, 2009:85). 
 
                                                          
16 See Andrew, (1977).  
17 See Taylor (1972:223-41) 
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Fishkin’s research suggests that some view of the appropriate conditions of pre-voting discussion is 
required to understand the threat of manipulated outcomes. I do not believe, however, that anything in 
Fishkin’s argument dictates that an account of this kind must be “stronger” in the Habermasian 
deliberative sense or even “deliberative” at all. The research does demand, however, that an account of 
public reasoning must have some account of appropriate conditions of pre-voting discussion. In some 
way, it must answer the challenge of explaining what constitutes “effective” discussion. It does not, 
however, dictate that any particular conception of the orientation; transformative power; status; or 
consensus-generating ability of that discussion is essential. Below, I explore how different contemporary 
accounts explain and seek to negate the threat of manipulated outcomes. 
 
First, in respect to orientation, we have seen that many deliberative theories demand a public orientation 
from citizens when they engage with one another. Asking citizens to move beyond their own interests and 
consider those of the whole community, however, can itself present opportunities for manipulation. In 
particular, there is a danger that what can appear to be in the interest of “the public” often turns out to be 
in the interest of its dominant members. The distinction between public and private interests can become 
blurred (O’Flynn, 2010:312). This blurring is problematic if we rely on pre-voting discussion to reflect 
the public interest. Clearly, conflating public and private interests could directly de-rail that enterprise. If 
this is the case, deliberators may be manipulated to reflect the interests of dominant persons and groups. 
This is, therefore, a particular danger for stronger deliberative views which most emphasise public-
orientated deliberation. Whilst the boundaries between different interests may be blurred under any type 
of public reasoning, these conflations are likely to have less effect under accounts where citizens are not 
asked to deliberate on the public interest at all. Citizens’ mistaking particular interests for the public 
interest is likely to be a less serious problem for public reasoning accounts which ask citizens to vote 
according to their self-interest, for two reasons. First, there may be fewer—potentially misleading—
references to the public interest in discourse before voting, because these would not be directly relevant to 
the orientation of debate. Second, where voters do nonetheless conflate the public interest with particular 
interests, this should not itself bear quite so directly on how they vote because they are not—in any 
case—voting for the whole community.18  
                                                          
18 The potential for deliberation to fail in this way is widely acknowledged by contemporary theorists. For instance, the use of symbols in political 
discourse can be used to manipulate opinion. It is understood by many political scientists to evoke “rather unthinking, reflexive, affective 
responses...rather than...calculations of probable costs and benefits” (Sears, 2001:17). Symbols might be used in all sorts of ways in political 
discourse, whether they refer to public interest or self-interest.  In studies of this sort, symbols are defined as focusing on “some enduring 
evaluative predisposition”, created at an early stage in a person’s psychological development (Sears, 2001:16). Defined in this way, their featuring 
political discourse is likely to produce manipulated results.  
This danger would be of relatively little concern  if the effect of symbols in political discourse could be reversed or mitigated through 
deliberation. There have been many studies to demonstrate that well-conducted deliberation can have that effect18.There is, however, evidence 
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In contrast, many, particularly “stronger”, deliberative theories attempt to correct these potential sources 
of manipulation through a form of deliberation aimed towards the public interest. This poses an additional 
problem. Contemporary theorists of political language have found evidence that abstract language 
commonly used in debates like these can lead citizens away from a measured and rational assessment of 
costs and benefits. Edelman, for instance, concluded that abstraction—for example towards notions 
associated with the public interest—is frequently used to justify policies without accurate reference to 
their real costs and benefits: 
“The revenue service deprives people of money, almost always involuntarily; the military draft 
imposes involuntary servitude... Usually the rationale for such restraints is an ambiguous 
abstraction: national security, the public welfare, law and order. We do not experience or name 
these ambiguous and abstract objectives as any different from goals that consist of concrete 
benefits, such as traffic control and disease control. Linguistic ambiguity spreads the potent 
rationale of these latter types of benefits to justify far more severe constraints and deprivations 
(including death in war) in policy areas in which benefits are non-demonstrable and doubtless 
often nonexistent.” (Edelman, 1974: 301). 
 
Abstract language is therefore another potential means of manipulation. In this respect, theories which are 
directed at self-interest hold an advantage because they are less reliant on a form of discussion between 
citizens which can be manipulated; both by conflation of public and private interests, and by ambiguity of 
language. An account which makes less ambitious claims on behalf of pre-voting discussion is less likely 
to expose participants to potential manipulation through conflation of public and private claims, or 
through abstract language associated with generalisable interests, rather than particular ones. 
 
This issue is thus particularly pertinent for those deliberative theories which see public reasoning in 
moralised terms. This gives pre-voting discussion a more significant role in democratic theory and helps 
to explain why discussion before voting might be important. It also, however, creates a new set of 
demands on citizens. Consider the effects of conceiving of deliberation in moralised terms as generating 
important normative values like legitimacy and justice. If, as seems likely, moralised deliberation of this 
sort also involves reference to abstract notions, there will be more opportunities for manipulation of those 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that early acquired dispositions persist through an individual’s life, and continue to shape their judgments (Sears, 2011:20). This particular mode 
of manipulation could be a danger for all theories of public reasoning, whether aggregative or deliberative. “rational choice” aggregative theories 
might attempt to weed out this effect through a process of discussion directed towards voters’ self-interest. 
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terms in their use. Talisse (2009: 54-58) has linked these kinds of damaging discursive norms with the 
epistemic criteria stipulated by contemporary (particularly Rawlsian) public reasoning accounts. In these 
views, the moralised role of discussion creates particular duties, and expectations, on those participating. 
These, in turn, have the capacity to limit discussion and allow its outcomes to be manipulated. Notions of 
reasonable persons and acceptable reasons have the potential to be manipulated to diminish the input of 
some citizens. It is thus an advantage for accounts of public reasoning if they can explain the value of 
discussion without recourse to these.  
 
It is partly for these reasons that some (“weaker”) deliberative democrats are less stringent in the public 
orientation which they believe properly conducted deliberation demands of citizens.19 Accounts of this 
sort are likely to be less susceptible to allowing the manipulation of outcomes in this way. Similarly, 
“social choice” aggregative views are likely to be susceptible to manipulation in this way only to the 
degree that they demand a public-interested perspective from discussants. Of course, this varies 
significantly between specific accounts. For similar reasons, “rational choice” aggregative theories are 
extremely unlikely to allow manipulation through citizens being encouraged to conflate the interests of 
dominant participants with those of the public at large. Since these views do not require a departure from 
the voter’s own self-interest, the question (or misunderstanding) of what constitutes the public interest is 
less likely to arise at all.  
 
The same principle applies to other dimensions of accounts of public reasoning. A transformative 
conception of pre-voting discussion also carries with it some danger of manipulated outcomes. Of course, 
preference change has both positive and negative implications. It is possible that deliberation will cause 
individuals’ preferences to align on measures which serve the public interest, as intended, and improve the 
quality of decision making. It is also, however, possible that expressed preferences could worsen. They 
may change in line with errant, or mistaken, views of the public interest in a way which reflects 
manipulated discourse. Transformative theories are therefore subject to both the potential gains of well-
conducted deliberation, and the potential problems of manipulated discussion. In contrast, non-
transformative theories are immune to both. According to a transformative account, the potential for 
manipulation is a necessary risk of conducting the kind of deliberation. This is essential to producing 
public-interested decisions. Without it, citizens’ pre-deliberative views would be simply aggregated to 
produce decisions that do not serve the whole community. Imagine, however, that it is possible to reach 
the same result (decisions that serve the public interest) without recourse to a transformative conception of 
public deliberation. This would make the same, positive, result achievable without the risk of preferences 
                                                          
19 See, for example, Mansbridge (2006), Young (1990) 
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“worsening” because of transformations that have been manipulated by dominant voices. A non-
transformative account, that can reach the public interest, for example through aggregation, would 
therefore be at an advantage over transformative counterparts in respect to preventing manipulated 
outcomes. 
 
In theory, at least, a successful aggregative account offers many of the benefits attributed to successful 
deliberation, but without some of the potential pitfalls. It would provide fewer opportunities for 
manipulation, if a reliable aggregation of self-interested preferences could be shown to take place. The 
less ambitious role attributed to discussion by aggregative theorists has both advantages and 
disadvantages. My claim here is that successful aggregation of votes can do the normative job often 
attributed to deliberation. This means that there is less need to risk potential manipulation in search of 
completion of that job during pre-voting discussion. Of course, it is also possible that a pre-deliberative 
preference could be the product of some prior manipulation; or that no such aggregative mechanism exists 
for combining self-interested preferences. Those questions are, however, outside of the scope of our 
current focus: the normative merits of different accounts of public reasoning, rather than wider democratic 
theory. To consider public reasoning in its own right, we need to assume that citizens approach discussion 
with preferences which reflect their own interests. The relevant question for accounts of public reasoning 
is: “what should happen next?” 
 
Aggregative views are less reliant on preference change. They are also less reliant on certain discursive 
norms. This is a potential advantage in respect to manipulation, because those norms may be used to 
manipulate citizens’ deliberative participation. The discursive ideal put forward by “stronger” deliberative 
democrats relies heavily on there being the right kind of cultural background against which discussion can 
productively take place. In non-ideal conditions, the potential for manipulated discursive outcomes could 
become a significant problem. Contemporary theorists often claim that justifying decisions to the public 
has an important “civilizing” effect on governors. It is important to remember that this too, like the other 
benefits associated with deliberation, is contingent on certain social norms against which discussion takes 
place. To understand this, it is useful to take a look at how the views of one very prominent democratic 
theorist, Jon Elster, have evolved over time. In 1998, Elster famously argued that the presence of a public 
audience to which officials feel the need to justify their arguments in terms of the public interest imposes 
constraints on the actions and arguments that those officials subsequently pursue. Self-interested officials 
may make “public interest” arguments to justify views which are actually based on mere self-interest or 
prejudice. By appealing to the public interest in this way, however, they then become subject to two 
constraints: “imperfection” and “consistency” (1998:104). The former means that the official will need to 
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ensure that his ongoing “impartial” arguments are not seen to too closely mirror his own interests20 since 
this would undermine their credibility: 
“If the impartial justification corresponds perfectly to the speaker’s interest, the disguise may be 
too transparent to work” (1998: 102)  
 
Consequently, he will have an incentive to ensure that his subsequent “impartially” justified arguments 
are an imperfect reflection of his own interests. Similarly, justifying an initial argument on grounds of the 
public interest also constrains the positions that an official can take: self-interestedly, she will wish to 
appear consistent. An official who argues for a policy that aligns with his self-interest will be seen as 
opportunistic if he then deviates from it when it stops serving his needs (1998:104). 
 
Together, these constraints “civilise” the claims made by officials during deliberation. Elster’s argument 
interestingly relies on the self-interest of the officials rather than their public-spiritedness. It provides an 
explanation of how a deliberative setting can encourage officials to make proposals that serve the public 
interest, even if their true motivation is self-interested. Unlike idealised accounts, his argument does not 
rely on the realisation of ideal discursive conditions. Like other deliberative theses, Elster’s argument is, 
however, reliant on the dominance of a discursive norm which favours justification in terms of public 
interest, and provides incentives for participants to appear impartial in its pursuit. This is more likely to be 
associated with epistemic moralised than epistemic prudential reasoning.21 The former more often 
espouses discussion in pursuit of the public interest, which implies the potential for citizens to persuade 
one another, using reasons which reflect that end. It is likely that many “rational choice” aggregative 
audiences will be more swayed by arguments that are relevant to their own interests, rather than 
“impartial” appeal to the public interest. “Rational choice” aggregative citizens reasoning together will 
not need to appeal to ideas like the "public interest" as much as deliberative citizens because their task is 
prudential. The aggregative citizen will listen to those claims that she believes bear directly on her self-
interest, however. The exact details of the kind of public reasoning that an aggregative account 
encourages will determine how relevant the consistency and imperfection constraints are to aggregative 
officials.  
 
                                                          
20 Note that the reference to his perceived interests does not appear in Elster’s account. This will be important in subsequent chapters when 
we contrast the role of hypocrisy under a Benthamite account. 
21 This is not necessarily only because officials will never appeal to what is “good for society” under an epistemic prudential system, but 
because the culture of such a system is less likely to esteem public spiritedness over self-interest quite so much as an epistemic moralised 
system 
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More recently, however, Elster has also conceded that this “civilising force of hypocrisy” is itself 
contingent on public esteem for public-spiritedness over self-interested motivations, and that this may not 
apply in many cultures (2011), perhaps even including the United States. Without a public disdain for 
self-interested arguments, officials will not feel the full force of the imperfection and consistency 
constraints because being “exposed” as self-interested would not discredit them. This underscores how 
reliant Elster’s argument for the benefits of public justification is on an epistemic moralised culture which 
esteems impartiality and appeal to public interest arguments. Without that culture, the hypocrisy of 
officials cannot civilise their behaviour. This implies that deliberative accounts which assert the benefits 
of public justification as a response to the potential self-interest of elites must also show why their—
sometimes implicit—assumption of public esteem for impartiality holds. We can also expect them to 
show how their argument works in conditions where this assumption does not apply. Conversely, an 
aggregative case for preventing manipulation of discursive outcomes does not rely on public respect for 
impartiality, so will be at an advantage over deliberative counterparts. In general, aggregative views are 
less reliant on these cultural factors. 
 
This is particularly interesting in light of Elster’s admission that many cultures do not esteem public 
spirited motivation above “partial” claims.22 The importance of discursive norms is also illustrated by an 
interesting cultural example from Gambetta. In his essay “Claro!”, he notes the effects that a particular 
type of discursive culture can have on the efficacy of debate. Under such a culture, norms dictate that an 
individual’s failure to win an argument on one particular question discredits her, and causes her to be less 
respected when other questions are discussed amongst citizens. A “Claro!” culture takes hold when wider 
assumptions about knowledge are prevalent: expertise is seen as “indexical” (Gambetta, 1998: 24-5) or 
general rather than subject-specific; individuals are seen, in general, as learned or not, rather than expert 
in some areas and ignorant in others. 
 
These norms shape the incentives that societies create for individuals. In particular, they provide a strong 
incentive for individuals to conceal their ignorance of a particular question. “Claristas” pretend that they 
already know what fellow citizens were going to say: that their point was clear, or obvious (“claro”). 
Individuals debating together change their approach to public discourse because they have much, in social 
standing and influence on future debates, to lose from “losing” any particular debate. This promotes 
discussion on the basis of reputation rather than reasons. “Winning” or “losing” debates will therefore 
come to reflect the forcefulness of those taking part rather than the merits of their arguments. “Claristas” 
do not learn together about the public interest; or other relevant reasons for a collective decision. Instead, 
                                                          
22 Elster’s thesis seems to discount the possibility that a deliberative audience could be so manipulated that they cannot discern between 
“public” claims and self-interested claims from officials. This is a danger that the Benthamite account takes more seriously. 
54 
 
they scrap for status; only taking on discursive battles that they can be confident of winning. Assumptions 
about knowledge thus change incentives. These, in turn, alter the nature of debate. A type of “discursive 
machismo” takes hold, and prevents the cooperative learning about the public interest on which 
deliberative democracy relies: “the distinction between arguments based on pride and arguments based on 
reason may be blurred” (1998:33). 
 
One of the great advantages claimed for deliberation above aggregation is that it harnesses the benefits of 
persuasion using justified reasons, rather than merely aggregating relevant interests. Consequently, a 
“Claro!” culture has extensive implications. I believe that these illustrate some wider potential problems 
in deliberative theory. Claristas leave others’ questionable claims unchallenged when they are not 
confident that they can win a “fight” to disprove them. A “Claro!” culture unduly dismisses deliberators 
who have a sound understanding of one particular question (e.g. transport) if they have previously “lost” 
unrelated debates (foreign affairs). Consequently, the community will lose the benefits of their (transport) 
expertise in relevant areas. Debate will cease to revolve around justified reasons, and instead turn on the 
status of those involved. Gambetta’s argument emphasises the great impact that these kinds of norms can 
have on the efficacy of deliberation, and the potential for discussions to reflect the will of dominant voices 
rather than true agreement based on relevant reasons. This is a particular concern for theories which 
understand the capacity of public reasoning to reach agreement on the public interest, or something 
beyond mere self-interest, as essential to effective decision-making. Deliberative failings like these are 
critical if we rely—as some deliberative theorists do—on deliberation to reach the public interest. 
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Aggregative views of manipulation 
In contrast, some aggregative approaches explain the interaction of citizens and elites without assuming 
the background of a society that esteems public-spiritedness. These aggregative views model the danger 
of elite control in a different way. Assume that citizens and officials are self-interested actors and wish 
their preference regarding a given policy decision to be realised. In this context, the discussion between 
citizens and elites can be modeled as the exchange of information that can inform parties’ actions. In this 
situation, aggregative voters need to learn more about policy options in order to inform their “technical 
beliefs”; those about the causal relations between policies and outcomes. These dictate how citizens’ 
preferences can be realised in practice (Austen-Smith, 1992:47). Pre-voting talk can also convey 
important information about the intentions of other participants; citizens will factor these into their 
beliefs. The exchange of such information will play an important role if information and expertise are 
unequally distributed across a society. For citizens, it may be the only way to garner essential information 
before deciding how to vote. Indeed, aggregative theorists have suggested the fact that individuals 
exchange this kind of information before voting is itself evidence that expertise and information is 
unequally distributed (Przeworski, 1998:145). 
 
Prudential reasoners will thus be reliant on receiving information from elites before they vote, if those 
elites have access to information they need. Without this kind information, citizens will be unable to 
understand how their preference for lower mortgage rates or lower investment volatility should translate 
into a political preference for one policy or another. My preference for a lower mortgage rate for my home 
will thus translate into a policy preference only via a number of technical beliefs. These concern how 
domestic government spending, regulation, political priorities and many other factors influence the rate I 
pay. These beliefs will, therefore, be critical in determining how preferences produce votes on particular 
issues. Indeed, the same preference could lead to two opposite voting outcomes, depending on the 
technical beliefs of the individual who holds it. There is a problem with citizens relying on information 
from elites in this kind of way. If, as seems likely, interests—as well as information—are unequally 
distributed across society, then elites will have a strong incentive to misinform citizens. This is a 
significant problem: technical beliefs, informed by statements by elites, can cause an individual’s 
preference to produce wildly different conclusions about specific policies. The unequal distribution of 
interests in society thus gives elites the opportunity to serve their own interests by misinforming voters. 
This is an important reason why rational choice theorists have been sceptical about the ability of talk to 
change preferences. Since talk is cheap, it is a convenient way to mislead. Citizens will thus be placed in a 
situation where they require information--through discussion—but are also aware that those providing 
information have an incentive to deceive them. Rational listeners will discount talk in many situations. 
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Pre-voting talk, then, should lack credibility unless it is in the speaker’s interest to tell the truth, or it is not 
in her interest to lie (Austen-Smith,1992:47).  
 
While aggregative accounts are potentially less susceptible to manipulation of abstract terms used in 
deliberation, misinformation also poses a manipulative threat.23 The scale of this threat will vary 
according to how strong discussants’ incentives to lie are, relative to the cost of talking, thus “when lying 
is easiest, it is least effective because rational listeners take no notice of relevant assertions” (Austen-
Smith, 1992:49). Listeners will discount statements in this way if they are acting rationally. We might ask 
what role misinformation plays when listeners are inhibited from doing so by pervasive norms. In this 
sense, aggregative accounts may also be reliant on discursive norms in a way which is analogous to 
deliberative counterparts. 
 
Elite manipulation can thus be a threat via misinformation24 and via unequal access to deliberation. It can, 
however, also take place through rhetoric, and the (mis)use of language. Habermas alludes to this problem 
when citing Becker’s view that the “normatively laden but vague terms of political debate have...an 
emotional significance...not a cognitive function” (Habermas, 1997:294).This is something that rational 
choice approaches sometimes discount. Rational choice theorists (Austen-Smith, 1992) analyse speech in 
strategic terms, and explain its importance solely in terms of the information conveyed rather than the 
style or rhetoric used.25 If deliberation evokes emotions rather than prompting citizens to learn, it fails in 
its primary purpose. 
 
Rhetoric is usually accounted for in deliberative theories via the conditions stipulated for deliberation. 
Members of an elite who attempt to deceive citizens by acting like Gambetta's Claristas will fail to live up 
to an "epistemic moralised" Habermasian ideal of communicative action. In seeking to promote their own 
interests, they will not engage in the kind of cooperative mutual search for truth that is required. Similarly, 
"weaker deliberative" conditions for deliberation will also commonly seek to rule out the abuse of rhetoric 
                                                          
23 The more that preferences among the discussing parties vary, the greater the incentives become for elites to deceive citizens, and the 
greater the problem of elite control is likely to be (Fearon, 1998:47). So, the aggregative view understands the threat of elite control in terms 
of the exchange of information primarily influencing technical beliefs rather than perverting deliberation. 
24 On the aggregative view, the truthful sharing of information through discussion aids preference satisfaction through voting. Once again, 
however, this exposes a strain between the challenges of PD and NEC. By providing an explanation of the importance of information 
sharing to aggregative democracy, aggregationists do show that pre-voting discussion plays a central role, so answer that aspect of the PD 
challenge. An aggregative response to manipulation thus will evade concerns about the propensity of deliberation to be controlled by elites. 
In doing so, however, it must also explain how aggregative citizens can counter the problem of elites providing misleading information as 
part of pre-voting discussion. We return to this point in chapters 4 and 5.  
 
25 A notable exception is Riker’s “The Strategy of Rhetoric” (1996) which does seek to explain the value of rhetoric. It does so primarily by 
trying to explain the advantages associated with negative campaigning, however, rather than attempting to combat the problem of elite 
manipulation through rhetoric. 
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by stipulating discursive norms which preclude it. This will be considered an appeal to emotion or 
preconception, rather than a deliberative appeal to reason. Analogously, when the effect of rhetoric is to 
promote false beliefs that stymie individuals' preferences being satisfied, aggregative theories can clearly 
model this. The effects of rhetoric can be wider: influencing preferences, as well as technical beliefs. 
Stokes has argued that rhetoric during deliberation can influence fundamental beliefs about what is 
valuable, citizens' sense of identity, and other key factors in their voting decisions. We should consider 
the capacity of discussion to “influence citizens at a deeper level: to mold [sic] their very sense of who 
they are and what their capabilities are” (1998:124). It would be odd to care about the manipulation of 
voting intentions during discussion, but ignore potential to manipulate underlying preferences themselves. 
Aggregative theories could be accused of doing so by assuming that preferences are fixed through the 
democratic process. 
 
An aggregative response to manipulation should thus address the concern that elite control of pre-voting 
discussion can influence citizens' political decisions and actions in a variety of ways, beyond 
misinformation. Elites may skew our causal beliefs, but this does not make our more fundamental values, 
or even sense of identity, immune from improper influence. By conceiving of discursive manipulation 
primarily as misinformation regarding causal beliefs, aggregative theories have often neglected this point. 
I believe that aggregative theories should address the important question of whether and how preferences 
can be manipulated before discussion. That question is not—itself—however within the scope of this 
work. Our focus is instead on how citizens should reason together before voting rather than the complete 
process they should engage in prior to this. 
 
Another “weaker deliberative” thesis is presented by Rawls. In acknowledging the "burdens of judgment", 
he certainly does not expect ideally conducted deliberation to result in consensus as "stronger" 
Habermasians do. This helps explain why pre-voting discussion is of normative importance. 
Unfortunately, however, it also weakens the Rawlsian response to discursive manipulation. When criteria 
are established for encouraging citizens to preclude certain types of reasons from debate, so it becomes 
more likely that those criteria could be exploited by members of political and other elites to promote their 
favoured outcomes. Rawlsian public reasoning could be seen in this light. 
There is therefore an aggregative suspicion that deliberation is associated with some form of paternalism 
about the conclusions that citizens “should” reach; if they deliberate properly. Even weaker deliberative 
views can be more exposed to discursive manipulation, therefore, because the norms they believe are 
served by well-conducted deliberation, although not productive of full consensus, have the potential to 
exclude legitimate input from citizens. Rawslian “public reasons” thus risk introducing elite bias to 
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deliberation, as the history of conflation between perceptions of public and private spheres suggests.26 The 
prescription of reasons of this sort makes it possible for some legitimate underplayed during, or excluded 
from, deliberation. 
 
Advocates of non-deliberative accounts, like Posner (2004) have, therefore, implied that contemporary 
deliberative democracy could amount to a “power grab” by those with the intellectual and social resources 
needed to win public debates. Without endorsing such an accusation, we might still worry that the 
conditions required to participate in meaningful deliberation can exclude some in society and favour 
others. Since voting provides each individual with a clear way of influencing political outcomes, and 
relies less on discursive conditions, aggregative accounts are less susceptible to this concern. This 
speaks to a central strength of aggregative theory. Its seeming ambivalence about the substance of 
citizens’ preferences means that it is less likely to create norms which allow citizens to be told that their 
preferences are simply “wrong”, or have been reached in an inadequate way. 
 
Thus, aggregative, and some “weaker deliberative” theories hold an advantage in this respect because they 
do not demand that citizens reach consensus through deliberation at all. At one extreme of this spectrum, a 
“rational choice” aggregative view could ask citizens to vote on solely according to their own interests; it 
would be no surprise if this caused individuals to disagree. Aggregation of self-interested preferences 
allows for more divergence because the public interest is reached through counting, not talking. Since this 
makes convergence unnecessary, aggregationists need not avail themselves of epistemic moralised 
discursive norms to promote convergence. As we have seen, aggregeationists may also reject the "weaker 
deliberative" theorist’s more modest discursive norms which are designed to exclude "mere" self-interest 
from debate. In this respect, aggregative citizens are less at risk of a system that favours elite interests by 
pushing them towards consensus via discursive norms. Non-consensus-forming theories of public 
reasoning thus reduce potential for elite control through those norms. To achieve this, they sacrifice the 
ability to claim the gains that theorists like Elster attribute to justification in reference to the public 
interest produces.  
                                                          
26 They also risk creating a variety of normative problems, and undermining the epistemic progress which discussions can make. See Talisse 
(2009: 42-77) so an overview 
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Conclusion 
We have looked at a variety of contemporary accounts of public reasoning and examined how they vary 
across four key dimensions: orientation, transformative power, status, and expectation of consensus. We 
have also examined two normative challenges for any account of public reasoning: providing an account 
what constitutes effective discussion, and preventing elite manipulation of outcomes. Broadly, public 
reasoning accounts are better placed to explain what constitutes effective discussion when they have four 
characteristics. These views are most often held by “stronger” deliberative theorists who follow the 
Habermasian tradition: 
 public orientation (information and learning required); 
 preference transformation; 
 moralised deliberation; 
 expectation of full consensus. 
 
For the reasons discussed, however, these four characteristics are also potential sources of manipulated 
discursive outcomes. Thus, while “stronger” deliberative theories provide a good answer to our first 
challenge, they provide a weak answer to the second. Conversely, a “rational choice” aggregative 
approach provides opposite strengths and weaknesses. It provides a poor account of the value of public 
reasoning before voting, but a good account of preventing manipulated discursive outcomes.  
 
Between these two extremes, individual accounts vary in relation to each of the four dimensions noted. 
Some demand public orientation from deliberators; rely on the transformation of preferences; associate 
important democratic norms with moralised deliberation; and expect full agreement between participants 
to result. Nonetheless, it is now possible to revisit the trends identified above, in Table 1. Doing so should 
allow us to see how two normative challenges identified apply to a variety of contemporary views. Table 
2, below, summarises these trends. In short, aggregative theories are often fundamentally opposed to the 
premises which allow deliberative theorists to paint a compelling picture of why pre-voting discussion is 
so important.  
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To summarise:  
Table 2. Contemporary account of public reasoning, revisited 
 “Rational 
choice” 
aggregative 
“Social choice” 
aggregative  
“Weak deliberative”  “Strong 
deliberative”  
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
(a)Focus 
(What are citizens 
asked to vote 
according to?) 
 
 
 
Self-interest 
Either self-interest 
or public interest 
Self-interest or 
public interest 
Public interest 
(b)Transformative 
power 
(Does discussion 
before voting 
transform or reflect 
preferences?) 
Reflect Reflect.  Reflect and/or 
transform. 
Transform. 
(c)Status 
(Does discussion play 
a moralised role?) 
No. No.  Often moralised  Moralised 
(d)Output 
(Is consensus 
expected?) 
No. No Only sometimes. Yes 
     
Examples Riker, 
rational 
choice  
List, social choice 
theory  
Gutmann & 
Thompson, Fishkin. 
Habermas, 
Dryzek. 
 
Better account of the value of discussion 
Better account of preventing manipulated discursive 
outcomes 
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I believe this presents a key, and difficult, challenge for aggregative theories of public reasoning. Once an 
aggregative account attempts to mimic deliberative theories by defining conditions for the improvement 
of individuals’ preferences, it risks departing from the assumption of the “citizen sovereignty”. Doing so 
also makes accounts subject to the accusations of paternalism and elitism expressed against some 
deliberative democrats. Preference transformation may provide a neat explanation of the importance of 
pre-voting discussion. The idea of transformative deliberation is, however, in fundamental tension with 
aggregative theorists’ view that individuals’ preferences should be aggregated rather than assessed against 
some prior—moralised—notion of the “public interest”. Most intractably, aggregative theorists often 
assume the independence of voters, and this precludes altogether their influencing one another through 
deliberation. Fundamentally, aggregative theorists will instinctively resist calls to move away from 
preferences as a definition of value: to reject ideas of a "good [defined] independently of anyone ever 
thinking it to be good" (Goodin, 1995: 119). There is merit in this rejection. It means that aggregative 
views are less likely to allow citizens to be told that their preferences are simply “wrong”, or have been 
formed in the wrong way. It also makes it more difficult, however, for aggregationists to explain why 
public reasoning should be an important component of democracy.  
 
Despite these limitations, or perhaps because of them, aggregative theories are well-equipped to answer or 
second challenge. The less ambitious role they ascribe to pre-voting discussion offers fewer opportunities 
for manipulated discursive outcomes. Given this, the key question is: “can aggregative theories provide a 
better account of effective discussion without sacrificing their advantages in respect to preventing 
manipulation?”. To begin answering that question, we will examine one interpretation of a prominent 
writer in the development of aggregative political theory: Jeremy Bentham.   
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Chapter 2. A conventional view of Bentham on public reasoning 
"The common view of Bentham as a paternalistic utilitarian who wants to employ a corps of 
civil servants to measure utility and then govern to maximise it is clearly at odds with a free, 
indeterminate public opinion in a mass democracy"  
(Cutler, 1999: 324) 
 
Introduction 
A relatively simple view of Bentham on public reasoning is often held; it concludes that there is little, if 
any, role for pre-voting discussion in democracy. While seldom expressed in explicit and positive terms, I 
believe that this simple or “conventional” view is evident in passing references made to Bentham by 
deliberative democrats, and in the relative inattention paid to the conditions of public reasoning in some 
Bentham scholarship. This view has clear implications. It means that Bentham’s democratic theory lacks 
the normative resources deployed by contemporary deliberative theorists to explain the value of pre-
voting discussion. Contemporary “stronger” deliberative democrats follow Habermas (1997). They may 
cite four ideas to explain the value of pre-voting discussion: public orientation; preference transformation; 
moralised deliberation; and expectation of full consensus. In contrast, the simple or “conventional” view 
of Bentham cannot cite these concepts; doing so would contradict its fundamental premises. The 
conventional view is archetypally aggregative. It provides few normative resources to explain the value of 
pre-voting discussion. Conversely it also, therefore, provides few expectations of deliberation and—
potentially—fewer opportunities for discursive manipulation, as a result.  
 
In recent years, much comprehensive historical analysis has focused on how Bentham’s political views 
evolved. Particular attention has been given to his transition to democracy (Schofield, 2006); his plan for 
parliamentary and legal reform, and other related important aspects of his work. It is striking, however, 
that the story of how Bentham’s democratic views developed is seldom told in terms of how those views 
provide, or fail to, an account of public reasoning. Often, the focus is instead on the types of democratic 
institutions that Bentham wanted to build, and franchise reform required to deliver them. Below, I attempt 
to address this by looking at how Bentham’s relevant views are often understood. In later chapters, I focus 
on Bentham’s views on public reasoning, and how these can be understood to imply that a particular type 
of character, termed “public aptitude”, is required from citizens. 
 
Before presenting that understanding of Bentham, we should first consider some alternatives. The 
“conventional view” is the first of these. This chapter thus attempts to do three things: to define this 
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“conventional” view of Bentham; to locate that view in relation to contemporary accounts by using the 
four dimensions identified in Chapter 1 (orientation, transformative power, status, expectation of 
agreement); and to examine whether this view meets the challenges of offering a plausible explanation of 
the value of discussion, and preventing manipulation of discursive outcomes. 
 
What is the “conventional view” of Bentham? 
What I shall refer to as a “conventional view” of Bentham on public reasoning is grounded in some well-
known aspects of his ethics. At its simplest, this reading of Bentham suggests that the public interest is 
reflected in democratic decisions though the aggregation of self-interested votes alone. There is, therefore, 
little--if any—significant role for pre-voting discussion to play. Counting votes does the normative work; 
not (deliberative) talking between citizens. Pateman, for example, contrasts contemporary theorists who 
believe that democratic participation is valuable for a number of reasons with Bentham, for whom “The 
participation of the people has a very narrow function; it ensures good government…through the sanction 
of loss of office” (Pateman, 1970: 19-20). The implication here is that this sanction operates through the 
ballot box, alone; not discussion. 
 
The conventional view is often contrasted with democratic theories which emphasise democratic 
participation from citizens, including through public reasoning, to a greater degree. Gutmann’s work 
(1980) is an interesting reference point here. Along with Thompson, she has been at the forefront of 
contemporary debates on deliberation; including how normative theory can be translated into better 
decision-making in the real world. These two authors have, through a series of complementary analyses, 
set out what they believe to be the significant benefits of increased deliberative participation in politics 
from citizens. The foundations for these more developed deliberative views (Gutmann & Thompson, 
1996; 2004) were, however, set in earlier work. In “Liberal Equality” (1980), Gutmann outlines how a 
number of historical arguments have changed our understanding of democratic participation. Prominent 
among these examples is Bentham. Other philosophers conceptualise participation in different ways. But 
Bentham is used as an example of a theorist who is concerned with the outcomes of political decision-
making and remains neutral between different ways—bureaucratic or democratic—of arriving at those 
outcomes (Gutmann,1980:26). A crucial distinction is thus drawn between the variety of contemporary 
theories which place a high value on participation in a deliberative process, and Bentham who supposedly 
did not: 
“In Bentham’s own theory, democratic participation has no value independent of the limits upon 
political tyranny that it is expected to effect. However, were participation seen as (in part) a 
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pleasure in itself, or as a means of increasing an individual’s future capacity for pleasures, the 
realm of democracy might be increased...Mill’s revision of classical utilitarian doctrine serves to 
remind us of this” (Gutmann, 1980:26) 
 
This is the essence of the conventional view of Bentham. It suggests that “bureaucratic determination” 
(Ibid) is vital to good political decisions, and that voting is a necessary check on that exercise of power. 
Beyond these two concepts, there is apparently little space left for an active process of public reasoning in 
which citizens participate to promote the public interest. I believe that the tendency to see Bentham in 
these terms is a consequence of three, related but different, aspects of Bentham's thought: 
 i)  The belief that Bentham defines value as “raw” preference satisfaction. 
 ii) Bentham's purely quantitative utilitarianism. 
 iii) Bentham's aggregative definition of the public interest; what Postema (1986) refers to as his 
“'individualism”. 
 
The first of these aspects of Bentham’s thought suggests that there could be little role for pre-voting 
discussion in reforming or improving individual preferences. The second implies that there can be little 
significant role for public reasoning in “educating” individuals about the superiority of some (types of) 
preferences above others. Finally, the third aspect suggests that aggregating self-interested votes through 
the ballot box produces decisions which reflect the public interest. This means that public reasoning 
directed toward the public interest would, in any case, be redundant. 
 
Below I examine each of these claims in turn and explore why they have provoked the conclusion that 
there is little, if any, role for discussion in Benthamite democracy. Finally, I outline how these three 
claims have interacted by examining some examples of the conventional reading of Bentham. 
 
 
i) Bentham defines utility as “raw” preference satisfaction 
For good reason, Bentham is best known as a utilitarian: he argued that we should evaluate “every action 
whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of 
the party whose interest is in question” (Bentham, 1970a: 12). He stipulated that this principle had 
universal scope: it applied “not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of 
government” (1970i: 12). In the case of government, Bentham held, decisions should serve the public 
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interest, and be assessed by their tendency to do so. In contemporary thought, utilitarianism is usually 
taken to imply that utility is defined as preference satisfaction. So, on this basis, many writers appear to 
assume that Bentham believed that the right action is that which causes the most preference satisfaction.  
 
This underlines the contemporary assumption, which we shall investigate below, that Benthamite 
utilitarianism calls for the satisfaction of whatever “raw” preferences happen to exist in a society. If utility 
is preference satisfaction, and Bentham assesses political decisions on utilitarian grounds, then it follows 
that individuals should vote according to their own preferences, and public decisions should reflect the 
aggregate of what these individual votes dictate. It is presumably on these grounds that Bentham argued 
that legislators should gather information about citizens’ existing (not ideal, fully rational) preferences 
before making laws. (1970:56). Bentham’s acceptance of the value of existing preferences provides a 
stark contrast with the views espoused by some deliberative democrats. For instance, it is difficult to see 
how the conventional reading of Bentham could account for the kind of “improvement” in preferences, 
envisaged by contemporary deliberative democrats like Benhabib (Benhabib, 1996: 73). Of course, 
different writers mean different things when they refer to "raw" preferences. Three particular conceptions 
of this idea are particularly relevant. Preferences might be “raw” in the sense that they incorporate some 
form of referential error. Second, a raw preference might may be personal, rather than social or 
communal. Finally, raw preferences may be considered those which were produced without adequate 
deliberation. 
 
The referential aspect of raw preferences is exemplified by a critique of Bentham put forward by a 
respected contemporary political theorist, Kymlicka. This implies that while an individual may have a 
stated preference for “X over Y”, that preference will in fact be raw if she has misunderstood what X, or 
Y is; if her preference refers to the wrong things. Imagine I have two glasses of liquid in front of me and 
am asked to choose between them. The glasses are close enough to see but not to pick up or smell.  
On the left is glass X, a tumbler filled with clear liquid which looks like water. On the right is a wine glass 
filled with a red liquid which looks like red wine. If asked to choose between these two options by an 
observer, I might respond “I prefer glass X over glass Y”. I may do so while thinking to myself “this is 
the right choice because I prefer water to red wine”. That stated preference will be accurate if the two 
glasses do in fact contain water and red wine. Imagine, however, that I then move to pick up glass X and, 
just as I take it my mouth, ready to drink notice the strong, and alarming smell of paraffin. In this case, 
my stated preference for one glass over the other was based on referential error. It did not accurately 
reflect a true state of affairs. In this sense, my preference could be considered “raw”.  
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This conception of raw preferences is implied by Kymlicka. In his Contemporary Political Philosophy: 
An Introduction (2002:31ff), he criticises a utilitarianism which equates value with the satisfaction of 
preferences. Interestingly, he cites Bentham as a key example to make this argument:  
“Satisfying our preferences does not always contribute to our well-being. Suppose that we are 
ordering food for lunch, but some of us want pizza, while others want Chinese food. If the way to 
satisfy the most preferences is to order pizza, then this sort of utilitarianism tells us to order it. 
But what if, unbeknownst to us, the pizza we ordered is poisoned, or just rancid? Ordering it now 
would not promote our welfare. When we lack adequate information, or have made mistakes in 
calculating the costs and benefits of a particular action, then what is good for us can be different 
from the preferences we currently have…Utilitarianism of the preference-satisfaction variety says 
that something is made valuable by the fact that lots of people desire it… [but] having the 
preference does not make it valuable—on the contrary, its being valuable is a good reason for 
preferring it. And if it is not valuable, then satisfying my mistaken preference for it will not 
contribute to my well-being. My utility is increased, then, not by satisfying whatever preferences 
I have, but by satisfying those preferences which are not based on mistaken beliefs” (Kymlicka, 
2002: 31ff) 
 
Like the choice between glass X, which actually contains paraffin, and glass Y which holds red wine, this 
counterexample relies on the assumption that utilitarians like Bentham are bound to satisfy preferences 
which are “raw”: they refer inaccurately to relevant states of affairs. The example of poisoned pizza is 
straightforwardly based on individual in question lacking some critical information: that one of their 
culinary options is dangerous. If he had been better informed, the individual in question would have held 
a “better” preference; based on a fuller and more accurate description of the options open to him. 
Consequently, any preference utilitarian view which requires “adequately informed” rather than “raw” 
preferences would be unaffected by this critique. The fact that this example is used against Bentham 
illustrates that Kymlicka implicitly ascribes to Bentham a “raw preference satisfaction” definition of 
utility.27 In Chapters 3 and 4, we shall explore whether Bentham really did believe that "utility is 
increased...by satisfying whatever preferences I have" (Kymlicka, 2002:31ff). 
 
                                                          
27 Similarly, Kymlicka cites an individual’s preference for reading poetry which he finds ‘disturbing rather than pleasurable’ (2002: 13) as a 
counterexample, on the same grounds. 
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If understood in these referential terms, accepting raw preferences for aggregation entails that public 
reasoning cannot be used to correct even the most basic referential errors in citizens’ expressed 
preferences. For instance, a theorist who accepts the value of (referentially) raw preferences would be 
content to aggregate citizens’ expressed preferences for an increase in Value Added Tax (VAT) even if—
in expressing that preference—they think that VAT is the same as income tax, or that it only applies to the 
wealthy. Rather than correcting this misunderstanding in what an expressed preference refers to, a raw 
preference theory would merely aggregate views and determine decisions. It would add together the—
mistaken—preferences that citizens express without attempting to improve them through dialogue. 
Clearly, a view of this sort would leave very little scope for public reasoning for voting to play any 
meaningful role: it does not value its capacity to correct even basic errors. This claim entails not just that 
discussion is not needed to transform preferences towards the public interest, but also that it can play no 
role in reforming expressed preferences to better reflect self-interest. This stronger claim might sound like 
a “straw man”, or an extreme criticism. It can , however, be found in the work of some highly 
sophisticated contemporary thinkers. It is usually expressed in the distinctions drawn between the benefits 
of active deliberation and passive voting without deliberation (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996:170; 
Richardson, 2003:43; Chambers, 2004).  
 
There is a second sense in which preferences may be “raw”. They may be personal rather than social; they 
may reflect the interests or concerns of an individual rather than those of the whole community, or a wider 
group. Relatively frequently through the literature on deliberative democracy, proponents of deliberation 
explain their position by distinguishing it from a view of democracy which merely adds together votes as 
expressions of personal interests rather than refining or developing them through the exchange of reasons 
and arguments between fellow citizens. Cohen, for example, argues that properly conducted democratic 
politics “involves deliberation focused on the common good” (1989:19), and that those “interests, aims 
and ideals that comprise the common good are those that survive deliberation” (1989:25). As O’Flynn 
(2010) has pointed out, there is certainly a potential tautology in this. Nonetheless, there is a sense in 
contemporary theory that deliberation is essential to voters’ holding views which reflect the public interest 
rather than their own narrow interests. In turn, those preferences which have not gone through refinement 
through deliberation are often considered “raw”. As a consequence of being pre-deliberative, they are 
considered unready to be counted at the ballot box, or accepted by all in a public forum.  
 
Slightly different implications follow this second conception of “raw” preferences. A utilitarian who is 
content to aggregate this type of raw preference will see no need for discussion that transforms 
preferences toward the public interest. This clearly precludes a Habermasian form of deliberation; aimed 
at consensus on the public interest, achieved through preference change (Benhabib, 1996; Habermas, 
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1997). These theorists tend to define raw preferences in distinction to preferences which have been 
transformed through deliberation. This implies that a raw preference utilitarianism will entail a more self-
interest based view of discussion and voting. If Bentham is a raw preference utilitarian in these terms, his 
work is more likely to sit in the “rational choice” aggregative category identified above. 
 
Finally, raw preferences can be understood as those which have not resulted from well-conducted, 
appropriate deliberation. Like many deliberative theorists, Cohen (1998) combines the claim that raw 
preferences are those which do not reflect wider interests, and the view that they are also those which 
have not been improved through public deliberation. The latter implies the former. These two definitions 
are, however, distinct from one another. Consider, for example, a “weaker deliberative” view which does 
not demand public orientation from citizens. An account like this may acknowledge that a preference has 
been through an appropriate and full process of deliberation yet may still reflect personal interests rather 
than the public interest. This is a point that some deliberative theorists, like Mansbridge have been 
determined to emphasise (Mansbridge et al, 2010). Goodin, for instance, argues that preferences can be 
thought of as “raw” not because they are self-interested, but because they are in some sense inconsistent 
(1995:IV). On this view, "raw" preferences might be those which have not undergone this process of 
examination to become more consistent. This examination could take place through a variety of different 
means. These could range from an individual privately reflecting on her views, to full public deliberation, 
or a retrospective analysis of expressed preferences.  
In other works, Goodin implies something which is explicitly closer to a self-interest-based definition of 
raw preferences. He has argued, for example, that the benefits of deliberation can be achieved through 
citizens engaging in a form of "imaginative empathy" by considering the perspectives of fellow citizens. 
This allows the interests of fellow citizens to be considered, even when they are absent from discussions, 
thus unable to deliberate themselves (Goodin, 2000: 84).  
 
A conception of raw preferences is implicit in Gaus’ 1999 book, “Social Philosophy”. In that work, Gaus 
alleges that the divergence between expressed preferences and interests undermines a preference 
utilitarian view: “An alcoholic may want to keep on drinking, but it is not obvious that this is good for 
him” (Gaus, 1999:52). 
 
Both Kymlicka’s and Gaus’ objections assume that a basic form of utilitarianism—often associated with 
Bentham—defines value as the satisfaction of existing “raw” preferences. By highlighting examples 
where raw preferences seem to obviously diverge from “real interests”, they suggest that this form of 
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utilitarian democratic theory cannot plausibly characterise citizens’ interests. The accusation is that a 
basic raw preference view deems damaging and harmful courses of action valuable; even though they 
cannot—intuitively—be so (eating poisoned pizza, or providing an alcoholic with alcohol). Deliberation 
is often proposed as a remedy to this problem. It provides individuals with the perspective, information, 
time and capacity to properly consider relevant interests (Fishkin, 2009:125). 
 
As we have seen, the notion of raw preferences appears in three slightly different guises. Kymlicka’s 
critique appeals to the idea that raw preferences can contain some form of referential error and still be 
maximised according to Bentham’s view. Gaus’ criticism is slightly different. Instead, it appeals to the 
reader’s intuition that the alcoholic is making poor decisions. His stated preference for continuing to drink 
does not reflect his real interests because, under better circumstances, with full information and a full 
awareness of the consequences of his different options, the drinker would not choose to harm himself in 
this way. This stated preference is pre-deliberative, in the sense that it has not resulted from an appropriate 
process of consideration and information. It follows that if we define value in terms of the satisfaction of 
this kind of raw preference that there would be little conceivable role for pre-voting discussion in 
transforming raw preferences into post-deliberative preferences which are a suitable basis for collective 
decisions.  
The exact implications of a raw preference view depend on exactly how we define that concept, however. 
The conventional view is right to attribute a self-interest-based view of public reasoning. Indeed, Bentham 
repeatedly emphasises that citizens voting should do so on grounds of self-interest. It is partly for this 
reason that Bentham endorsed the secret ballot; on grounds that it would lead to each vote becoming a 
better reflection of the individual's own interest (James, 1981: 55). Bentham’s belief in the value of self-
interested voting is famously illustrated by the differences between his views and those of JS Mill 
(Schofield, 2006: 144-50; Lever, 2007; Park, 1931). There is a considerable amount of evidence, which 
we will return to in subsequent chapters, to suggest that Bentham held what some contemporary 
deliberative democrats would classify as a “raw preference” view. Indeed, a self-interested understanding 
of voting underlines not only Bentham’s own arguments for the secret ballot, but also his utilitarian logic 
for voting. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to describe Bentham as a “raw preference utilitarian” in the 
other two respects considered above. We shall explore evidence for rejection of these views in subsequent 
sections. 
 
A “raw preference” has obvious implications for public reasoning. It would suggest that Bentham’s work 
can conceptualise no significant role for pre-voting discussion. This claim may be allied to either a 
deliberative conception or non-deliberative conception of “raw” preferences. The former, implied by 
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deliberative democrats like Habermas and Gutmann & Thompson, entails that no transformation away 
from self-interested preferences can take place on Bentham's view. The stronger, latter claim, entails that 
no role for pre-voting discussion could be conceptualised by a Benthamite approach, even on prudential 
rather than deliberative grounds. This conclusion follows from the assumption that raw preferences are an 
inadequate reflection of individuals' interests; and that Bentham was content to define utility in terms of 
their satisfaction. 
 
In some cases, like those above, the attribution of a raw preferences view to Bentham does not seem to be 
based on a significant sample of his work. In other cases, the view is advanced as part of a far more 
sophisticated and detailed understanding of Bentham as a writer. Some scholars, for example, cite 
Bentham’s readiness to define the satisfaction of subjective preferences as being rooted in his 
epistemology: 
“the subjectivist Bentham is led in the direction of recognizing as many different truths as there 
are minds, with truth for each of us consisting in the set of propositions in which we believe” 
(Quinn, 2012:20).28 
 
A number of commentators have recognised just how extensive Bentham’s commitment to subjectivism 
was throughout his writing career. Harrison notes, for example, Bentham seemed less concerned with the 
metaphysical questions or scepticism and realism than with pragmatic decisions about the kinds of 
enquiry that are likely to improve utilitarian outcomes (Harrison, 1983:53-4).  
 
The subjectivist view of Bentham is buttressed by much of his political writing. The Bentham who wrote 
a constitution for the Islamic state of Tripoli, for example, wanted to accommodate and satisfy existing 
preferences rather than attempting to “correct” or “reform” them (Bentham, 1990:12). It is for this reason 
that his constitution for the territory is prefaced by a survey of sociological facts about existing practices 
and beliefs. These included the size and geographical location of mosques (1990:12). At its simplest, 
therefore, the raw preferences view of Bentham is based on a passing reference to his work. When allied 
to an understanding of his subjectivism, and approach to punishment and constitutional writing, however, 
it takes on a more plausible interpretative guise. The Bentham who recognised the value of utility that 
criminals derived from crime seems an unlikely proponent of any view which demands that citizens 
should move beyond their "raw" preferences before voting. 
                                                          
28 Quinn also goes on to identify the ‘objectivist Bentham’ in the same article: this quotation is provided to illustrate that the subjectivist 
reading reinforces a ‘raw preference’ view. 
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b) Bentham is a quantitative, rather than qualitative utilitarian 
The belief that Bentham defined utility as the satisfaction of raw preferences is complemented by the 
assertion that he was a quantitative rather than qualitative utilitarian. This implies that, since: 
(i)- the satisfaction of no (type of) preference is intrinsically more valuable than another; and 
(ii)- the value of a process designed to “reform” preferences cannot be explained in terms of its ability to 
provoke individuals' transition from holding one (type of) preference to another; therefore... 29 
(iii)- the value of pre-voting discussion cannot be explained in these terms. 
 
The grounds for this understanding of Bentham are well known. Mill famously proposed a qualitative 
conception of utility, thus could conceivably deny (ii). In contrast, however, Bentham was famously 
adamant that the value of any activity or preference could be judged only by reference to the quantity of 
utility it produces (Crisp, 1997: 23). Quantitative utilitarianism does not rule out public reasoning creating 
significant utilitarian benefits. It does limit the way in which those benefits can be explained, however. It 
means that Bentham’s form of utilitarianism cannot readily be associated with a public reasoning which 
induces qualitative improvements in the preferences held by citizens. Quantitative utilitarianism is not a 
natural complement to the kind of preference change envisaged by Habermasian deliberative democrats, 
for instance. 
A quantitative notion of utility thus complements the “raw preference” view, and reinforces the 
conventional reading of Bentham. If utility varies only in quantity rather quality then one explanation for 
the value of pre-voting discussion—that it induces qualitative improvement in preferences—is ruled out. 
Since individuals' experience is the highest evidence of their own interests, and these preferences cannot 
be exchanged for qualitatively “better” alternatives, a Benthamite government seems bound to simply 
aggregate existing preferences via voting. “Conventional” Bentham is the simplest kind of hedonist. He 
defined the good as pleasure and did not discriminate between "good" and "bad" preferences. This is 
perhaps what Bentham is most famous for: the idea that pleasure is all that matters, and pleasure is merely 
the satisfaction of one's preferences, however apparently misled they might appear to be.  
 
c) Bentham is an individualist (defines the public good in terms of individual welfare) 
                                                          
29 Note that (ii) does not preclude the possibility that the value of pre-voting discussion could be explained in terms of its ability to provoke 
a move to preferences whose satisfaction create a greater quantity of utility, but this would require an extra-preference definition of utility. 
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The first two foundations for the conventional view mean that the value of public reasoning cannot be 
explained in terms of reforming, or inducing qualitative improvements in, “raw” preferences. Let us now 
turn to Bentham’s individualism. This assumption suggests that the public interest is no more than simply 
an aggregate of individuals' self-interest. This entails that the value of pre-voting discussion cannot be 
explained, in Bentham’s view, in reference to some wider, non-individualistic, conception of the public 
interest. 
 
Bentham defined the public good solely in terms of individuals’ welfare; and for this reason endorsed the 
secret ballot (1983b). This assumption means that Bentham could not, and did not, endorse a non-
prudential (or ‘moralised’) conception of pre-voting discussion which emphasises the transformation of 
preferences so that they better reflect the public interest rather than self-interest. The textual basis for this 
view is well known. Most famously, at the start of an “Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation” , Bentham explicitly posits individualism: 
“The interest of the community then is, what is it?—the sum of the interests of the several 
members who compose it” (Bentham, 1970a: 2). 
 
In reference to pre-voting discussion, we may reason from this statement that, since: 
i) Bentham is an 'individualist'. 
ii) 'individualist' accounts hold that public interest decisions can be reached through aggregation of self-
interested preferences; and 
iii) public-interested preferences are not necessary to this aggregation; therefore 
iv) individualist accounts, including Bentham's, cannot explain the importance of pre-voting discussion by 
reference to the transformation of preferences towards the public good. 
 
I believe that these three complementary claims have, together, provided the basis for a contemporary 
assumption that there is little significant role for pre-voting discussion in Bentham’s democratic theory. 
The implication of this view is that deliberators following Bentham’s democratic principles cannot 
promote the public good by better informing (self or public-interested) preferences. This is because he 
accepts “raw” preferences in his definition of utility. The conventional view cannot provoke a move from 
qualitatively “worse” to “better” (self or public-interested) preferences, because Bentham held that utility 
varied only in quantity rather than quality. Finally, and in any case, the conventional view has no need to 
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move individuals' preferences towards the public interest before voting. Bentham’s individualism—like 
Condorcet’s (1785) theorem—entails that the public interest can be reached through counting votes, 
without talking. These three premises thus provoke the conclusion that little of value can be gleaned from  
Bentham’s writing about the importance of public reasoning. 
 
Of course, we must take care not to caricature the relevant literature. For example—like many Bentham 
scholars—neither Lieberman (2014) nor Hume (1978) suppose that Benthamite democracy relies 
exclusively on aggregation; and that the citizenry should play no role other than voting. They would both 
also question the grounds for attributing a “raw preferences” view to Bentham; on grounds we shall 
investigate in the next chapter. There is, however, in these and many other works, including those of 
Bahmueller (1981), Manning (1968), and Himmelfarb (1969), and Mack (1962: 255-61; 450), the 
repeated implication that voting and institutions are the critical means of serving the public interest in 
Bentham’s political theory, rather than a deliberative engagement from citizens. The emphasis in this kind 
of secondary literature is consistently on counting rather than talking. Perhaps as a result of this emphasis, 
other contemporary theorists (Richardson, 2003) have also accepted the conventional view of utilitarian 
democracy as focusing on counting votes, and institutions rather than public reasoning. Along with this 
presumption, these theorists also import the conclusion that Bentham’s democratic theory lacks the 
normative resources needed to explain the kind of discussion that citizens should take part in when 
forming their preferences before voting.  
 
In more general contemporary debates, Bentham is often mentioned as promoting an individualistic view 
of wellbeing. He is, according to these writers, towards the more extreme version of a political worldview 
which discounts the importance of society, and only has regard for individuals. A good example of this 
kind of cursory interpretation of Bentham is found in Keen's recent popular book “Debunking 
Economics”, which portrays Bentham as the father of neo-conservatism, based on this individualism. In 
making this claim, Keen relies on the quotation above to ascribe egoism to Bentham: “Behind apparent 
altruism, behind apparent selfless behaviour, behind religious commitment, lies self-interested 
individualism” (Keen, 2001:26). Of course, the reality is more complex. A variety of different conclusions 
have thus been drawn from Bentham’s individualistic definition of the public interest (above). These 
views reinforce the conventional reading. Like consumers in a marketplace, citizens in the society 
Bentham envisaged would register their self-interested preferences on the ballot paper. They were not to 
be public-spirited deliberators, in search of the mutual understanding of common values. 
Where does conventional Bentham sit in relation to contemporary accounts? 
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Having explained some of the central aspects of the conventional view of Bentham, it is important to 
understand how this view fits into contemporary debates on the value of discussion between citizens 
before voting. In Chapter 1, I focused on four dimensions in which contemporary accounts tend to differ 
from one another: orientation, transformative power, status, and expectation of agreement. Where does 
“conventional Bentham” sit in relation to these four questions? 
 
First, consider the orientation of discussion. Conventional Bentham suggested that individuals could 
generally be expected to act according to their own interests, and that public-orientated preferences were 
not necessary to public-interested decisions because the public interest could be reached through an 
aggregation of individuals’ self-interested preferences. The conventional view of Bentham therefore 
suggests that public-orientated deliberation is unnecessary. In this respect, it follows “rational choice” 
aggregative theories which rely on an aggregation of self-interested preferences rather than public-
orientated deliberation. Like Condorcet’s theorem, the conventional view of Bentham seemingly reaches 
towards the public interest through multiplication rather than deliberation. Individuals are the best 
available judge of their own interests. Indeed, this is the basis of Bentham's argument in IPML that we 
may trust citizens to vote. By reflecting self-interest at the ballot box, they play their part in creating 
collective decisions which serve the community as a whole, since the rightful end of these decisions 
should be nothing more than the aggregate interests of all individuals in the community:  
 “...if a man can well judge his own interests, then 'why not in the measures to be observed by 
public men in the direction of those'" interests? (Bentham, IPML: ft. 40 in Schwartzberg , 2007b`:574) 
 
The self-interested view of voting, coupled with an individualist conception of the public interest thus 
mitigates the degree to which pre-voting discussion can play a useful role: we are left with a conventional 
view that Bentham was an aggregative rather than deliberative democrat. It follows from this that since 
preferences are supposedly fixed rather than subject to transformation during deliberation, discussion 
before voting can –at most- be understood as the sharing of information between citizens who seek to 
satisfy their own preferences when they vote.  
 
Second, contemporary views differ in their understanding of whether public discussion before voting has 
the power to transform expressed preferences. Often, but not always, this transformation is understood to 
take place towards the public interest, and seen to weed out incomplete, partial, or merely self-interested 
preferences (Benhabib, 1996). Here, again, the conventional view of Bentham appears to sit alongside 
“rational choice” aggregative rather than contemporary deliberative views because transformation towards 
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the public interest is unnecessary to good outcomes. It might, however, be compatible with other forms of 
preference change which are considered integral to deliberation. “Weaker deliberative” theorists like 
Gutmann & Thompson (2004:1-15) propose that deliberation performs a valuable clarificatory role in 
regard to decisions. It helps participants to sort through and reconsider their preferences in light of new 
information. Whilst fundamentally different from the kind of public-interested transformation demanded 
by some “stronger deliberative” democrats, it is possible that the premises outlined for the conventional 
understanding of Bentham’s view on public reasoning do leave some space for clarificatory discussion of 
this sort, which primarily exchanges information and signals between participants rather than deliberative 
reasons. In this sense, the conventional view sits alongside some contemporary aggregative approaches 
(Austen-Smith, 1992); it conceives of pre-voting talk as functional rather than transformative. 
 
In respect to the third of our categories—the status of discussion—this naturally leads the conventional 
view of Bentham to a functional rather than moralised account of pre-voting discussion. The conventional 
view of Bentham interrogates the value of public reasoning in terms of the benefits it can produce for 
society through the production of better political decisions; primarily in respect to the subsequent 
aggregation of votes at the ballot box. Whilst it might, therefore, endorse various democratic practices as 
useful to the public utility, it would do so not in an absolute way; but only contingent on their usefulness. 
Unlike contemporary “stronger deliberative” theorists, therefore, the conventional view of Bentham does 
not ground fundamental political values like justice or legitimacy on the act of participation in public 
deliberation. Bentham’s work as cited as part of the conventional understanding of his democratic theory 
makes no mention of a need to reflect fundamental values like “natural duty of respect” (Rawls, 
2003:373). Similarly, conventional Bentham did not portray public reasoning as the part of a rights-based 
definition of the legitimate exercise of political power (D’Agostino, 1996:57); nor did he claim that the 
right type of discussion between voters constituted vital democratic norms, as Habermasian democrats do. 
 
The conventional reading of Bentham usually has less to say about the fourth of our categories: 
expectation of consensus. The conventional response to the previous three categories we have examined 
may suggest that there should be few reasons to expect full agreement from public reasoning. After all, 
conventional voters will consider their own interests at the ballot box and may, or may not, engage with 
one another in something akin to deliberation; depending on how useful it happens to be to the public 
utility. The individualist conception of the public interest renders consensus redundant to achieving 
political decisions which serve the public interest. On this conventional reading, Bentham certainly did 
not expect full consensus to emerge from properly conducted deliberation as “stronger deliberative” 
theorists like Habermas (1997) and Dryzek (2002) do. This conception of public reasoning is not 
“destined” for a “stronger deliberative” full consensus of all participants for the same shared reasons. It is 
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less clear, however, how far Bentham, on the conventional view at least, expected agreement to emerge 
from well-informed, self-interested voters exchanging information before casting their ballots.  
 
The implications of the conventional view are clear. These observations on Bentham prompt the 
conclusion that he was a “rational choice” aggregative democrat. He emphasised counting votes over 
talking; encouraged a self-interested focus from voters; rejected transformative dialogue before voting; 
attributed no moralised deliberative functions to discussion between citizens. Finally, he did not suggest 
that such discussion—properly-conducted—should produce full consensus between participants. 
 
If we reject this strong version of the “raw preference” view, however, there may be prudential grounds 
for pre-voting discussion in a conventional view of Bentham’s work. Public reasoning could be justified 
on grounds that it somehow allows individual citizens to glean a “better” or more accurate set of 
preferences which reflect their 'real' interests. On one construal of this view, some prudential reasoning 
may be possible; on the other none is possible. On neither view is any “moralised” deliberation--
orientated towards the public interest—necessary.  
 
As an aggregative theory that emphasises the secret ballot, the conventional view of Bentham is thus 
somewhat similar to the principles of contemporary social choice theory. We should assume that 
satisfying preferences should be the goal of government. The role of democracy is thus to count these 
preferences, and satisfy them as well as possible. Deliberation should not encourage citizens to transform 
their preferences. Bentham is often seen in this light: as part of the social choice tradition. The 
conventional view thus seems to concur with the social choice theorist's assumption of "citizen 
sovereignty”: the idea that social choices are determined by individual desires (Arrow, 1963:29). This 
corresponds with Bentham’s own suggestion that individuals' judgments regarding their interests should 
not be overridden on paternalistic grounds (1983b: 131) and complements his quantitative utilitarianism. 
Thus Bentham agreed that public decisions should be responsive to individuals' preferences rather than 
exogenous conceptions of the "public interest". It is for this reason that Schofield (2006) and others 
understand Bentham as fundamentally rejecting the view that the unenlightened preferences of the masses 
needed to be fundamentally reformed by members of  a political and social elite.   
 
Each of these claims supplements the conventional, non-deliberative picture. Individuals’ preferences 
were the best available guide to their interests; the community was nothing more than the sum of its 
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members; and government should seek to satisfy the preferences that individuals happen to have. Without 
any clear view of the conditions under which preferences should be formed, or how they should be 
assessed, conventional Bentham seems to lack any plausible explanation of why talking should be 
fundamental to democracy, not just counting (votes). As we have seen, aspects of this characterisation of 
Bentham have permeated not only cursory studies like Keen’s but also the critiques of sophisticated 
deliberative democrats (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004) and contemporary political philosophers (Gaus, 
1999). For the reasons stated, conventional Bentham is highly unlikely to meet the challenge of providing 
a plausible account of the importance of discussion before voting. 
 
Aside from the question of pre-voting discussion, the conventional view has had wider implications. 
Bentham's individualist definition of the public good; his insistence on maximising the good; and on the 
commensurability of a simple definition of happiness between people have provoked a number of well-
known objections in contemporary political theory and ethics. Foremost amongst these is Rawls' 
accusation that utilitarianism fails to take seriously enough the “separateness of persons” (McKerlie, 
1989). It may be appropriate for an individual to sacrifice his own welfare at one point in life in order to 
gain greater welfare in the future; for example through “consumption smoothing”. Many contemporary 
political theorists, however, believe that redistribution of welfare between people is of a different 
character; that we cannot justify sacrificing the interests of one individual  to promote those of another. In 
many instances, maximising the total welfare without regard for its distribution may demand this. This 
concern has a number of further implications. We may worry that utilitarianism as a simple maximising 
theory pays insufficient attention to the interests of minorities. If the suffering of one or two individuals 
can bring utility to many then this kind of theory could urge us to inflict such suffering. 
 
Millian utilitarians have an obvious response to this. They may argue that the “permanent interests of man 
as a progressive being” are not served by redistributions of this sort. Brink and others have provided 
perfectionist readings of Mill which provide a number of potential responses of this sort (Brink, 1992). In 
contrast, Bentham was bound by his assumption of quantitative utilitarianism so may give no such 
response. 
 
A critique of the conventional view. 
It is clear that the conventional view of Bentham does reflect some important ideas in the development of 
his political theory. It is in some ways, however, an incomplete view of Bentham’s work on public 
reasoning and democratic theory. Since this reading essentially casts Bentham as a “rational choice” 
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aggregative theorist, the normative strengths and weaknesses attributable to it follow from the particular 
characteristics of this type of view. Along with other aggregative theorists of this kind, like Riker (1982), 
conventional Bentham studies the interaction of voters by assuming that their preferences are self-
interested. He analyses different ways of using those preferences to produce collective decisions. Below, I 
examine briefly some of the normative merits of that view, as described. Having done so, we shall then 
consider whether Bentham was, in fact, “conventional” in the sense described.  
 
First, let us consider conventional Bentham in reference to the orientation, transformative power, status, 
and expectation of consensus that are attributed to public reasoning. In each of these respects, this 
construal of Bentham follows a “rational choice” aggregative approach. Relative to rival contemporary 
views of public reasoning provided by deliberative and aggregative theorists, therefore, this reading of 
Bentham provides a weaker response to the challenge of explaining the value of pre-voting discussion, but 
a stronger response to that of preventing manipulated discursive outcomes. To explain why, it is worth 
briefly summarising why these conclusions follow from the normative characteristics attributed to 
conventional Bentham. 
 
The orientation of public reasoning in question is tilted towards the self-interest of participants rather than 
the public interest, or other wider interests. There are two separate points to note here. First, the 
conventional view of Bentham focuses on voting and the logic of institutions necessary for a successful 
aggregation of votes. It therefore reflects the fact that Bentham spent a great deal of his writing career 
explaining and analysing the functioning of aggregative democratic processes and—compared with 
contemporary deliberationists—relatively little time explaining the details of how a process of public 
discussion should lead citizens towards understanding the public interest.  
 
The second point to note is that quite apart from not appearing in a conventional construal of Bentham’s 
political theory, a view of public reasoning which was directed towards the public interest in this way 
would actually be contrary to some of its principles. While contemporary deliberationists write with 
enthusiasm about the benefits of discourse in the public realm, and the changes that it can induce both in 
citizens and the decisions they take part in, the conventional view of Bentham approaches public-
orientated discussion of this sort with some suspicion. The conventional insistence that individuals should 
vote according to self-interest means that conditions for public-interested deliberation are not given 
significant emphasis. It also means that public-orientation of this sort is precluded. Conventional Bentham 
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is thus both “rational choice” aggregative in approach, and apparently hostile to public-interested 
discourse before voting. 
 
It follows that the conventional reading of Bentham, like other aggregative views which rely on self-
interested voting, is in a poor position to respond to the challenge of explaining the normative value of 
pre-voting discussion between citizens. It does not hold that public-interested collective decisions require 
successful public-orientated discourse in order to be realised. Consequently, there is no strong reason to 
believe that public reasoning should be essential to good decision-making; or that it plays any particularly 
important role. 
 
As we have seen, the lack of a public-orientation at the ballot box also has likely consequences for 
“rational choice” aggregative views in response to the challenge of preventing manipulated discursive 
outcomes. If, as conventional Bentham suggests, the public interest can be reached through an aggregation 
of self-interested votes at the ballot box, it follows that this view, like others, offers the chance to produce 
good outcomes through collective decisions without the offering more opportunities for outcomes to be 
manipulated during deliberation before voting. Whilst public-focused deliberation may have a number of 
other benefits, it does also imply the potential for discussion to be manipulated to favour some interests 
over others. In particular, depending on how the term is understood, the demand for discourse to reflect 
only “public” reasons also carries with it the potential for public and private reasons to be conflated, 
leading to manipulated outcomes (O’Flynn, 2010). That conflation can only happen if discourse is 
expected to refer to, and clarify the public interest rather than self-interest. 
Denying the value of a public-orientated deliberation before voting thus puts the conventional 
understanding of Bentham in a weaker position to explain the value of pre-voting discussion, but a 
stronger position to prevent manipulated discursive outcomes. In particular, the conventional view implies 
that individuals’ expressed preferences should be considered an reliable reflection of their interests. This 
is essentially the opposite of the approach implied by many deliberative democrats. While those theorists 
imply the need for an “improvement” in preferences, through an appropriate process of consideration and 
deliberation; the conventional view simply aggregates existing views. Consequently, the conventional 
view is unlikely to give cause for citizens to be told that they have the “wrong” preferences. While 
deliberative theorists have been criticised for implying that a failure to reach certain conclusions is the 
result of deliberative failings (Posner, 2004), conventional Bentham would be unlikely to level such an 
accusation at any preferences, or conclusions.  
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As a “rational choice” aggregative view, conventional Bentham also denies that public deliberation before 
voting has the power to transform preferences towards the public interest, or in related important ways. 
This reduces the potential value of discourse before voting, because it cannot radically change the 
underlying preferences that individuals hold. Consider, for instance, two competing goals: a desire to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions, and for consumer energy prices dipping below £0.10 per Kilowatt-hour. 
Assume that this price level cannot be achieved without scrapping “green levies” on resale prices and 
therefore increasing the carbon dioxide emissions of created by electricity consumption. Assume that a 
national referendum has been scheduled to decide whether green levies should be scrapped.  
 
A citizen has an underlying preference for lower energy prices over environmentally-sound energy 
generation. Many deliberative views imply that an individual like this may well be prompted to revisit and 
revise her preference as a result of deliberation. It is not merely that deliberation provides information 
about how lower energy costs and more sustainable generation can be achieved. It can, rather, 
fundamentally cause the voter to change her mind about which goal should be prioritised, and which 
should be sacrificed. In contrast, public reasoning according to the conventional view of Bentham is non-
transformative. It does not claim the ability to cause the voter to amend her underlying preference for 
lower energy costs. Citizens may present information to one another, and consider relevant evidence, but 
the purpose of this input will be primarily to help citizens understand how their preferences relate to the 
question at hand; not to transform that underlying basis for making a decision on how to vote. 
 
Assuming that transformations happen in a positive way, and deliberation acts as it should do, deliberative 
theories are better placed to explain the value of pre-voting discussion in light of the transformative 
conception of discourse they advocate. In comparison, the conventional view of Bentham does not appeal 
to this potential for significant, positive preference change. Thus, it cannot appeal to these kinds of 
benefits to explain the value of discussion before voting. So, citizens following this blueprint for voting 
cannot “worsen” their preferences through a process of deliberation which has gone astray. Nor can they 
“improve” their preferences through an enlightening and positive deliberative engagement. This makes 
public reasoning less potentially damaging, but also less important. Like other “rational choice” 
aggregative views, conventional Bentham may invoke a less paternalistic attitude toward preferences than 
deliberative counterparts. As a result, it may be less susceptible to potential manipulation of discursive 
outcomes. Similarly, however, denying the potential for preference change also makes it more difficult for 
the conventional view to provide a plausible explanation of why public reasoning before voting should be 
considered an important, or valuable component of democratic procedure. These concerns are also 
reflected by the status that conventional Bentham accords to public reasoning. There is nothing in the 
conventional view of Bentham to suggest that public reasoning should play a moralised role. It is not, for 
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example, associated with reflecting, creating, or constituting fundamental democratic norms like justice or 
legitimacy. 
 
As a consequence, the conventional view of Bentham does not provide any obvious answers to the 
challenge of providing an explanation of the value of pre-voting discussion. Its emphasis on counting 
votes rather than talking to generate better public understanding of political decisions means that the value 
of discussion can be explained in functional rather than moralised terms. Further, the right kind of 
discursive interaction between citizens is not portrayed, on this reading, as the basis for the legitimate 
exercise of democratic power, or for the basis of wider principles of justice. Conventional Bentham thus 
provides a characterisation of democracy which is something very close to what Barber calls mere 
“selection among preferences…[with] efficient decision-making as its sole measure” (Barber, 2003:198). 
 
For the reasons discussed, however, the lack of a concept of moralised debate on the conventional 
Benthamite view is an advantage in reference to our second challenge of preventing manipulated 
discursive outcomes. Insofar as a moralised conception of debate is thought to apply to different 
contemporary views, it is also believed to imply that further conditions or duties should apply to the type 
of deliberation that citizens engage in before voting. These conditions, in turn, create some opportunities 
for discussion to be manipulated to favour the interests of dominant figures rather than the whole of the 
community. In particular, they have been associated with the potential for elites to make paternalistic 
judgements about the validity of the preferences expressed by members of the community. As we shall 
see in subsequent chapters, attitudes like these may increase the danger of manipulated discursive 
outcomes—produced as a result of social pressure to reach a conclusion within prescribed times. 
Similarly, there is little in the conventional understanding of Bentham to suggest that deliberation should 
be expected to achieve full consensus between citizens on complex and fundamental questions. Unlike the 
“stronger deliberative” views of Habermas and Dryzek, conventional Bentham does not suggest that 
achieving this kind of complete agreement for shared reasons is reasonable expectation for well-ordered 
discussion between citizens before they vote. 
 
Indeed, it would be strange if an aggregative view which asks individuals to vote according to their self-
interest did expect citizens to fully agree in a Habermasian way. After all, the conventional view denies 
the public-orientation and transformative power of pre-voting discussion. As we have seen, the stronger 
deliberative view which expects deliberation to achieve full consensus offers a strong response to our first 
challenge of explaining the value of discussion, but also creates opportunities for discursive manipulation, 
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particularly through the danger of false consensus. The conventional view of Bentham denies the 
assumption of full consensus and, therefore, is less likely to subject discussion to the danger of false 
consensus. It is thus at an advantage in respect to responding to our second challenge of preventing 
manipulated discursive outcomes.  
 
We have seen that the conventional reading of Bentham has both normative strengths and weaknesses 
relative to contemporary views on the role of public reasoning. Irrespective of these normative merits, I 
believe that the conventional view is, however, an incomplete reflection of the parts of Bentham’s writing 
which are relevant to this question. Whilst Bentham did advocate the secret ballot and express an 
aggregative definition of the public interest, his account of individuals’ motivation was more nuanced 
than often suggested. In particular, it would be misleading to ascribe a simple (referential) raw preference 
utilitarianism to Bentham; particularly in light of his writing on epistemology. Far from being happy to 
accept referential errors in expressed preferences as a basis for voting, Bentham was determined to 
acknowledge the potential for referential error. Indeed, the correction of errors was central to much of his 
writing. 
 
Consider, for example, “A Table of the Springs of Action” in “Deontology together with a Table of the 
Springs of Action and The Article on Utilitarianism”. This was Bentham’s attempt to chart the sources of 
motivation for different types of action. Here, as we might expect, he argued that pleasure and pain lie at 
the foot of all motivations to act (Bentham, 1983c:98). Ultimately, he believed, members of society often 
made referential errors in the way they understood people’s motivations. These errors could result either 
from the judgement of an observer being swayed by his interest in the matter in question, or his 
intellectual weakness. Judgment could be “influenced, and perverted, by interest”, or an observer being 
subject to some form of “mere weakness- intellectual weakness” (Bentham, 1983c:111). Bentham thus 
explicitly acknowledged and addressed the capacity for error. This featured under the heading “Causes of 
misjudgement and misconduct” (Ibid). Here, as in many other places, Bentham does not sound like a 
thinker who could not distinguish between preferences based on referential error, and those based on 
sound judgment.  
 
These works also demonstrate that Bentham was not the simple egoist that he is sometimes portrayed to 
be. Bentham certainly emphasised the importance of self-interest as a motivation throughout much of his 
career. Mack, for instance, points towards his writing in 1790 which notes “the universal, necessary, and 
undisputed, and not even to be lamented property in human nature, the predominance of the self-regarding 
83 
 
affections over the social” (Bentham in Mack, 1962:455). Passages like these became more explicit and 
common in the later Bentham’s work, as his political theory also developed in a democratic direction. In 
“First Principles Preparatory to Constitutional Code”, for instance, Bentham assumes something which 
sounds like a simple egoism as a starting point for understanding how public opinion should work: 
“On every occasion, the conduct of every human being will be determined by his own interest… 
meaning according to his own conception of it, to the conception correct or incorrect entertained 
in relation to it by himself at the moment of action”  
(Bentham, 1989:68)  
 
Alongside this, however, in his study of motivation in IPML, Bentham acknowledged the pleasure that 
individuals take from the interest and welfare of others. He was, nonetheless, careful to take account of 
self-interest as a predominant, if not absolute motivation for human action throughout both his earlier and 
later writing on institutional design (Hume, 1978:7).  
 
So, Bentham argued, pleasure and pain lay at the root of people’s interests and motivations. The utilitarian 
roots of interests and motivations were not, however, always perceived clearly. For a variety of reasons—
which we will revisit in subsequent chapters—people could and did err in how they perceived their own 
interests, and those of others. Bentham’s recently re-edited writing on sex emphasises this point. Bentham 
believed, and readily acknowledged, that prejudice could pollute public opinion, often on a persistent 
basis. He argued, for example, that the exclusion of women from the franchise had been based on 
prejudice rather than a proper understanding of interests (Quinn in Zhai & Quinn ed. 2014:79). 
In recent years, Schofield (2006:1-5) has radically clarified our understanding of Bentham’s views in this 
area. Where previous scholarship had referred to Bentham’s theory of fictions in general (Ogden, 1932), 
Schofield more precisely identified the relationship between real and fictitious entities, and later instances 
of misjudgement which resulted from their conflation. Often, Bentham believed, confusions in language 
caused people to misunderstand interests in society. Prime among these confusions was the mis-use of 
fictitious entities in common language which often implied that they were real and physical rather than 
merely a construction of language. Whilst real entities could be perceived by the senses, fictitious entities 
could not. They had to be carefully analysed to test whether they ultimately had meaning. Ultimately, 
Bentham believed that meaning could be derived only from reference to real i.e. physical entities 
(Schofield, 2006:8). 
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Indeed, Bentham believed that this form of referential error—between real and fictitious entities—was a 
serious problem. Once a name was attributed to a fictitious entity, and it featured in common discourse, 
that named entity would often be mistaken for a real entity: 
“to speak of an object by its universally known name, is to ascribe existence to it. Out of this 
error, misconception, obscurity, ambiguity, confusion, doubt, disagreement, angry passions and 
even discord and hostility have to no inconsiderable amount had place” 
(Bentham, UC cii 447 (9 July 1826) [Bowring viii, 327-8] in Schofield, 2006:77) 
 
Bentham’s political arguments in many areas, and their roots in his theory of language as clarified by 
Schofield, do not sound like those of a theorist unconcerned with referential error. Bentham’s arguments 
about language, and the distinction between real and fictitious entities, also support the idea that he was an 
individualist i.e. defined the public interest as the aggregate of the interests of relevant individuals. 
Clearly, there is textual evidence to support this view: 
“The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as 
constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the 
interests of the several members who compose it.” (Bentham, 1970: 12)  
 
This definition is put to use in many aspects of Bentham’s later political theory. To take one example, in 
the “Constitutional Code” (CC), he considers the performance of the legislature in reference to “the 
national interest... [which is] nothing more than an aggregate of the several particular interests” (Bentham, 
1983b:43). Here, and elsewhere, Bentham believed that a general and abstract notion was comprehensible 
only in terms of the physical interests of individuals involved. Bentham’s individualism makes much 
sense in the context of his views on language.  
If, as Bentham asserts, the public interest is a fictitious entity, and individuals, along with the physical 
utility they experience, are real entities, then there is no other way in which the public interest can be 
understood. Bentham’s theory of language, and the categories he dictates mean that the public interest can 
be nothing other than individualistic. There is no scope in his approach for an alternative, abstract concept 
of the public interest, which exists apart from the concrete utility of individuals. The individualism 
Bentham asserts thus runs deep. It is etched into the foundations of his worldview; not just his politics.  
 
Whilst the grounds for believing that Bentham was an individualist are strong, those for suggesting he 
was a raw preference utilitarian are not. The utilitarian painted by Kymlicka is content to accept 
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preferences containing referential errors. But Bentham himself consistently tried to seek out and correct 
mistakes like this. Perhaps most famously, Bentham applied this idea of error to the popular notion of 
rights (Bentham, 1998b); arguing that the widely held basis for individual rights was mistaken since it 
was not ultimately comprehensible in real (physical) terms. He did not respond by concluding that 
existing rights-practice was justified; simply because it was valuable according to existing preferences. 
Rather, he believed that rights talk was either comprehensible in terms of harms and benefits to 
individuals; or it reflected nothing more than the personal view of a speaker. In Bentham’s view, 
uncritical talk of individuals’ rights was harmful precisely because “most commonly when examined into, 
the only meaning which it is found to cover is the latter”: personal prejudice rather than a reflection of the 
harms and benefits encountered by individuals (UC cliii. 133-8 in Schofield, 2006:107). Referential error 
was thus fundamental to Bentham’s famous rejection of rights. Such discourse was meaningless because 
it did not refer to real entities. 
 
This is just one example of a wider theme. Bentham wished to distinguish real entities from the properties 
ascribed to them. He believed that doing so would allow individuals to understand their physical 
environment better; and maximise their own welfare. There is some evidence that this, in turn, fed into 
Bentham’s views on how public opinion would operate in a democracy. Whilst he believed that 
individuals should be amenable to arguments based on the harms and benefits of particular measures, this 
was no guarantee that they always would be. Just as Kymlicka’s diner might make mistakes in assessing 
whether the pizza in front of him is his favoured lunch option, Bentham’s citizens might also err in their 
appreciation of the utilitarian reasons to vote one way over another:  
“To prove that an institution is agreeable to the principle of utility, is to prove...that the people 
ought to like it: but whether they will like it or no after all, is another question” (Principles of 
Penal Law”, Part II: ‘Rationale of Punishment’, Bowring, i, 390-525, at 411, quoted in Quinn, 
2014: 74).  
 
This related idea of referential error in language was essential to Bentham’s writing on logic. His “central 
concern in his writings on logic was to understand the way in which language might be used both 
accurately to describe, and inaccurately or erroneously to misdescribe, the physical world” (Schofield, 
2006:13). With these writings on logic and language in mind, we can conclude with some confidence that 
Bentham did not espouse a referential raw preference view of welfare. Contrary to Kymlicka’s 
implication, Bentham would not have been content to satisfy a diner’s misplaced preference to eat pizza 
which, unbeknownst to them, has been poisoned. 
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With some notable exceptions (Schwartzberg, 2007b; Rosen, 1983), relatively little attention has 
historically been paid to the implications that these kinds of error had for Bentham’s political thought. 
There may be a couple of reasons for this. First, it is only relatively recently, in 2006, that Schofield has 
established just how significant and clear the link between Bentham’s logic, writing on language, and later 
political theory was. Seen in this context, Bentham’s attack on abstract references to individual rights 
follows from his earlier insistence that fictitious entities must be analysed and understood in relation to 
physical terms. Only through that process could they be properly understood, rather than causing 
confusion and harm.  
 
Second, many interpretations have rightly been influenced by contributions of H.L.A. Hart, who edited 
the “Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation” in its most recent form. Whilst revelatory 
and fascinating in many other ways, Hart’s analysis gives fallibility of judgement, and the potential for 
error, a rather cursory treatment. In his “Essays on Bentham” (1982), Hart outlines only briefly, then 
dismisses, the basis for Bentham’s belief in the fallibility of judgement. Rather than suggesting that the 
capacity for error is an important idea in Bentham’s thought, he instead suggests that it is wholly based on 
a “naively subjectivist” account of beliefs, and consequently, speech acts, that cannot adequately explain 
the “common sense” meaning of claims that are common to everyday discourse (Hart, 1982:11). In 
support of that conclusion, Hart cites Bentham’s view that “That to which expression is given, that of 
which communication is made is always the man’s opinion nor anything more” (Bowring, VIII, 321). A 
simple interpretation of this view would suggest that: 
(S) the only logical meaning of any speech act “that p” is in fact “I believe that p”, and nothing 
more. 
 
Hart’s explanation of Bentham’s rejection of claims to infallibility was therefore that any such claims 
must necessarily be false. The speech acts of supposedly infallible speakers, like other speech acts are –by 
definition—incapable of relating to anything more than their speakers’ mind states. This position is 
criticised as a “naive” basis for rejecting claims to the possession of infallible judgement regarding the 
external world (Hart, 1982:12). In a state of affairs where (S) holds, claims to infallibility are necessarily 
false; the speech acts of supposedly infallible rulers are by definition, incapable of relating to facts about 
the external world. However, (S) also entails more than this. There is some textual evidence for Hart’s 
view. From the “elliptical” basis of speech acts, Bentham draws two principal conclusions: “avoid 
dogmativeness...still more avoid intolerance”.  A central tenet of fallibilism (his belief that human 
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judgment is always liable to error) thus emerges: “never cease to bear in mind how slippery and hollow 
the ground on which your opinion, and consequently the utmost value of any expression which you can 
give to it, rests” (Bowring viii 330).  
 
Bentham did hold that “the falsity of all such claims to infallibility was a consequence of some simple 
truths about the character of human judgements”. This claim is not, however, necessarily reliant upon (S). 
Indeed, Hart quickly dismisses Bentham's fallibilism. He suggests that “...here I think his limitations as a 
philosopher begin to appear” (Hart, 1982:12-3). Hart goes on to assert that the weakness in this epistemic 
argument also damages Bentham’s wider account of the nature of law; it “infects his conception of 
commands, prohibitions, and permissions” (1982:12). He quotes Bentham’s insistence that “of no matter 
of fact external to, of not matter other than that which passes in a man’s own mind can any immediate 
communication be made by language” (Bowring, viii 321). The term “immediate” is central to this 
quotation’s meaning. Hart interprets this as textual evidence for the centrality of (S) as a premise for 
Bentham’s rejection of claims to infallibility. An alternative explanation is possible. The quotation above 
reasserts that—in political terms—the possibility of error in the exercise of judgement should always be 
borne in mind. The falsity of claims to infallibility was thus explicable in terms of the possibility of error 
which was a recurrent theme of human judgement in Bentham's epistemology.  
 
I believe that Hart is right to imply that this would be a confused basis on which to reject claims to 
infallibility. Instead of identifying specific sources of error in judgements—thus statements—about the 
external world, this premise would instead undermine the very basis for the possibility of a reliable 
relation between speech acts and external facts. The Hartian criticism is, however, flawed on two grounds. 
First, Bentham cannot be understood as working within the same analytic approach as many 20th century 
philosophers; particularly those who followed the “linguistic turn”. As a consequence, the counter 
argument that his theory does not accommodate everyday language is not conclusive. Work done by 
Schofield (2006:1-27) on unpublished manuscripts confirms that Bentham’s project was not to work from 
the foundation of everyday language; discerning and clarifying the truth found in its use. Instead, he 
wanted to apply a radical new epistemology, using direct sensory perception of real entities as a starting 
point, and expose the systematic misunderstandings and biases ingrained in the application of language. 
For Bentham, language was not so much an authoritative epistemic starting point as an established 
custom; riddled with error and demanding criticism from an alternative perspective. Consequently, he 
emphasised the practical steps necessary to expose fallacies and the false beliefs they engendered. Doing 
this required an active and critically engaged response to language. This could only be achieved when 
claims to infallibility were rejected: fallibility of human judgement “ought never to be out of mind” 
(Bowring, viii:300n). 
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The “fact” that a thesis implies one cannot acknowledge as legitimate everyday references to apparently 
external objects is thus irrelevant. A central tenet of Bentham’s project was to confront and expose the 
illegitimacy of many such references. The root to correcting systematic errors of this sort lay outside, 
rather than inside the established customs they embodied.  
 
Second, it is not quite as clear as Hart implies that Bentham’s understanding of the meaning of speech 
acts was entirely subjectivist. Rather—as Postema has argued at length—Bentham also believed that the 
value of speech acts could be assessed and understood in reference to their utilitarian value (Postema, 
1983: 40-58). In turn, this relied on an interaction with a series of external facts about the external world: 
not merely an interlocutor’s own mind state in isolation. Bentham believed that the presentation of false 
beliefs still had potential to promote utility because any perception of their apparent falsity could only be 
probabilistic. Consequently, there was rarely any reason to exclude the expression of any specific types of 
argument in public discourse. Bentham thus links infallibility and the liberty of discussion, pre-empting a 
subsequent argument by Mill: whether this “theory of impeccability or infallibility emerged in a 
madhouse or in a den of thieves would be a question suitable for a debating club were it not that under 
this theory “all debating clubs, all meetings that can produce discussion on topics the most interesting to 
human happiness, are silenced” (Bentham, 1989: 276, quoted in Schwartzberg, 2007: 574). 
 
So much for the idea of referentially “raw preferences”; what of pre-deliberative preferences? Is Bentham 
a “raw preference” utilitarian in this sense? The first thing to say, of course, is that the idea of preferences 
as pre-deliberative depends very much on which conception of deliberation is used to frame that idea. For 
instance, it should be clear from what we have noted about Habermasian deliberation that Bentham did 
not endorse a “stronger deliberative” conception of pre-voting discussion. There is little to suggest that 
Bentham endorsed a fully transformative, moralised form of deliberation, expected to reach full 
consensus. It follows from this that Bentham probably was a raw preference utilitarian if we accept this 
stronger notion of deliberation and define deliberation in “stronger” Habermasian terms.  
 
Beyond this, things get more complicated. “Weaker deliberative” theorists emphasise the value of pre-
voting discussion without necessarily holding that this should produce full consensus between 
participants, or that deliberation holds a particular moralised value in reference to the democratic norms it 
reflects, generates, or constitutes. For a weaker deliberative theorist, preferences might be raw if they are 
formed without full information, reflection, or consideration. Here, there is more common cause between 
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weaker deliberationists and many examples of Bentham’s democratic writing. Bentham argued that 
people need adequate information and consideration to understand their interests properly. There are 
many examples of this in his writing. In the “Deontology”, for example, he argued that individuals have 
been misled to believe that sacrifices of their own welfare are morally valuable. This caused them to 
misunderstand their own interests. His task was to liberate people from the influence of this “gloomy 
system of theology” (Bentham, 1983c:122); to clear away misleading use of terms like “virtue” and 
“vice”. In reality, he believed, terms like these had no value aside from their relation to happiness, which 
was “all that is ultimately and for its own sake worth regard” (1983c: 122). Some of Bentham’s 
constitutional writing reflects a belief that mistaken beliefs of this sort can be exposed and eradicated 
through rational argument. In “First Principles…”, for instance, he focuses on the role of delusion in a 
political system, and the harm that it had done.  
 
Whilst he did not want to speculate about all of the psychological and historical sources of such delusions, 
Bentham was clear—as we will see in Chapter 4—on its serious effects. Delusion in public discourse 
caused erroneous opinions about interests, which damaged citizens’ true interests:  
“Not one history out of a thousand—not one biography out of ten thousand—that tends not to 
keep the mind plunged into this error: and this is one of the ways in which the making men dupes 
has for its effect, and to a vast extent for its object, their being made slaves”  
(Bentham, 1983c: 265) 
 
The strength of language here is important. Deluded citizens had not merely been led astray, but actively 
enslaved by their rulers (Ibid: 264). Given the importance of delusion in Bentham’s constitutional writing, 
it would be misleading to conclude that he believed that the satisfaction of informed, considered 
preferences was of the same value as those of uninformed, unconsidered preferences. It was precisely 
because reflection and information was necessary to proper assessment of interests that Bentham 
denounced “prejudice”. He defined this as: an opinion “embraced without sufficient examination...a 
judgement which, being pronounced before evidence, is therefore pronounced without evidence” (UC cii. 
540 (6 Aug. 1811) [Bowring, ii. 478] in Schofield, 2006: 265). There are, therefore, good reasons to 
believe that Bentham believed that individuals could significantly err in their understanding of interests, 
and that information and reflection, along with the clarification of language, was needed to help correct 
these errors. 
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Bentham argued that people need to reflect on this information before voting rather than merely vote 
according to an unconsidered initial view. The details of how this reflection and collecting of information 
should take place will be our focus in subsequent chapters. There are, however, some clear indicators that 
Bentham wished voters to inform themselves and reflect before voting, and for legislators to a play a role 
in helping them to do so (Quinn, 2014:85). 
 
Finally, if we consider raw preferences to be personal—rather than social or communal—the picture is 
somewhat clearer. Whilst Bentham wanted laws and political decisions to reflect the public interest, he 
also argued in the strongest terms that individuals should vote according to their own interests. He 
believed that secrecy was important to voting. It was “the only security for genuineness of suffrage” 
(Bowring, iii, 599). Protection from the effect of public opinion and, critically, the approval or 
disapproval of powerful and exalted patrons, allowed voters to express their real views at the ballot box 
rather than courting the approval of others. This argument complements the famous assertion in IPML 
that self-interest is a predominant motivation for much action (Bentham, 1970a: 97-8), as well as an 
appropriate evaluative standard for individual actions (1970a:12). Indeed, in Bentham’s political writing, 
the “general predominance of self-regarding affection in man's nature over social affection” is sometimes 
simply assumed as “a matter of fact” (1989: 264-5). 
To recap, the conventional view results from three assumptions about Bentham’s political theory: raw 
preference utilitarianism, a quantitative conception of utility, and an individualist definition of the public 
interest. These are sometimes accompanied by a crude view of Bentham’s work on motivation. In reality, 
this acknowledged both social and selfish motives for action, and the predominance of the former over the 
latter. Taken together, these suggest a modest and functional, rather than expansive and extensive, role for 
pre-voting discussion between citizens. As a result, the conventional view of Bentham is relatively weak 
in response to the challenge of explaining the normative value of pre-voting discussion. It grants 
discussion a functional rather than consensus-producing, moralised role. It is also relatively strong in 
response to the challenge of denying opportunities for manipulation of discursive outcomes, exactly 
because it denies discussion such a significant role in democratic theory. Additionally, it provides few 
“paternalistic” grounds on which the preferences of ordinary citizens may be criticised; relatively to some 
“stronger” deliberative views. 
 
In interpretive terms, the conventional view is an incomplete reading of Bentham’s work. It is fair to say 
that Bentham emphasised self-interested action by citizens and voters; both at the ballot box and before 
this. He did not, however, endorse “raw preference” utilitarianism; understood in terms of referential 
error. Bentham was not a “stronger deliberative” democrat, so did not conceive of raw preferences as 
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those preceding this form of Habermasian deliberation. He did, however, conceptualise the importance of 
error in the formulation of preferences.  
 
Having examined the strengths and weaknesses of the conventional view, we shall proceed to investigate 
an alternative. It is clear that the conventional view does not convincingly respond to the first of our 
normative challenges: effective discussion; though it does have some strengths in reference to preventing 
manipulation of discursive outcomes. In the next chapter, we shall discover if an alternative reading of 
Bentham can fare any better.  
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Chapter 3. A participatory view of Bentham 
Introduction 
Contemporary theories of public reasoning focus on the status and role of discussions between citizens, 
including before voting, and the obligations that apply to participants. In contrast, it is relatively rare in 
Bentham scholarship to examine explicitly Bentham’s political writing in these terms. Instead, many 
commentators focus on the role publicity plays as a feature of the constitutional system Bentham 
espoused, and its relation to the architecture of government.  
 
In this chapter, I examine some examples of Bentham scholarship which provide potential grounds for 
understanding Bentham’s views on public reasoning. These are “participatory” in the sense that they 
suggest significant grounds for citizens’ participation in discussion before voting. Unlike the conventional 
view, therefore, they attribute to Bentham something more than a simply aggregative democratic view, 
which holds that aggregation of votes alone, without significant discussion, is sufficient. 
 
There is sometimes a gap between the terminology and concepts used by Bentham scholars and 
contemporary normative theorists. Most Bentham scholars do not explicitly use the normative concepts 
and terminology which characterises contemporary debate between deliberative and aggregative 
democracy. For example, they have not often systematically examined the obligations of participants in 
discussion, or the effect that discussion is believed to have on the character of citizens, and the nature of 
arguments presented. Nonetheless, concepts explored by Niesen, Ben-Dor, Crimmins, Lyons, and 
Schofield do provide many of the resources required to understand Bentham’s views on pre-voting 
discussion. Each provides a valuable insight into how Bentham wanted democratic debate to function. In 
doing so, they challenge suggestions—outlined in Chapter 2—that Bentham wished voters to engage 
solely at the ballot box, and not before. 
 
Some of these participatory views—for instance those based on work by Lyons and Niesen—imply that 
we should reject the assumption that Bentham wished citizens to deliberate, and vote according to, their 
own self-interest. I argue that this would be a mistake; for two reasons. First, Bentham’s argument for the 
secret ballot places self-interested voting at the centre of his rationale for democracy. Second, a self-
interested view of pre-voting discussion fits more comfortably with the context of Bentham’s work on 
language and epistemology. Attempts to equate Bentham’s views of discussion with those of 
Habermasian “stronger deliberative” theorists are likely to mislead: Bentham consistently advocated a 
93 
 
non-moralised form of discussion. This was based on an informed understanding of self-interest; not a 
“moralised” realisation of the public interest, as suggested by some deliberative democrats. Other 
participatory views, like those of Schofield, do reflect Bentham’s focus on self-interest. I believe that 
these views provide strong foundations for understanding Bentham’s views; but this scholarship tends to 
focus on the idea of publicity and democracy rather than the nature of citizens’ participation. There is, 
therefore, an important challenge ahead: to understand how the concepts identified by these scholars 
translate into a view of public reasoning, and how that view fits within the context of other competing 
views in the contemporary debate.   
 
In general—and for different reasons—these more “participatory” views of Bentham do not provide 
grounds for a view which both explains the normative value of pre-voting discussion and negates 
opportunities for manipulated discursive outcomes. Niesen and Ben-Dor suggest that a type of 
participation was essential to the outcomes that Bentham wished to create through political decision-
making. Schofield identifies the important place that publicity played in Bentham’s constitutional 
thinking; which could lend itself to a fuller picture of the type of public reasoning required. In contrast, 
the “dual standard” that Lyons attributes to Bentham could suggest that individuals should participate in 
public deliberation and have a duty to reflect considerations relevant to the public interest in doing so. But 
this view provokes further difficult challenges. Broadly, participatory views thus offer the option of either 
stretching Bentham’s views to overplay similarities with contemporary deliberationists; or analysing the 
concepts in Bentham’s thought without applying them to the terms used in contemporary debate.  
 
Participatory views of Bentham 
Let us begin by defining what we mean by “participatory” Bentham scholarship. There is a distinct 
contrast between the conventional view of Bentham, as an aggregative democrat for whom prior 
discussion is a relatively unimportant mere preliminary, and what Mansbridge et al. describe as the 
“classical ideal of public reason” under which “individuals “enter a deliberation with conflicting opinions 
about what is good for the polity, but after voicing and hearing the reasons for different the reasons for 
different options, converge on one option as the best, for the same reasons” (Mansbridge et al, 2010: 66). 
That ideal is a hallmark of what I have called “stronger deliberation”. That view holds that deliberation 
should have some key characteristics. These include: focussing on the public interest, transforming 
preferences, constituting or creating important democratic norms, and expecting full consensus between 
participants. 
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Participatory views of Bentham imply that his democratic views are closer to this “stronger deliberative” 
perspective than often thought. They liken some aspects of his democratic thought to the kind of 
deliberation espoused by Habermas and his followers. On this view, talking literally takes the place of 
counting, making Bentham something of a deliberative theorist. The participatory view rejects the idea 
that Bentham merely relies on the aggregation, through voting, of raw, self-interested, unreformed 
preferences. As a result, it suggests that public reasoning is a critical stage in Benthamite democratic 
theory.  
 
Different accounts reach this conclusion for different reasons. Some participatory views imply that 
citizens should deliberate together according to the public interest rather than self-interest. Unlike the 
conventional view, the participatory view suggests that citizens should deliberate, or at least discuss 
policy, together: this plays an important role in decision-making. Each instance of the participatory view 
is different. Some examples imply that citizens should deliberate together regarding the public interest. 
Others, in contrast, do not depart from a conventional assertion that Bentham wished citizens to consider 
their own interests before voting rather than those of the community. This is an important distinction, and 
one which has not always received the attention it deserves.  
 
Consider, for instance, Niesen’s recent writing (2011), which builds a case for Bentham’s deliberative 
credentials on a reading of his evaluation of parliamentary discourse. Niesen’s direct focus is 
parliamentary, rather than public, deliberation. In the account below, I use his analysis of the former to 
shed light on the latter. I am aware that doing so steps over an important distinction. My aim is not to 
evaluate Niesen’s interpretation of Bentham on parliamentary deliberation, but to see how far a view of 
public reasoning based on it can go. There are two key questions here. First, can this account—based on 
Niesen’s work—provide a coherent interpretation of Bentham? Second, can it answer the two challenges 
outlined above: defining the role of effective discussion before voting and reducing opportunities for 
manipulation of discussion? In considering those questions, we shall use Niesen’s analysis as a starting 
point. Having done so, we shall later return to the distinction between public and parliamentary 
deliberation, arguing that it undermines the degree to which Niesen’s reading of “Political Tactics” (PT) 
could ground an understanding of how Bentham believed citizens should reason together before voting.  
 
Niesen provides an interesting analysis of how “Political Tactics” (PT)—Bentham’s analysis of political 
procedure and behaviour in the newly established French Assembly—evolved as a text.  
The kind of parliamentary reasoning Bentham endorsed was to be open to the public. Citizens needed to 
see and understand the rationale for political action in order to hold their representatives to account. 
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Niesen does not spell out the details of how this interaction should take place. It is perhaps in the dynamic 
interaction between parliamentary representatives and public scrutiny that we may find productive 
grounds for understanding Bentham’s views on public reasoning. In “Political Tactics”, Bentham suggests 
that a form of deliberation creates benefits across all levels of society. Niesen attributes those benefits to 
the way parliamentary representatives should interact with the public they represent: 
“…decision-making in parliament profits from the dynamic relationship...[and] the public will 
then profit from its exposure to high quality deliberations. Gradually ‘[a] habit of reasoning and 
discussion will penetrate all classes.’" (Niesen, 2011:7) 
 
The benefit of this kind of reasoning was clear: it made “sound opinion” more common (Bentham, 
1999:31). To vote before deliberating was, therefore, to decide on a question while isolating oneself from 
the means of doing so in an informed way; to conclude without hearing the wisdom of peers. This places 
Bentham alongside deliberative democrats who claim that the process of deliberation causes unacceptably 
partial or biased preferences give way to “those that can form the basis of a public consensus” (Gaus, 
2003:148). 
 
The context for PT is particularly interesting. Bentham’s original “Essay on Political Tactics” was written 
in 1791, but not published then. The best known version of this text, however, was published in French in 
1816 as part of Dumont’s “Tactique des assemblees politiques deliberantes”. Dumont was more than just 
a translator. Rather, as a recent editor of “Political Tactics” has remarked, Dumont’s were “reworked 
versions which, while preserving the essence of Bentham’s texts, were shorter and more concise…[and] 
encumbered with less detail” (Pease-Watkin, 2003:4). In 1843, Bowring, the executor of Bentham’s will, 
combined Dumont’s text with the earlier 1791 essay as part of Bentham’s collected works. This creates 
some particular challenges. Using these texts, it is impossible to know exactly how faithful Dumont’s 
1816 French text was to the preceding work on which it was based. As a result, we do not have a single, 
authoritative English version of PT from which to discern Bentham’s views. When an updated and re-
edited version was published in 1999, it took account of available original manuscripts. For many sections 
of the text, however, original texts had not survived. Consequently, the editors often had to rely on 
Dumont’s work from 1816.  
 
Niesen tries to address some of these challenges. He examines differences between available manuscripts 
from 1789-91, and the text published by Dumont twenty five years later. Those differences are 
particularly interesting on the subject of deliberation, and how it is described. The 1816 text refers to 
different aspects of the process of a group of representatives debating and making decisions together as 
“deliberation”. In contrast, Bentham’s original table of contents for the work refers to “proposing”, 
“debating”, and “voting” separately; it does not use this catch-all term (PT, 217 in Niesen, 2011: 2). By 
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the time Bowring published an amalgamated version of this work in 1843, the terminology had changed 
again; to “debate”. 
 
Niesen suggests that the importance of these differences goes beyond terminology. In earlier manuscripts, 
Bentham made a critical distinction between the discursive and decisive phases of parliamentary 
procedure. He believed that these separate activities had been conflated as a consequence of the imprecise 
language used in debates about the French Constitution. Commentators observing the French Assembly 
used a single word, “deliberation” to describe the entire decision-making process, rather than identifying 
specific activities required of legislators at different stages. As Niesen notes, it is therefore ironic that 
Dumont himself made exactly this “error” in introducing Bentham’s analysis (Niesen, 2011:3). By 
separating those two activities, Niesen suggests, Bentham wanted to establish that deliberation and 
decision were different functions of a legislator. The former improved exercise of the latter. Better 
decisions resulted from prior discussion and consideration of the arguments. By implication, therefore, 
worse decisions were made when there was less opportunity for motions to be proposed and debated first.  
 
The importance of deliberation should also be reflected in parliamentary procedure. Indeed, a failure to 
acknowledge the need for proper deliberation diminished debate and led to worse parliamentary decision-
making. Without the time to propose, discuss, and consider motions before having to vote on them, 
assembly members would not be able to learn from the arguments, reasons, and evidence presented by 
their colleagues. In this respect, the terminological error made in describing “deliberation” had real 
consequences. Bentham believed that analysts of French parliamentary procedure had diminished the role 
of deliberation by failing to correctly describe the procedure needed to facilitate it. To illustrate, Bentham 
cited past practice in French Estates as an example. In those bodies, each representative voted in 
sequence: after making his own contribution to the debate, but before hearing from others in the group. In 
doing so, each was “deliberating” in the broad sense used at the time; i.e. making a decision together as a 
group. In Bentham’s view, however, they were missing what was essential and valuable about 
parliamentary deliberation: learning from, and persuading, one another before deciding how to vote. 
 
Indeed, voting before fully debating a question was inimical to the kind of parliamentary deliberation that 
Bentham considered essential. Conversely, allowing assembly members to debate questions in turn and 
exchanging and considering reasons and evidence together, is central to Nisesn’s “participatory” reading 
of Bentham: 
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“…He who speaks last and "into whose lap the collected wisdom of the whole assembly is 
poured in a full tide, sees no one to whom he can give the benefit of illumination but himself." 
(PT: 95 in Niesen, 2011:5) 
 
This argument suggests something rather different from the “simple” or conventional view of Bentham 
considered in Chapter 2. “Conventional” Bentham assumes that isolated individuals express fixed 
preferences through voting, and remain independent of one another before this. In contrast, Niesen’s 
“participatory” Bentham suggests that representatives should vote only after proposing and debating 
together to consider the merits of relevant questions. Rather than merely expressing fixed preferences, 
Niesen suggests that representatives should be encouraged to change their minds during debate (PT: 94 in 
Niesen, 2011: 4). Democratic decision-making should thus be understood more as a forum in which 
participants learn from one another, than a marketplace in which they register individual preferences.  
 
On this view, the merits of discussion between representatives before voting are those of the influence of 
“understanding on understanding”. We have seen that aggregative and deliberative accounts of public 
reasoning differ in a number of respects. One of these is the transformative power attributed to discussion 
before voting. Some aggregative theories suggest that voters should be considered as independent of one 
another before they vote. In contrast, deliberative theories actively encourage interaction between voters 
as part of democratic participation. A central part of this interaction is the capacity of participants to 
persuade each other to change their minds: to transform the preferences they previously held. The force of 
persuasion using reasons is thus principally a feature of deliberative, rather than aggregative, conceptions 
of public reasoning.  
 
The features of Niesen’s reading of Bentham more readily fit into the deliberative side of this divide than 
the aggregative side. Participants are seen not as isolated individuals but rather as co-operators in a 
common “exercise of their intelligence” (Niesen, 2011: 5). Bentham famously distinguished between 
expository and censorial analysis. The task of expositor was to show and understand what had already 
been done by judges and legislators. The role of the censor was to demonstrate what they ought to do in 
future (Schofield, 2006: 51). In “Political Tactics” (1999), Bentham as expositor outlines some details of 
parliamentary procedure and how they interact practically when applied to political decision-making. 
Bentham the censor evaluates these by reference to a utilitarian definition of the public interest. As 
censor, he concludes that procedural restrictions, of the French Estates in particular, were a barrier to good 
decision-making. 
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The importance of representatives changing their mind before voting was thus central to the “common 
enterprise” of deliberation and it was critically important to reflect this in the design of parliamentary 
procedure. Without this, the community would not be able to realise decisions which reflect the shared 
wisdom of the community, realised through discourse: “Bentham's criticism is that the French practice 
rules out changes of mind on the part of earlier speakers and thereby disadvantages later speakers” 
(Niesen, 2011:5). Niesen’s work thus suggests that pre-voting discussion has an important role to play, 
and that this is related to participants’ capacity to change their minds before voting.  
 
We saw in Chapter 2 that Bentham defined the interests of the community as those of the individuals who 
compose it (Bentham, 1970a:2). In these terms he was, as Postema (1986) defines it, an “individualist”. 
That individualism lends itself to the conclusion that the public interest can be reflected through an 
aggregation of votes at the ballot box rather than informed, or special forms of discussion before voting. 
How might individualism be squared with the participatory reading suggested by Niesen? Rather than 
disputing Bentham’s individualism, Niesen acknowledges that Bentham believed that the public interest 
could—in the abstract—be reached through an aggregation of individual interests. It was a product of 
counting of interests, rather than talking between deliberators. The importance of pre-voting discussion 
could, however, be understood in practical rather than abstract terms.  
 
Niesen suggests that deliberative principles become vital to Bentham’s democracy not because the 
abstract aggregation of individuals’ interests was undesirable, but because it was difficult to achieve in 
practice. Bentham wished legislators to make rational decisions based on an informed assessment of the 
utilitarian impact of different proposals. Niesen’s Bentham also believed that they should, in practice, 
pursue utility through a form of deliberation. The importance of this form of debate, on Niesen’s view, 
was established by the necessary difficulties involved in conducting a comprehensive and complete 
calculation of relevant interests. While the latter was, for Niesen’s Bentham, ideal, the former would often 
be the best available route to maximising utility. Niesen’s interpretation of Bentham thus contends that the 
right kind of discursive interaction helps to secure the merits of “well-ordered deliberation” which can 
consequently “be seen as a functional equivalent to the elusive [felicific] calculus that Bentham had 
suggested” (Niesen, 2011: 13). Utility is thus served through public-spirited deliberation, practically akin 
to that advocated by Habermas (1997). This argument is instrumental: it suggests that deliberation is made 
valuable by the benefits it creates for public decision-making. It follows, therefore, that deliberation 
procedures between citizens are justified to the degree that they perform that role.  
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The right discursive conditions thus give participants access to reasons that accurately reflect the interests 
at stake. Presenting information and arguments during deliberation facilitates a decision that takes each 
claim into account, and assesses relevant evidence in light of available information. Indeed, contemporary 
utilitarians sometimes assert that this form of reasoning is implicit in the way Western polities debate 
policy. Riley provides one example of this. He cites Ely’s claim that American government is “a sort of 
applied utilitarianism—unfortunately possessing utilitarianism’s weaknesses as well as its strengths—an 
institutional way of determining the happiness of the greatest number”. Ely insists that the root of the 
appeal of democratic government in America is thus utilitarian: “the formation of public policy, at least in 
this country, [America] begins with the questions how many are helped, how many hurt, and by how 
much” (Ely quoted in Riley, 1990:336). The claim here is not that utilitarianism should lead to 
aggregation of votes without prior discussion, but that discussion should be guided by utilitarian 
principles. 
 
Similarly, Niesen’s Bentham suggests that by exchanging proposals, reasons, and arguments with one 
another, representatives in the Assembly mimic the merits of an abstract utilitarian calculation of interests. 
Their discussions act as an approximation of exact utility calculations. They allow the interests of each 
individual to be appropriately considered as a constituent of the community’s interest. Just as Bentham 
used an abstract calculus to count the interests of each person equally, so the “right” discursive conditions 
perform a similar purpose. They allow each party’s needs and preferences to be presented, considered, 
and judged.  The procedures followed in parliaments should thus shape and facilitate debate to play this 
role. They should prevent the interests of some individuals being afforded greater regard than those of 
others. 
 
Niesen illustrates using a number of examples from “Political Tactics”. For instance, there is to be no  
hierarchy among speakers. This is to be avoided, and mitigated, by rejecting permanent distinctions 
between frontbenchers and backbenchers (PT, 54 in Niesen, 2011: 9). Doing so would prevent the merits 
of arguments presented being distorted by received misled notions of authority and prestige. Similarly, 
Bentham wanted contributions to debates in the Assembly to actively respond to the contributions of 
others, in a creative way. This creativity resembles the progress that some contemporary theorists believe 
citizens achieve through, and during, deliberation. Bentham rejected the idea that speeches should be pre-
written before they were presented (PT 77, 132 in Niesen, 2011:9). In contemporary debates, this is 
resonant of the claim, made for instance by Jon Elster (1986), that a public form of deliberation is likely to 
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encourage individuals to present public-interested rather than self-interested arguments, as they seek 
reasons which will garner support from the widest group of their audience.  
 
We have not yet considered what Niesen’s participatory reading implies about the orientation of debate. 
On this question, Niesen’s references to Bentham’s view on parliamentary procedure are instructive. 
Those procedures were to be designed to encourage impartiality from speakers. They were expected to 
consider and reflect the interests of the community; not merely or those of the groups they represented 
directly. For this reason, every speaker was to speak from a neutral tribune; in contrast with British 
parliamentary practice of the time (Niesen, 2011: 7). This is a key difference between Niesen’s 
participatory view, and the “simple” or “conventional” reading of Bentham on public reasoning. That 
interpretation suggests that aggregating self-interested votes allows decisions which serve the public 
interest. Aggregation therefore makes public-interested deliberation redundant, and an impartial approach 
from deliberators unnecessary. “Conventional” voters are free to be “partial”: there is no need for them to 
reflect anything other than their own interests at the ballot box. In contrast, Niesen’s reading of PT 
suggests that Bentham wanted deliberators in the French Assembly to be impartial, in an important sense. 
They were to consider interests closer to those of the whole community, and further away from the 
preferences with which they initially entered the forum. 
 
On Niesen’s view, measures like this were intended help debate in the Assembly operate as a real world 
version of the felicific calculus. The inputs into that calculus were meant to reflect what Mill later called 
Bentham’s dictum. This was his famous insistence that “Every individual in the country tells for one; no 
individual for more than one” (RJE in Bowring vii, 334).30 Analogously, debate in the Assembly was to 
ensure equal consideration of the interests of all, and Niesen’s argument suggests that this demands a 
measure of impartiality from deliberators.  
 
Niesen’s participatory reading thus reflects a kind of public justification that is also emphasised by 
contemporary deliberative democrats. This implies that “having to defend one’s policy preferences in 
public leans one towards using public reason” (Chambers, 2004:390). The parliamentary representatives 
described in PT engage with the public when they speak in debate; not just with one another. 
Consequently, they speak to defend their positions to a wider group that “demands more from such 
debates in the way of justification than would be necessary in order to defeat the parliamentary minority 
(Niesen, 2011: 7). As Niesen points out, there are some important and interesting passages in PT. These 
                                                          
30 RJE (Rationale of Judicial Evidence, specially applied to English practice ). See (Schofield, 2006:84). 
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challenge the idea that Bentham believed in aggregation, to the exclusion of deliberation. Indeed, 
Bentham explicitly rejected the simple aggregative view sometimes ascribed to him by deliberative 
democrats. We have seen that independence of voters is a foundational assumption of much aggregative 
theory (Condorcet, 1785). Bentham explicitly rejects that assumption in “Political Tactics” (1999:145). 
 
Rather than replacing discussion with aggregation, therefore, Niesen’s Bentham instead urges use of 
appropriate modes of discourse to reach decisions that best serve the community’s interest. Niesen’s 
understanding of Bentham thus resembles some claims advanced by contemporary deliberative 
democrats. Both espouse the benefits of deliberators having to justify their arguments to a wider (public) 
audience. For this version of the participatory Bentham, those benefits are exclusively instrumental. As 
we discovered in Chapter 1, different deliberative democrats ascribe different types of value to 
deliberation. Indeed, Niesen himself makes this point. He cites Gutmann & Thompson to suggest that they 
have more in common with Bentham than they acknowledge (Niesen, 2011:8).  
 
Niesen does not himself specify the full details of the type of reasoning which should take place under this 
account. I believe, however, that his references to Bentham’s attempt to promote impartiality, are 
instructive. So too is his emphasis of the critical importance of deliberators changing their mind during 
participation before voting. Together, these arguments suggest something akin to public-orientated 
deliberation, with its potential to transform preferences; rather than aggregation using fixed preferences. 
This reading is thus closer to contemporary deliberative democracy than it is to the “conventional view” 
of Bentham as exclusively aggregative. 
Having outlined Niesen’s reading of Bentham, we should now turn to consider its strengths and 
weaknesses. Niesen’s work has the great merit of challenging the idea that Bentham was simply an 
aggregative democrat with little to contribute to contemporary debates about the role of democratic 
discussion between citizens. There are, however, two reasons why it should not form the basis of a 
reading of Bentham on public reasoning. One relates to the editorial history of Political Tactics; the other 
to the scope of that work. 
 
Since Niesen’s reading relies on “Political Tactics” (Bentham, 1999), it must necessarily focus primarily 
on parliamentary rather than public discourse. That work is not an explicit statement of Bentham’s views 
on public reasoning. Instead, it is more an explication of his beliefs about how a parliament should 
function. Above, we have attempted to consider whether that reading could provide the basis for an 
interpretation of Bentham on public reasoning. Unfortunately, the editorial history of PT presents some 
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significant barriers to us using the text in this way.  First, consider the question of editorial history. As I 
have attempted to explain, the history and provenance of PT is complicated, even compared with 
Bentham’s many other works. Editors have access to original manuscripts to corroborate, or contradict 
interpretations of many other texts. Following editorial work at the Bentham Project, we now have access 
to reliably edited versions of many key texts. These include “First Principles preparatory to Constitutional 
Code” (1989), the first volume of the “Constitutional Code” (1983b), IPML (1970a) and many other 
important and relevant texts. Each of these provides a clear insight into Bentham’s views on important 
questions. Each broadly reflects the order and content of what he intended to publish. Editors of each text 
have made extensive use of original manuscripts throughout the editorial process to corroborate the 
decisions they made. 
 
The same cannot, unfortunately, be said of PT. A re-edited text is now available to us, but original 
material used to produce it was necessarily limited. As a consequence, there is greater uncertainty around 
the reliability of “Political Tactics”; relative to other texts from Bentham’s corpus. I do not claim that PT 
should be disregarded. Rather, it should be given less weight than other texts; particularly where apparent 
contradictions emerge between them. Given this, it would be counterintuitive to base a reading of 
Bentham’s views on public reasoning—or any other significant matter—exclusively or predominantly on 
this text. After all, there is still real uncertainty around which parts of PT could reflect Dumont’s views, 
and which faithfully report Bentham’s. “Political Tactics”, as it was published in 1816 then 1843, was 
somewhat detached from, rather than regulated by Bentham’s personal oversight. Much of the text that we 
must still rely on remains an inexact re-translation into English from an earlier translation into French, 
which may or may not have been wholly accurate. It is possible that the original translation of this text 
into French, and its subsequent re-translation and editing back into English, both perfectly reflected 
Bentham’s views. It is possible that they did not. While this editorial history does not invalidate PT as a 
source for Bentham scholarship, it should moderate the degree of confidence we place in this single work 
as a reflection of Bentham’s beliefs.  
 
My assumption here is that—in general—we may more reliably infer an author’s intentions from works 
whose publication they oversaw, and from original manuscripts they wrote, than from texts which have 
been edited, translated, and retranslated in their absence. In recent years, Rosen (1983) and Schofield 
(2010) have demonstrated just how significant editorial decisions like these can be. Schofield showed, for 
example, that Bentham did not hold the positions attributed to him by Hart’s attempt to describe a 
“utilitarian tradition” of jurisprudence (Lieberman, 2014:121) and apply the principles of this tradition to 
contemporary legal debates. Just as Hart’s editorial decisions and subsequent interpretations had an 
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impact on how Bentham was understood in the past fifty years, it is likely that decisions taken by Dumont 
also had an effect in the 19th century.  
 
Second, consider the scope of PT. Niesen himself is acutely aware that “Political Tactics” addresses a 
very specific question. It is not an attempt to prescribe general conditions for useful discussion, nor to 
explain how citizens should engage in deliberation and voting. Instead, PT provides an examination of 
how parties do and should behave within the constraints imposed on them by membership of an assembly. 
It considers how the design of that body—and behaviour of those within it—should be amended to better 
serve the community. This does not make the principles it describes, by definition, inapplicable to other 
contexts. Rather, we must consider how those principles could read across to the wider public, and 
whether Bentham intended them to be used in this way. Clearly, a simple read across from parliamentary 
to public deliberation could imply that Bentham wanted members of the public to behave like effective 
assembly members. That might entail that they should consider reasons to vote from a position of some 
impartiality; having regard for the public interest rather than just their self-interest, and engage in a form 
of open deliberation which can transform the preferences of those involved.  
 
There are, however, clear grounds to conclude that Bentham held public and parliamentary discourse to be 
very different activities; with very different outputs and expectations. Consider some of the important 
differences between parliamentary and public participation. Bentham famously argued citizens should 
vote in secret to protect their ability to reflect their self-interest (Schofield, 2006:144-5). In contrast, he 
often wanted parliamentary representatives to vote in public, so that they could be held accountable for 
their service of the public interest (Ibid: 280). I believe that fundamental differences between 
parliamentary and public reasoning mean that “Political Tactics” cannot justify ascribing to Bentham a 
public-orientated, deliberative view of public reasoning. To claim, therefore, that Bentham is a “stronger 
deliberative” democrat who wished citizens to deliberate directly about the public interest would 
contradict, or ignore some of the most important arguments in his democratic theory. These include his 
view that public-interested voting was unnecessary and dangerous (Bentham, 1998b: 430-2); and his 
belief that expressed notions of the public interest were often delusory (Schofield, 2006: 264). Consider 
how fundamentally different the public discourse Bentham later advocated in the “Constitutional Code” 
(1983b:36) was from parliamentary discourse advocated in “Political Tactics”. In the former, discussion is 
defined as having an unlimited, open membership and an open agenda. In the latter, only assembly 
members are assumed to take part in deliberations, and Bentham defines strict procedures for setting the 
agenda for debate (Bentham, 1999:77). We shall return to these important differences in Chapter 4. 
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Niesen’s analysis reinforces my scepticism about the potential for “Political Tactics” to be used as a basis 
for understanding Bentham on public reasoning. Later editions of PT did emphasise the importance of 
“deliberation”. References in sections of the text which can be traced directly back to Bentham do not, 
however, give sufficient confidence that Bentham himself was referring to the kind of “stronger” 
deliberation espoused by contemporary theorists. Bentham himself did emphasise the importance of 
representatives changing their mind during debate (Bentham, 1999:72). Here too, though, he did not 
provide sufficient detail about the character of this process to suggest that this amounted to the kind of full 
preference transformation espoused by theorists like Habermas (1997). For example, it is possible that the 
“changes of mind” referred to by Bentham are the result of representatives becoming better informed 
about how to realise existing preference(s), rather than the consequence of transformation through 
“stronger” deliberation. Niesen’s interesting analysis improves our understanding of how Bentham 
approached aspects of parliamentary procedure, as it aims to do. It would, however, be inappropriate to 
stretch that excellent analysis to explain Bentham’s views on how members of the public should reason 
together. Indeed, there are significant reasons to reject such a move. To summarise, these include: 
important differences between Bentham’s arguments for parliamentary and public discourse; the uncertain 
editorial history of PT; and the existence of more reliably edited texts elsewhere.  
 
In normative terms, I believe that Niesen’s view meets the first of our challenges: explaining and defining 
the importance of pre-voting discussion. It does so because it places discussion, and information-sharing 
between individuals, at the centre of democratic decision-making. If well-ordered deliberation is the best 
functional equivalent of the felicific calculus—and we accept the utilitarian basis from which Bentham 
approached political theory—then it follows that effective deliberation is essential to the kinds of 
democratic outcomes Bentham sought: those which maximise public utility. It is clear from the critique of 
the French Assembly put forward in PT that Bentham believed that expressed preferences better reflected 
the public interest after deliberation than before it. On some basic level, therefore, this contention could 
form part of an explanation of the value of pre-voting public discussion in a democracy. The conditions 
for deliberation, which PT sets out, speak to the same insight cited by some contemporary deliberationists. 
Fundamentally, this is that the consideration of interests and principles, through the right sets of 
discursive conditions, is an essential component of democratic participation and decision-making. Of 
course, for Bentham, individuals’ interests alone ultimately define good outcomes. Those theorists who 
argue that ideally conducted deliberation embodies an intrinsically valuable virtue (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1996) will, therefore, be disappointed by this utilitarian response.  
This response will not satisfy deliberative theorists who insist that deliberation is intrinsically valuable; 
but no utilitarian account ever could do. For this reason I do not take this as a necessary condition of a 
successful response to this challenge. There are other deliberative critics that Niesen’s participatory thesis 
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cannot satisfy. Those who believe that appropriately conducted deliberation embodies a deep and valuable 
commitment between individuals as free and equal citizens will be unlikely to be convinced. How could a 
merely instrumental argument capture the value of deep connections of that sort? Rawls, for example, 
conceived of public reason in those terms (1997). Rawlsians will thus deem inadequate a view of public 
reasoning which neglects intrinsic duties held by citizens towards one another. The participatory view of 
Bentham suggested by Niesen is thus illuminating in reference to Bentham’s understanding of 
parliamentary deliberation. It cannot, however, help us by providing grounds for an interpretation of 
Bentham’s views on public reasoning. Our search for an interpretation of Bentham’s views on this matter 
must therefore move on to different primary texts and alternative analyses. Let us consider an alternative 
analysis of Bentham.  
 
Ben-Dor has also argued that Bentham’s democratic theory relies heavily on a developed conception of 
how public opinion should operate in a democracy. The argument is presented in Constitutional Limits 
and the Public Sphere (2000); a work which outlines various aspects of a view regarding how public 
discourse and public decisions should interact. This is an impressive and innovative reading of Bentham’s 
political theory that provides a novel way to understand how Bentham wished citizens to reason together. 
Indirectly, the form of public reasoning that Ben-Dor advocates asks citizens to consider something more 
than their own self-interest. It does not thus share a “simple” self-interest orientation with the 
conventional reading. Equally, this form of reasoning does not have a simple public-interest orientation. 
To understand the relevance of this reading of Bentham, let us examine some of its key proposals. 
 
Ben-Dor attempts to tackle some very wide issues in legal theory. Among other things, he is interested in 
the normative foundations for legitimate laws when citizens have fundamentally different—often 
incompatible—ethical views. In examining a range of answers to that question, he argues that an 
appropriate response should be procedural rather than substantive. Rather than stipulating a single set of 
reasons that grounds legitimate laws, theorists should instead identify the right procedural conditions for 
citizens to participate in their formation. Ben-Dor’s version of Bentham describes appropriate discursive 
conditions for forming public opinion; not the substantive ends it should serve. Through this discursive 
process, citizens are supposed to question the very ideas of harm and benefit—broadly construed—as well 
as the activities to which they are applied in practice. Seen in this light, the objective behind Bentham’s 
political theory is less to promote utility directly, and more to allow citizens to do so themselves, through 
discourse: 
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"Instead of justifying morality upon a priori substantive metaphysical ideals, his main goal was to 
liberate the public sphere and to unfold communicative possibilities within it"  
(Ben-Dor: 2000:237) 
 
Individuals could thus only begin to engage in what Ben-Dor calls “utilitarian consensus-formation” 
(Ibid) once they accept that public discourse regarding the ends of public decisions was desirable, and 
necessary to democracy. Doing so, in turn, required them to reject the claims of religious and political 
authorities which demanded unquestioning acquiescence. An analogous position is now relatively 
common in contemporary debates on deliberation. Habermas, for instance, is often understood as part of a 
tradition which seeks to establish deliberation as a “sovereign guide” to resolving fundamental 
disagreements (Gutmann & Thomspon, 1996:17). Ben-Dor’s reading is unusual because it portrays 
Bentham as part of that tradition. In doing so, he is quite explicit that some aspects of his argument are 
inspired by Bentham, rather than attributable to him. Nonetheless, in large part, Ben-Dor’s view is also a 
reading of Bentham on public opinion. It is that reading of Bentham (on public reasoning) that I shall 
outline and respond to here, rather than Ben-Dor’s response to wider questions in political theory. 
 
Unlike Niesen, Ben-Dor does not rely on “Political Tactics” as a primary source. Instead, he analyses how 
public opinion is supposed to operate in Bentham’s wider constitutional writing. Also unlike Niesen, Ben-
Dor does not suggest that deliberation should be construed as a proxy for the felicific calculus. Instead, he 
holds that effective public reasoning promotes convergence between citizens around the principles and 
norms that they believe serve the public interest. Ben-Dor focuses on the role of the “Public Opinion 
Tribunal” (POT) to explain how public opinion could promote political outcomes and behavior which 
served the community. 
The POT was a “fictitious entity”, which was officially recognised in Bentham’s proposed constitution. It 
appears in various different texts; each time with a slightly different purpose. For instance, Bentham’s 
writing on the Panopticon prison plan includes a form of POT: designed to aid the rehabilitation of 
inmates. The focus for Ben-Dor’s book is however, more narrowly on how the POT operates as part of a 
constitution; how it contributes to the creation of justified laws. For that purpose, Ben-Dor focuses on the 
“Constitutional Code” (CC), which provides an interesting picture of how Bentham wished public opinion 
to contribute to democratic governance. This aspect of Bentham's corpus has received more attention 
since publication of the first volume of the Constitutional Code, edited by Rosen, in 1983.  
 
According to Ben-Dor, the POT provides a template for how public opinion helps to make legitimate 
democratic decisions possible: by facilitating a special kind of consensus. He identifies building blocks of 
this position in the references Bentham made to two ideas: the possibility of agreement between citizens; 
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and his concept of the “social sanction”. We shall examine each below. On consensus, Bentham expresses 
a general expectation that citizens discussing joint ends in the right sorts of ways should be expected to 
reach agreement (Bentham, 1983b:36). This is perhaps surprising. We have seen that Bentham expected 
individuals to—predominantly—be guided and driven by their own pleasure and pain: not that of the 
community as a whole (IPML: 1). Given this, we might expect agreement between citizens to be elusive 
in cases where their individual interests diverge. Indeed, it is unsurprising that contemporary aggregative 
accounts that assume the self-interest of voters also tend to emphasise aggregation rather than—
deliberative—consensus (Riker 1982).  
 
For Ben-Dor, the POT addresses that challenge: it explains how Bentham expected predominantly self-
interested individuals to reach agreement; despite their different interests and circumstances. Following 
principles set out in the POT, public discourse does not produce consensus by some happy accident; or 
because individuals disregard their previously divergent interests for the public good. Instead, the process 
of discussion is itself specifically geared towards generating consensus. It helps to produce agreement by 
creating an identification of interests between the individuals within a community and that community at 
large. Rather than simply allowing consensus to emerge from discourse, Ben-Dor’s participatory view 
makes use of Bentham’s extensive writing on persuasion and incentives, found in the “Deontology” 
(1983c) and elsewhere. This “participatory view” of Bentham on pre-voting discussion between citizens 
thus operationalises individuals’ ability to judge public ends in concert while still being motivated by self-
interest. Public reasoning bridges the gap between citizens’ self-interest, and the need for political 
decisions that serve the whole community. It does so by forming a special kind of consensus, which helps 
to ensure that conceptions of the former become compatible with the latter. When successful, it causes 
self-interested individuals to consider “what is good for me?”, and produces answers which serve the 
whole community.  
 
Ben-Dor’s Bentham believed that public discourse should take place regarding utilitarian ends: the harms 
and benefits created by different pieces of legislation. Seemingly, this is an obvious implication of 
Bentham’s utilitarianism. It also underscores much of Bentham’s constitutional writing. As Niesen notes, 
the basis for justification of political proposals in a parliament ought to be both public and utilitarian 
(Niesen, 2011:9). Since the rightful ends of political action concern the pleasures and pains they create for 
the individuals in a community, it followed that the rightful object of political discourse should also be a 
form of instrumental reasoning. This meant considering prospective pleasures and pains, and the 
probabilities of them being realised. Debate on these utilitarian terms would not, however, guarantee 
agreement. There could be substantial disagreement about which outcomes would help or harm 
individuals; even if there was consensus about the outcomes that a particular measure would create. After 
all, individual citizens could assess those outcomes in different—perhaps opposite—ways. The possibility 
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of this kind of disagreement is implied by Bentham’s earlier writing on the principle of utility, and its 
alternatives. Bentham asserts in IPML, for instance, that observers should approve of an act in proportion 
to its tendency to produce to utility, but may not do so. In fact, he believed that approval was often 
wrongly attached to acts that destroyed pleasure and promoted pain. He labelled this attitude “asceticism” 
(IPML, 17-21). The possibility of asceticism, and similar evaluative errors, meant that it was far from 
certain that people would agree on particular policies; even when evidence pointed towards their 
utilitarian merits. For Ben-Dor, the role of the POT in Bentham’s constitution was to ensure that approval 
and disapproval were allocated to promote utility, rather than negating it.  
 
The use of powerful “sanctions” was essential to that endeavour. In IPML, Bentham described four of 
these, which could be used to shape the behaviour and attitudes of citizens: “physical, political, 
moral...and religious…” (IPML, 34). To understand the role of the moral (or “popular”) sanction in Ben-
Dor’s account, let us briefly step back and explain these sanctions more generally. The physical sanction 
emerged in the course of nature; without any need for intervention from other people. In contrast, 
Bentham believed that the religious sanction related to the pleasures and pains that people expected to 
experience after death. He went to great length to analyse whether religious faith could thus be understood 
in utilitarian terms (Schofield, 1999). The political sanction was embodied in the rulings of judges, under 
the power of the state. The moral sanction, in contrast, was created by what an individual believed others 
thought. In particular, it had often been created by the opinions of “significant individuals” (Schofield, 
2006:35). Ultimately, this moral sanction was grounded in the approval or disapproval of the community: 
their “sympathy and antipathy” (Ibid: 36). This sanction thus gave an opportunity to encourage utility-
maximising motives and actions, and to discourage harmful alternatives.  
 
Bentham believed that the same event, and the physical pain it created, could be an instance of any of 
these sanctions. He cited the example of a man whose goods or person are consumed by fire. That same 
event could be an instance of the physical sanction, if it occurred by accident. It could also be the result of 
the political sanction, if it resulted from punishment mandated by the state. The moral sanction may have 
been its source if the fire occurred as a result of a neighbour withholding help in disapproval of his moral 
character. Finally, it could be caused by agents being distracted by the thought of suffering in the afterlife: 
the religious sanction. Bentham thus proposed sanctions as a way of understanding the source of 
(dis)pleasure, rather than as a set of categories for utility itself (IPML: 36). While the political, religious 
and physical sanctions were predominantly operated through other means, the moral sanction relied on 
public opinion. Consequently, Bentham thus also termed it the “popular sanction” (Ibid). Whatever the 
source of the pleasure or displeasure in question, he believed that individuals naturally wished to seek out 
the former and avoid the latter, for themselves at least. The expectation that a sanction would operate in 
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response to an activity would thus help to shape how individuals behave. Famously, it was for those two 
twin masters of pain and pleasure “alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what 
we shall do” (Ibid:11).  
 
Quinn has written extensively about how Bentham believed a legislator should encourage the rational 
allocation of sympathy and antipathy in her community, and respond to errors in these allocations: those 
that did not promote utility (Quinn, 2014:74-5). This work illustrates two things. First, that Bentham 
believed public opinion could err in its ascription of sympathy and antipathy to outcomes; second, that it 
could—nonetheless—play an important role in democratic debate. Predominantly in his earlier writing, 
Bentham termed this means of shaping conduct “indirect legislation”. He defined that term negatively. It 
was used to cover all measures that a legislator might take to prevent misconduct, without explicitly 
prohibiting it: 
It was “whatever...can be done in the way of law’ which is not direct legislation, which does not, 
that is to say, prohibit acts identified as sufficiently mischievous as to be designated offences”. 
(Quinn, 2014:82)  
 
Thus, while direct legislation was concerned with the punishment of harmful actions through prosecution, 
indirect legislation also allowed the encouragement of beneficial actions by non-legal means. It was a 
powerful tool placed in the hands of the legislator: a “subtle engineering of conduct based on the 
understanding of the motives for action, in order to manipulate…an individual’s perception of what is his 
or her best interest” (Brunon-Ernst, 2012:68). A public-spirited legislator could thus use indirect 
legislation in pursuit of the public interest while also satisfying the self-interest of individuals in a 
community. It is here—in the critical use of the moral, or popular, sanction—that Ben-Dor suggests the 
Public Opinion Tribunal plays a crucial role. The POT is thus a way to understand how citizens can make 
use of the sanctions Bentham described: to make future agreement possible (Ben-Dor, 2000:108). It does 
so by promoting an “intersubjective consensus” between citizens considering public decisions (Ben-Dor 
2002:109). This utilitarian mode of thinking thus allows individuals to co-ordinate their interests with one 
another.  
 
Effectively, Ben-Dor’s reading suggests that the POT makes indirect legislation a vehicle of public 
opinion, rather than one of fan enlightened legislator. It places the power to influence the social incentives 
offered to others in a community in the hands of the people rather than those of a legislator. It allows 
citizens, together, to shape their social environment: the background against which preferences are 
determined. Doing so makes agreement possible. Effective public reasoning could, therefore, encourage 
the growth of a group of egoists who genuinely believe that their own interests are served by actions that 
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help the community. It encourages consensus on the consequences of political decisions which are 
harmful or beneficial. Critically, however, this type of reasoning demanded an unlimited group of 
participants. Constraints on the types of people able to take part in the POT were—Ben-Dor’s Bentham 
believed—likely to produce results that favoured sections of a community rather than the public. 
Consequently, the POT could not by constituted by political parties or other sectional groups. That would 
lend itself to discussion reflecting their interests rather than those of the public. The tools of persuasion, 
through the moral sanction, which could help to shape citizens’ conception of their own interests were 
powerful; only a public unencumbered by party loyalties could be trusted to deploy them to proper effect 
(Ben-Dor, 2000: 108).  
 
By discussing the consequences of various political decisions—the possible benefit or harm which might 
result from different possible outcomes—citizens begin to equate the terms of their own welfare with 
those of the whole community. The moral, or popular, sanction is essential to this process. It allows a 
community to promote views which contribute to the public welfare—by expressing its approval—and 
dissuade those which detract from it, through disapproval. Ben-Dor thus reconstructs Bentham’s beliefs 
about how the moral sanction could operate to explain its role within the POT. In doing so, he relies 
predominantly on Bentham’s “Table of the Springs of Action” rather than IPML. That work 
acknowledges the importance of a “principle of sympathy” which motivates individuals to help others. 
When allied to rationally-justified moral norms--expressed through public opinion—therefore, “love of 
justice” could be a powerful tool to promote utility. It could include: desire of self-preservation (if justice 
involves the individual concerned); sympathy for someone suffering injustice, now or future; antipathy for 
someone profiting from, or causing, injustice (1817:97). 
 
Just as someone usually motivated by self-interest might act on her “love of justice”, so she might also act 
on a desire for public approval: in conformity with the moral sanction. A predominantly self-interested 
individual considering a practice which harms the public interest must consider the disapproval she will 
receive from the community. As “someone profiting from, or causing injustice” she will be subject to 
“antipathy” from the community and experience pain, and the absence of pleasure as a result. In this 
sense, it could be in her self-interest to abstain from actions which harm the public good if this is what the 
moral sanction, expressed through public opinion, dictates. In this way, just as Adam Smith (1759) 
believed that the sentiment of sympathy could promote moral behaviour, analogously, the (dis)approval of 
the community can materially shape a citizen’s interests. Thus although Bentham argued that public 
opinion needed to be liberated from irrational political and religious influences to which it had been 
enslaved, he also argued that social influences on opinion could be harnessed to promote progress. If 
repeated consistently and persistently, this process could fundamentally shape how individuals conceive 
of their own interests. The approval of her peers therefore provides the individual with an incentive to 
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gradually conform her preferences to the public utility, because only by doing so could she also gain the 
public approval from which she derives further utility. 
 
Ben-Dor’s version of the POT uses this principle. It starts with largely self-interested individuals with 
different ideas about what serves utility and—over time and through dialogue—gradually helps create a 
group of citizens who agree about what serves the public interest. The POT also encourages a long-term 
consensus because, by carefully and dynamically allocating approval and disapproval, it encourages 
citizens to understand their own interests in a way which serves rather than detracts from that of the 
community. This form of public opinion thus aligns individual and community interests without expecting 
citizens to consciously become any less self-interested. Just as Bentham believed that a wise legislator 
should use punishments and indirect legislation to deter crimes which harmed the public interest so, Ben-
Dor’s POT uses the incentives created by the moral sanction—operated through public debate—to 
promote agreement on the public interest. A simple example may illustrate this principle. A community 
might encourage the perception amongst peers that it is in one’s own interest to hold and discharge 
responsibilities towards others: to vote; to donate to charity, to vote in elections, or volunteer for “good” 
causes. Over time, the POT may consistently express approval of actions like these which—for 
argument’s sake—serve the public interest. In response, self-interested individuals will gradually begin to 
factor the approval of their peers into their decisions on how to act, and which activities to value. 
Exercising public opinion in this way thus makes egoists more likely to perform public-serving acts. More 
broadly, and indirectly, it also makes a public orientation from individual egoists more likely. If I derive 
utility from social approval, and can gain that approval from valuing the same ends as my peers, I will 
begin to factor that public reception into my plans: to incorporate the social sanction into my thinking. 
The incentives provided are thus analogous to those cited by Elster (1986).  
  
Having outlined some features of Ben-Dor’s interpretation of Bentham, we must now consider its 
strengths and weaknesses. As many commentators have remarked, Ben-Dor’s fascinating and ambitious 
argument challenges common views of how Bentham should be understood in relation to normative 
debates about how justified laws are formed. Some aspects of his view are, however, controversial 
amongst Bentham scholars (Harrison, 2003:257). I believe that some of this controversy is well-founded. 
There are three particular reasons to question Ben-Dor’s argument as a basis for understanding Bentham 
on public reasoning. First, Bentham’s substantive arguments do not sit well with a procedural 
interpretation. Second, there is no extensive evidence to confirm that the POT’s principal role—as 
described in the “Constitutional Code”—was to apply the moral sanction to citizens, rather than rulers. 
Third, the terminology of “utilitarian consensus” is misleading. It was never used by Bentham, and carries 
connotations which conflict with important aspects of his work. Let us examine each of these objections 
below, in turn. 
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First, I do not believe that Bentham can be understood as a purely procedural theorist of public opinion. 
Ben-Dor’s aim is to elucidate the discursive ideals of Bentham’s constitutional theory without relying on 
Bentham’s own substantive conception of morality (Ben-Dor 2000:237). That objective risks neglecting 
some of the—explicitly utilitarian, substantive—reasons why Bentham himself came to advocate 
democratic governance. Ben-Dor advocates a view of justification based on the conditions under which 
citizens can deliberate together. A more standard interpretation of Bentham would start with his utilitarian 
definition of value, and analyse why democratic procedures are valuable, in those terms. As Harrison 
notes, this more traditional reading of Bentham has some distinct advantages over Ben-Dor’s procedural 
alternative. In particular, it explains why Bentham made such extensive efforts to improve the substantive 
conclusions reached by public opinion, rather than just the discursive conditions producing it:  
"What Bentham does to natural rights, Ben-Dor, on Bentham's behalf, does for all evaluative 
foundations. In so doing he thinks that he has made his hero a greater Samson. But what he has 
got may be a blinded Samson with no other option than to pull down the house on both himself 
and all critical and legal theory” (Harrison, 2003:257). 
Disregarding Bentham’s substantive arguments grounded in utilitarianism therefore risks disregarding his 
substantive grounds for the other conclusions, including democracy. It is clear that this aspect of Ben-
Dor’s argument is a significant departure from Bentham’s own views. It is one of the reasons that Ben-
Dor himself describes parts of his account as Bentham-inspired rather than directly attributable to 
Bentham himself.  
 
This departure has other implications. One is that Ben-Dor’s Bentham would be unable to critically 
evaluate the substantive ethical conclusions reached by citizens in discourse. Rather, he would focus 
exclusively on the way discussion takes place. I do not believe that this kind of view is compatible with 
the way public opinion is characterised in much of Bentham’s work. Bentham was not ambivalent or 
agnostic about the substantive conclusions reached by public opinion. Rather, he believed that the 
individuals who generated public opinion could err. He explicitly encouraged legislators to deter them 
from doing so: 
“Every nation is liable to have its prejudices and its caprices, which it is the business of the 
legislator to look out for, to study, and to cure” (IPML, p.183 quoted in Quinn, 2014:85). 
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A purely procedural account would undermine the substantive beliefs which motivated Bentham’s 
reformist zeal. These were underscored by what Bentham believed were the dictates of utility. From his 
intent to root out and correct delusions in “First Principles...” (1989) to the notion of error in the 
“Constitutional Code” (1983b: 265); from the capacity for something close to false consciousness in 
chapter 9 of IPML (1970a), to the argument that the ability to amend a constitution was essential to 
correct for mistakes made by representatives and the public (1998b: 276); Bentham relied on a substantive 
evaluation of the outcomes of debate. I believe that he did so too often, and too insistently, to permit us to 
now portray him as an exclusively procedural theorist of public opinion with credibility. 
 
Second, while the early Bentham emphasised how important indirect legislation should be to legislators 
who seek to shape the behaviour and opinions of the community, it is not clear that the POT was intended 
to do so. There is significant evidence that the importance of indirect legislation gradually diminished as 
Bentham’s political theory became more democratic. The early Bentham believed than an enlightened 
legislator could help to achieve optimal outcomes through such means; but the later Bentham was 
intensely distrustful of political elites (Schofield, 2006:109-114). Ben-Dor reflects this by construing the 
POT as a vehicle for public rather than elite control of the moral sanction. What is less clear, however, is 
that the POT Bentham describes in the “Constitutional Code” is meant to apply the moral sanction 
principally to citizens rather than rulers, as Ben-Dor implies.  
 
Consider how the Public Opinion Tribunal appears in the 1983 edition of the “Constitutional Code”, 
edited by Rosen. We shall return to this question in more depth in Chapter 4. It is, however, worth noting 
two brief pieces of evidence which count against Ben-Dor’s interpretation of that text. First, the POT is 
explicitly listed as a check against misrule by those in power, under “Securities against Legislative, and 
Judiciary” (1983b: 39). Second, throughout the text, there are no explicit references to the POT applying 
the moral sanction to citizens. Again, in “Political Tactics”, Bentham explicitly describes the POT as a 
vehicle directed toward the powerful rather; not the population at large. It “always decides the destiny of 
public men; and that the punishments which it pronounces are inevitable” (1999:29-34 in Schofield, 
2006:260). As we shall see in Chapter 4, I believe that POT is better understand as being directed toward 
holding public officials accountable. This sits more easily with Bentham’s rationale for democracy than 
the claim it should engineer consensus. 
 
Finally, alongside these substantive challenges to Ben-Dor, there is a linguistic one. Throughout 
“Constitutional Limits and the Public Sphere”, he repeatedly attributes to Bentham a belief in “utilitarian 
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consensus” (Ben-Dor, 2000:112). Ben-Dor cites the “Constitutional Code” as evidence for this 
conclusion. He is right to say that Bentham anticipated agreement between citizens who reason together 
clearly. Bentham believed that much disagreement was the result of the use of unclear, non-utilitarian 
terms of debate which obfuscated relevant interests, as his arguments on fallacies suggest (1989:65). 
 
It is misleading, however, to describe this agreement as a fully-fledged “consensus”. Bentham never used 
that term. Throughout available texts from the “Constitutional Code”, he refers to the possibility of 
agreement rather than a full “consensus”. This may sound like a trivial distinction, but I believe it is 
significant. The contemporary meaning of consensus is absent from Bentham’s work, as well as that 
particular term. In contemporary political theory, “consensus” has a specific and significant meaning, with 
connotations that Bentham himself would have been unlikely to subscribe to. Consider one prominent 
example. For Rawls (1997:766), consensus conveys something far beyond mere agreement. It means not 
merely that citizens agree a response to “fundamental political decisions” but that they do so for the same, 
shared reasons: those which are justifiable to all reasonable persons. This is a world away from the kind of 
utilitarian agreement Bentham mentions in his political writing. Like Hume, Bentham famously opposed 
the idea that the authority of the state could be justified by a hypothetical contract between citizens 
(Wolff, 1993:87). That argument was unnecessary, because direct utilitarian justification was available by 
appeal to the interests of those concerned. It would be odd, therefore, to ascribe a proto-Rawlsian view to 
Bentham by supposing that he wished to promote some form of consensus, which is defined in reference 
to reasonable persons rather than the actual persons who constitute a community. 
 
One implication of Rawlsian public reasoning is that citizens have a duty to make relevant arguments on 
the basis of reasons that are justifiable from within all reasonable persons’ reasonable fundamental 
beliefs: what he calls “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls, 2005:214). Now, there are some 
references in Bentham’s work that make an analogous appeal. For instance, in “Political Tactics”, 
Bentham encourages parliamentary representatives to justify their arguments in general rather than 
sectarian terms (Bentham, 1999:122). The rationale for this view is, however, instrumental. Making a 
political case in broad, non-sectarian, terms could increase the likelihood of its success. Bentham’s claim 
is therefore very different from contemporary Rawlsian arguments. Indeed, as a utilitarian, Bentham 
would have no reason to necessarily prefer an agreement reached on political principles as a “modus 
vivendi” (in Rawls’ terms) to one reached for shared reasons. In contrast, that distinction is fundamental 
for Rawls. For him, public reasoning is part of a process whereby principles “initially accepted for 
instrumental gain... [become] an essential part of individuals’ worldview” (Stears, 2010:221). 
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Thus, while Bentham expresses his expectation of agreement in the CC, and elsewhere gives 
parliamentarians pragmatic advice to avoid sectarianism, there is little to suggest that he intended those 
references to convey adherence to a belief in full consensus, for the same shared (Rawslian) reasons. This 
point about the meaning of “consensus” thus complements our observation about Bentham’s use of the 
word. The term appears nowhere in his vast body of work. Indeed, it was popularised in the nineteenth 
century, after his death. In that context, we should be careful in attributing to Bentham a term or idea 
which developed later. Without strong evidence that Bentham believed in the same ideas as contemporary 
theorists of consensus, it would be wrong to attribute the term to his thinking on public opinion. I do not 
believe that such strong evidence exists. Consequently, attribution of this particular term to Bentham’s 
writing thus risks projecting (deliberative) assumptions and beliefs onto his work without justification for 
doing so. 
 
Interpretive barriers to Ben-Dor’s reading are significant; so too are the normative challenges. According 
to Ben-Dor, public reasoning is more than just the most efficient means available of satisfying existing 
interests in a society. It is also a way of reshaping the way individuals conceive of their interests to 
promote socially desirable ends. Just as Habermasian citizens shape norms for their society through the 
act of deliberating, so Ben-Dor’s citizens deliberate, and mutually shape their own interests by doing so. 
The moral sanction thus operates through public opinion. It serves a similar function to that proposed for 
discourse by contemporary “stronger deliberative” democrats. Of course, this gives pre-voting discussion 
a far more important position in democracy than that afforded by a conventional reading of Bentham. 
Perhaps this understanding of public reasoning is closer to the contemporary deliberative conception of 
preference change. It allows citizens to move beyond an initial impression of what their self-interest 
demands. Rather than departing from self-interest, Bentham instead believed that citizens—on Ben-Dor’s 
view—help to engineer conditions in which they, and others, conceive of it in more socially useful ways.  
Public reasoning thus induces a convergence of interests. Bentham’s famous belief that individuals are, in 
general, motivated by self-interest, thus does not entail a “rational choice” aggregative view. That view 
expects that individuals should vote according to self-interest and we should aggregate results to reach the 
public interest. Instead, Ben-Dor’s argument accepts egoism and claims that it makes discussion essential 
rather than unnecessary: it is the only means by which individuals’ conception of their own interests can 
be aligned with measures that serve the whole community. Without this kind of reasoning, some self-
interested individuals would not be motivated to perform some of the basic civic and social duties 
necessary to maintaining the stability and security of a society. In this sense, public reasoning can be said 
to be essential to the maintenance of a flourishing Benthamite society: one which serves the public 
interest, defined as the interests of individuals who compose the community. This is an instrumental 
explanation of public reasoning. It is one which, however, makes the criterion against which the outcomes 
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of political action are assessed itself responsive to a discursive process. Political action should serve the 
community’s interests, which are composed of the interests of individuals. In turn, individual interests are 
themselves shaped by public discussion.  
 
There are close parallels between Ben-Dor’s and contemporary discourse theory. Like Habermas, Ben-
Dor suggests that the norms which define the value of democracy are themselves defined—in part—
through a procedure of deliberation between citizens. This is a process through which “participants 
question and transcend whatever their initial preferences may have been” (Habermas, 1997: 449). This is 
a convincing response to the challenge of explaining the normative value of pre-voting discussion. It 
makes that act integral to the aims of a democracy. Without a public process for deliberating political 
ends, there might be little hope of reaching a collective decision which serves the public interest: 
individuals might approach, and exit, the voting booth with fundamentally divergent preferences.  
 
Ben-Dor and Niesen perhaps offer the most explicit departures from the conventional view. There are, 
however, other perspectives from which it is possible to interpret a view of public reasoning. One such 
potential avenue is provided by Lyons in his 1973 work “In the Interest of the Governed”. In that text, 
Lyons outlines and then departs from a common understanding of Bentham’s utilitarianism. The opening 
chapter of “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation” (IPML) is usually understood to 
state Bentham’s view that there is a single, simple standard by which all actions can be assessed: the 
principle of utility. That principle “approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the 
tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in 
question” (1970a:12).  
 
This single standard is usually understood as universal in scope. As Bentham implies, it applies to every 
action whatsoever and “therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of 
government” (Ibid:12). Thus, at a basic level, the rightness or wrongness of the actions of an individual 
can be evaluated by reference to likely consequences. Acts of parliament can also be subjected to this 
same, single standard. This “universalistic” reading of Bentham entails that the utilitarian evaluating 
options must consider “Whoever is likely to be affected by an action (or by its alternatives, since an action 
is to be compared with its alternatives)” rather than a particular or parochial group (Lyons, 1973:23). 
Lyons rejects that conclusion. Instead, he contends that the standard for evaluating laws and actions put 
forward by Bentham differed fundamentally according to whose interests were at stake. In turn, this 
means more than simply considering who is likely to be affected by a particular act. Thus while the 
117 
 
principle of utility is Bentham’s ultimate standard, which determines whether an act is right or wrong; it 
“alone does not suffice to tell us which acts are right or wrong” (Lyons, 1973:20). To do that, we need to 
assess the likely consequences of an action on relevant interests. Only then can it be evaluated according 
to the principle of utility. The relevant interests will, however, be different for “public” and “private” 
actions.  
 
As a consequence, the “first principle” of utility translates in two distinct and particular ways of 
evaluating actions, “with community interest as the test within the public or political sphere, while self-
interest is to rule in ‘private’ matters” (Lyons, 1973:20). In effect, this reduces the scope of both public 
and private action. The test for the former is condensed from universal interest into a test for serving the 
interests of a defined and relevant community. Similarly, the test for the private action reduces radically 
from maximising the welfare of anyone who could be affected, to simply serving one’s own interests. 
Lyons’ main project was to propose a revision of Bentham’s psychology and ethics. “In the Interest of the 
Governed” does not, therefore, explicitly consider public reasoning or the role of active citizens at and 
before the ballot box. It would not, however, take a huge leap to see the implications that a Lyons’ dual 
standard could have for this question. If “public” actions are to be assessed by their tendency to promote 
the public interest, and individuals’ private actions should be evaluated against their service of self-
interest, which category could voting fall into? As Lyons points out, Bentham consistently argues that the 
role of government is to serve the interests of the whole community; not those of particular individuals, or 
groups. 
 
The objectives of political action, voting, and public deliberation may thus be considered public rather 
than private. From this, we could conclude that citizens should vote according to the public interest. This 
might then lead to the conclusion that voters should deliberate according to the public interest before 
voting. An evaluative standard for voting seems to imply a set of expectations about pre-voting 
discussion. The dual standard thus potentially suggests something akin to “stronger” deliberation which is 
directed towards the public interest, and conducted in the expectation of consensus. Public- interested 
deliberation of this kind could then create a set of subsequent demands and obligations for citizens. When 
engaging in the “public” activity of deliberation they could, for instance, be obliged to appeal only to 
those reasons—whatever they might turn out to be—which promote an agreement which serves the 
community’s interest.  
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As we have seen, an argument of this kind could potentially be justified by appeal to “Political Tactics”. 
In that text, Bentham argues that an explicitly atheistic argument for abolishing blasphemy laws would be 
unnecessary. Rather, the same conclusion could be argued for in more general terms which do no alienate 
theists in the community (1999:122 in Niesen, 2011:10). Bentham does not himself describe these as 
“public” reasons; but we could understand these kinds of general, rather than sectarian, reasons—which 
appeal to a broad base of perspectives—in those terms. Lyons’ distinction between public and private 
actions could thus suggest a similar distinction between the private actions people take, for themselves 
and their family and friends, as individuals, and those they engage with as citizens, for the community. 
 
Aspects of Lyons’ dual standard are controversial amongst scholars; particularly in reference to 
Bentham’s ethics (Hume, 1978). It is not necessary to accept these critiques, however, to see that a more 
participatory reading of Bentham—along the lines suggested— based on Lyons’ interpretation would be 
misplaced. Suppose that Bentham did subscribe to two different evaluative standards for public and 
private actions, as suggested. It is possible that voting and deliberating could be considered public actions: 
the appropriate ultimate objective for each should be the community’s interest rather than the individual’s. 
It would follow from this that the actions taken by citizens as part of a process of deliberating, then 
voting, should be assessed by their tendency to promote the public interest. 
 
On utilitarian grounds, however, it does not follow from this that the deliberative participation of citizens 
should be consciously directed towards the public interest, as some deliberative theorists suggest. The 
numerous, extensive contemporary and historical debates on indirect and direct utilitarianism illustrate 
this point emphatically. They demonstrate just how aware many utilitarians are of the (possible) 
divergence between principles and motives used to make decisions, and the underlying rationale which 
ultimately justifies those principles (see Lyons, 1994). Indeed, to reach the conclusion that public-spirited 
deliberation is necessary, as a result of Lyons’ dual standard, a further assumption is necessary. We must 
also assume that direct pursuit of a particular goal, like the public interest, is the best way to realise it. 
Like many subsequent utilitarians, including Mill (Alexander, 1985), Bentham rejected that assumption. 
Consider two examples from his work. First, Bentham’s view of judicial adjudication is usually thought to 
imply “judges would not decide at case-level by applying directly the principle of utility, but they would 
rather apply general rules which, in turn, were enacted on utilitarian grounds” (Ferraro, 2010:1). 
Similarly, Bentham famously provided “subordinate ends” as a guide for legislators. In doing so, he 
explicitly acknowledged that principles grounded in utility often served that end better than its direct 
pursuit (Quinn, 2008). These examples confirm that even if Bentham did believe that public deliberation 
and voting should be evaluated against its tendency to promote the public interest, it does not follow that 
participants must explicitly pursue that end. It therefore also does not follow that deliberation which 
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focuses on public ends, or particularly public reasons is necessary to promote the public interest. A 
separate argument would be required to show that this is the case. 
 
A dual standard reading of Bentham thus does not count in favour of public-orientated deliberation before 
voting. Indeed, there are further reasons for rejecting that view. As we have seen, Bentham explicitly 
wished citizens to vote in a private, individualistic, and self-interested manner (Schofield, 2006: 263). His 
arguments for franchise reform and the secret ballot thus—while seeking to promote the public interest—
aim to protect voters from the dangers of public influence rather than exposing them to its benefits. If 
Lyons’ grounds for a dual-standard reading of Bentham are questionable, these are further and compelling 
reasons to reject his view as a basis to interpret Bentham as a public-interest deliberative theorist. Lyons’ 
argument provides a fascinating, if debateable, revision of the basis of Bentham’s utilitarian views. For 
the reasons outlined it cannot, however, be stretched to suggest grounds for a more deliberative reading of 
Bentham’s views on public reasoning. 
 
Unlike Lyons, Crimmins has explicitly suggested that Bentham can be likened to contemporary 
deliberative democrats like Habermas and, therefore, does provide something close to an account of 
public reasoning. Crimmins has briefly examined Bentham’s views on the Public Opinion Tribunal 
(Crimmins, 2011:154-5) as part of a wider survey on Bentham’s utilitarianism. His interesting revision of 
Bentham recasts Bentham’s famous dictum that “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”. 
The original source of this dictum, Schofield has established, was the “Rationale of Judicial Evidence”, 
which was edited by Mill and published in 1827 in five volumes (Schofield, 2006:84). Bentham’s original 
wording in that text was that each is “to count for one and nobody for more than one” (Mill, 1861 in 
Schofield, 2006:84). This statement is usually understood as a substantive claim about the outcomes that 
the principle of utility demands. Crimmins, however, reinterprets Bentham’s commitment. He suggests 
that it could relate to democratic participation rather than the outcomes it creates.  
 
Citing Habermas, he contends that “Bentham’s theory of representative democracy bears more than a 
passing resemblance to the deliberative model...[in part, since] it implicitly recognises the need for public 
reasoning, for reasons that are acceptable to all as free and equal citizens” (Crimmins, 2011:155). 
Crimmins suggests that this similarity is grounded in the six conditions of ideal Habermasian deliberation: 
unconstrained participation by all citizens; participants expressing their views and preferences in a truthful 
way; assertions must be presented in a logically coherent way; the principal objective of participants must 
be the common good; participants respect, and carefully listen to, one another; participants are open to 
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changing their mind in response to a better argument. Without elaborating much further, Crimmins then 
suggests that Bentham’s democratic views are “open to the same objections as the deliberative model”; 
principally that citizens may well struggle to communicate in a free and open way without a degree of 
material equality to mitigate the potential undue influence of money over on debate. He thus portrays this 
obstacle as an objection to both Habermasian deliberation and Bentham’s own views on public reasoning. 
I think that this accusation is misplaced for a number of reasons. First, while it is possible that some 
deliberative democrats are not sufficiently aware of the potential influence of material inequality on 
discursive conditions, this does not apply to Habermasian deliberation. Indeed, in his early writing, 
Habermas paid great attention to the interaction between economic conditions and discursive equality. It 
is precisely because he acknowledged the capacity of socio-economic conditions to impede proper 
deliberative participation that he assumed substantive social equality as a starting point for discussion 
(Habermas, 1996:308). Subsequently, a number of deliberative democrats have followed that lead. They 
argue that an existing distribution of power and resources must not affect chances to contribute to public 
deliberation. Egalitarian conditions of interaction must be satisfied in ways which are manifest to citizens 
in order for deliberation to function properly (Cohen, 1989:18).  
 
Of course, it may be that these conditions of substantive equality are difficult to realise, but “stronger 
deliberative” theorists usually account for this. They accept that real world conditions can be assessed by 
their proximity to the ideal. The stronger deliberative thesis is therefore not usually a binary choice 
between ideal conditions for interaction and rejecting the value of deliberation altogether. Consequently, it 
is not fair to accuse Habermasian deliberative theorists of failing to take account of—at least some of—
the real world conditions that could impede effective deliberation. Perhaps it is difficult to assess exactly 
how far real world circumstances are from this deliberative ideal. Making that assessment might itself be 
highly contentious and difficult; to such a degree that the practicality or cogence of the idea of a 
deliberative ideal is itself undermined. That is not the objection that Crimmins suggests, however. His 
argument is rather that “[i]t is easy to see that making the ideal a reality is fraught with obstacles” 
(Crimmins, 2011:155). Of course, it is possible that the benefits of achieving an ideal form of 
Habermasian deliberation justify the difficulties and costs of overcoming those obstacles. This is a 
possibility that Crimmins neither entertains nor responds to. 
 
More importantly, Crimmins provides little evidence to support his claim that Bentham’s democratic 
views can be equated with the Habermasian project. His version of Habermas insists that “the principal 
objective of the participants must be the common good” (Ibid: 155), but we have seen that there are good 
reasons—rooted in the argument for the secret ballot—to believe that Bentham did not demand a public 
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orientation from citizens during pre-voting discussion. Similarly, Crimmins echoes arguments put forward 
by Gutmann (1980:26) to imply that Bentham’s views on public reasoning construe that process primarily 
in terms of its ability to hold those in public office to account; to prevent abuses of power. This is quite 
different from the Habermasian approach. Ordinarily, this attributes more ambitious normative claims to 
the deliberative process. For instance, Habermasians ordinarily suggest that deliberation has a 
transformative power in reference to participants’ preferences; and that it can be expected to produce full 
consensus between participants. Clearly, for Habermasians, deliberation is more than just a “negative 
check” against abuse of political office. Rather, it is a positive, enlightening and transformative process 
that leads individuals towards a fuller appreciation of relevant interests and arguments.  
 
It is in light of the apparently negative character of discourse in Bentham’s democratic theory that 
Gutmann (1980:26-7) casts Bentham as an opponent of participatory deliberative democratic theory, and 
as a traditional aggregative democrat. Crimmins acknowledges the negative role of public opinion as a 
check against abuse. In doing so, he has a wealth of textual evidence to call upon. In contrast, his effort to 
ascribe to Bentham a positive, quasi-Habermasian form of deliberation, which teaches citizens about the 
public interest, has little textual basis. This short part of Crimmins’ work is interesting. It is a rare attempt 
to understand some important ideas in Bentham’s democratic thought in reference to a contemporary 
debate about the merits of public reasoning. Its cursory nature, however, illustrates how significant the 
gap between those two fields can be.  
 
Finally, there are many instances of recent scholarship which do not ascribe to Bentham a public-
orientated view of deliberation in order to explain the importance of public reasoning before voting. 
Consider Lieberman (2014:119-142), who has provided a rich analysis of how Bentham’s theory of public 
opinion interacted with his programme of legal reform. Like Schofield (2006) and Rosen (1983)—to 
whom we shall return in the next chapter—Lieberman approaches this question in terms of the 
development of Bentham’s political theory. He primarily emphasises how Bentham’s ideas about public 
opinion interact with his work to develop a comprehensive body of laws. Lieberman sees these as 
complementary strands in Bentham’s thought. The proper operation of publicity would help to assure that 
the body of law Bentham sought to define would operate in public. Unlike the common law, that body of 
law would be understood by those subject to it. In the long-term, that publicity would enable citizens to 
have more secure expectations about how the law would affect their own welfare. 
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The common law was established through a series of individual precedents, rather than explicit principles. 
This had made it mysterious and unpredictable to ordinary citizens. In place of the clear, explicit and 
predictable principles that they needed to enable them to plan their future, citizens were instead provided 
with a series of implicit and unclear precedents and tacit assumptions. Each judicial decision that helped 
to create precedent was itself a result of how a particular judge’s adjudication happened to progress. 
Critically, this undermined the security with which individuals could make plans to maximise their 
happiness. Of course, Bentham wanted to address this fundamental problem. As Lieberman emphasises, 
he was determined that laws should be more predictable and widely understood in the future than they had 
been in the past.  
 
Moving beyond the opacity of common law was a central objective of the comprehensive body of law that 
Bentham tried to create. In place of murky precedent and unpredictable application, it was to guard 
against the abuse of power by “furnishing a structure of publicly articulated and maintained securities, 
which enabled individuals to chart their futures, undertake complex cooperative ventures, and realise their 
plans and expectations for happiness” (Lieberman, 2014:138).31 This project of legal reform was itself 
intimately related to the idea of publicity. The transition from common law to a new, comprehensive body 
of law was also a transition from secrecy to publicity. It would accompany a move from implicit 
assumptions to explicit principles; from remoteness to accessibility. In his inimitable style, Bentham 
summarised by saying that his objective was to marshal the law so as to “maximise cognoscibility” 
(Lieberman, 2014:139).  
 
Lieberman’s detailed and interesting work on how Bentham’s thinking developed over the course of his 
career does much to explain some of his influences, and how they fit together in reference to publicity. It 
does not, however, aim to explain what Bentham’s views on public reasoning were, or how these might 
contribute to contemporary normative debates on the role of discussion between citizens before they vote 
(Lieberman, 2014:119-42). Similarly, Schofield has developed a comprehensive and rich exposition of 
how publicity functions in Bentham’s democratic theory (2006:250-71). He highlights the central place 
that Bentham gives publicity in assuring the accountability of public officials, and the many measures 
which were necessary to citizens having access to the information required for this. Reading this account, 
along with Lieberman’s, in the context of contemporary debates about public reasoning and deliberation, 
                                                          
31 Clearly, Bentham did believe that this security of expectations was critically important. Indeed, separately, Kelly has argued that it was, 
for Bentham, the single most important factor in determining utility over the long term. Without the security of understanding how the law 
would interact with their own lives, individuals would inevitably lack an important and “necessary condition of personal continuity and of 
interest formulation” (Kelly, 1990: 73). 
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however, it is striking that publicity is portrayed almost as a feature of the institutions of the state; rather 
than as an account of citizens’ behaviour and obligations. Following this trend, Schofield’s 
comprehensive analysis outlines how Bentham believed publicity and responsibility should operate in a 
democracy, and the features of the architecture and processes of government necessary to making 
publicity an effective catalyst for making governors responsible to those they govern. 
This account reflects some aspects of how Bentham believed the rationale for laws should be publicised, 
and how public opinion could go wrong when infected by delusions caused by fallacies. These are 
fundamental components of Bentham’s views about how citizens should interact with one another and 
their government. Indeed, Bentham clearly links the delusions evinced by fallacies as an instrument of 
misrule with prodigious harm to the political process. By acquiescing to the unjustified claims of 
authority, he believed, passive citizens played their part in impeding progress. Whilst Bentham believed 
that a rational and informed debate would attribute approval and disapproval appropriately according to 
the pleasures and pains at stake, the manipulated and delusory discourse had prevented this from 
happening. There was thus a direct link between the delusions generated by a discourse replete with the 
fallacies that Bentham identified, and outcomes which served sinister rather than public ends: “Wherever 
the moral branch of the field of thought and action is on the carpet, they are continually occupied, with or 
without intending it, in drawing portraits (1989:266). Bentham believed that “sinister” ends, or interests, 
were served when the public interest was sacrificed in service of the particular interests of a group or 
individual. 
 
Bentham also believed that the positive and negative implications of the language used in debate had been 
used to reinforce a false impression that members of the governing elite were benevolent and infallible. 
This failure of public discourse provided cover for sinister abuses because it made members of a 
governing elite immune to the kind of public scrutiny which was needed to make them dependent on the 
people they governed. It was this kind of unthinking reverence for putative authority that Bentham wished 
to demolish. He believed that public opinion could only operate successfully in a democracy once it had 
been liberated from these limitations. An appropriate process of reasoning between members of the public 
was part of the process through which that demolition of delusions and corruption could be promoted. In 
the long term, this would deprive sinister public officials of the opportunity to “reap the united fruits of 
selfishness and malevolence” (1989:266). 
 
What is perhaps less clear in this account, however, is whether and how those views put forward by 
Bentham can be understood to provide an account of public reasoning, and how that account might 
interact with contemporary debates on this question. Contemporary deliberative theorists grapple with 
questions like: “what duties do citizens owe one another when deliberating on certain questions? What 
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kinds of reasons should they appeal to or ignore? How does deliberation change the character of its 
participants?”. There are many valuable contributions to Bentham scholarship which explain how 
publicity should function, but they tend not to directly address questions like these.  
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Conclusion 
In Chapter 2, I argued that the conventional view can offer no convincing explanation of the value of 
discussion between citizens before voting. This is principally because its premises preclude many of the 
plausible grounds on which contemporary theorists conceptualise the value of this discourse. Participatory 
views do not fall into that trap. Where “conventional” readings of Bentham leave us with a view of 
democracy heavily reliant on aggregation, and relatively neglectful of public reasoning; participatory 
readings explicate ideas necessary to explaining the value of public reasoning. Both Niesen’s and Ben-
Dor’s views, therefore, offer a fuller account of the value of effective discussion between citizens before 
voting than the conventional view, but encounter interpretive issues in doing so. 
 
To summarise, the participatory views examined in this chapter offer a better response to the challenge of 
explaining the role of pre-voting discussion than “simple” or “conventional” readings considered above. 
Broadly, however, there are two reasons why they cannot provide grounds for a Benthamite account of 
public reasoning. Some of these accounts do not provide a plausible interpretation of Bentham’s views. 
Others do provide a plausible account, but do not relate it to the ideas which are relevant to contemporary 
debates. Let us recap these two matters in turn.  
 
There are a few reasons to conclude that the accounts examined do not accurately reflect Bentham’s 
views. For instance, some scholars—like Crimmins—draw a direct equivalence between Bentham and 
Habermasian deliberation. That allusion could answer the normative challenge of explaining the value of 
pre-voting discussion. But it sits uneasily with Bentham’s legal and political writing. There are few 
reasons to believe Bentham intended pre-voting discussion to be transformative in the sense suggested by 
contemporary Habermasians. Other participatory readings would suggest that Bentham endorsed a public-
spirited form of deliberation. That conclusion could, for instance, be drawn from Lyons’ (1973) dual-
standard. This conclusion is mistaken, in my view. Bentham endorsed the secret ballot. His rationale for 
doing so was to protect individual voters from public influence, rather than exposing them to it. Further, 
Bentham portrays self-interest rather than the public interest as a predominant—if not comprehensive—
motivation in individual behaviour.  
 
The interpretive objections to other participatory views are more nuanced. Both Niesen and Ben-Dor 
consider Bentham’s later democratic writing in some detail. Niesen offers a strong justification for pre-
voting discussion within a parliament. His excellent analysis of parliamentary discourse cannot, however, 
be extrapolated to explain Bentham’s views on public pre-voting discussion. Bentham believed that 
parliamentary and public forums were significantly different: consequently he stipulated different voting 
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rules for each. Second, the complex editorial history of “Political Tactics” limits how confident we can be 
in using that text to explain Bentham’s views; particularly where it seems to diverge from other texts. 
 
Ben-Dor’s argument instead relies on the view that public discourse makes consensus possible by aligning 
incentives between citizens through the social sanction. Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument 
suggests that it could be possible for full consensus to be reached through discussion rather than the 
aggregation of votes. Although rich and fascinating, this interpretation must also be challenged. The early 
Bentham wrote extensively about how an enlightened legislator should use indirect legislation. That line 
of argument is less prominent, however, in Bentham’s later, democratic writings. Indeed, the text on 
which Ben-Dor principally relies—the first volume of the “Constitutional Code”—characterises the 
Public Opinion Tribunal as a security against misrule by governors; not an instrument for engineering 
agreement between citizens. In “Securities Against Misrule”, as elsewhere, Bentham makes the link 
between publicity and security against abuses by governors explicit: 
 
“…the greater the number of the members of the whole community to whom the existence of an 
act of oppression has been made known, the greater is the number of those by whom, on the 
occasion of an endeavour to exercise other acts of a similar nature, supposing the past act notified 
to them, not only may obedience withholden, but resistance opposed” 
(Bentham, 1990:30) 
 
Bentham did not emphasise utilitarian consensus in the way Ben-Dor suggests. He did not use that term, 
or describe anything similar to the consensus described by contemporary theorists, including Rawlsians. 
Indeed, Bentham’s analysis of fallacies and delusion suggests a scepticism about the provenance of many 
of the (putative) agreements of his time. 
 
The second reason why some views we have examined do not suggest an interpretation of Bentham on 
public reasoning is simply that they do not directly address the question. Scholars like Schofield and 
Lieberman offer an accurate and detailed analysis of Bentham’s views on the constitutional role of 
publicity. In doing so, however, they do not explicitly address the questions asked and answered by 
contemporary theorists of public reasoning. There are, however, reasons for optimism. Interpretations like 
these show that publicity, if not public reasoning, was central to Bentham’s democratic theory. It is 
therefore possible that the arguments presented by these scholars can be re-framed to address the 
contemporary debate. I attempt to begin that process in the next chapter. By using primary texts—along 
with insights from Schofield, Rosen and others—we shall investigate how far the views Bentham himself 
expressed provide grounds for an account of public reasoning which responds to the two challenges we 
have outlined.  
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Chapter 4. Bentham reconsidered 
“It is well known that for Bentham the public interest is the sum of the interests of the members 
of the community, but it does not follow that the aggregate of whatever the individual members 
see as being in their interest at a particular time is in the public interest”  
(Rosen, 1983:29) 
Introduction 
Bentham’s rationale for democracy gives context for how he wanted public opinion to operate. 
Democracy was necessary because, without it, public officials consistently lacked the “aptitude” needed 
to serve the public interest. Creating that aptitude meant making them dependent on the people whose 
interests they should serve. Creating this dependency, in turn, required the use of clear language, rooted in 
individual interests. That required an empowered, critical, public opinion with the ability to exercise both 
social and political judgement (“sanctions”) against public officials. This is the context for public opinion 
in Bentham’s democracy. It must reflect individual interests and, in doing so, the public interest, to hold 
officials to account. It could therefore create “official aptitude” through a particular type of public 
engagement. I shall refer to this as “public aptitude”.  
 
I have outlined and responded to a number of contemporary accounts of public reasoning, and some 
interpretations of Bentham on this question. Clearly, there are some normative “gaps” in that debate; 
particularly in the boundaries between views which have often been termed “deliberative” and 
“aggregative”. Some contemporary views provide a compelling explanation of why pre-voting discussion 
may be valuable to a democracy. In doing so, however, I believe they create greater opportunities for the 
outcomes of discussion to be manipulated. Indeed, it is alleged that some of the deliberative conditions 
defined by theorists are open to manipulation, because they imply a form of paternalism about citizens 
preferences; or the conditions under which they are formed (Posner, 2004). The strength of deliberative 
theory may also be its weakness, therefore. Other accounts avoid this danger. They offer fewer such 
opportunities for discursive outcomes to be manipulated because they utterly reject any paternalism, or 
even evaluation at all, over citizens’ preferences. Doing so, however, weakens their account of the value 
of pre-voting discussion.  
 
In this chapter, I re-examine Bentham’s writing to determine the extent to which his work provides the 
basis of an account of public reasoning. In doing so it would, of course, be tempting to say that all of the 
gaps we have identified can be neatly filled by a proper understanding of Bentham’s actual views: that he 
anticipated and responded to all of the challenges posed by contemporary debates in this area. 
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Unfortunately, I do not think that a faithful reading of Bentham’s work does answer every aspect of the 
challenges mentioned. Such a reading does, however, go far beyond some of the crude generalisations 
often made by contributors to that debate; particularly some of the deliberative theorists mentioned in 
Chapter 2. Bentham was not the blinkered subjectivist that Hart suggested, or the unthinking aggregator 
that Gutmann & Thompson imply. As the quotation which begins this chapter suggests, he did not believe 
that legislators should unthinkingly maximise whatever citizens happen to value at a particular time 
(Rosen, 1983:29). He consistently argued that the public interest should be understood in aggregative 
terms, but also placed public opinion—and an active and informed citizenry to generate it—at the centre 
of his democratic theory. In this sense, Bentham’s views were both participatory and aggregative. We 
should not dismiss Bentham’s potential contribution to the contemporary debate lightly: the simple 
premises of his views do not preclude a meaningful explanation of pre-voting discussion.  
 
Of course, one major barrier is that Bentham wrote in a radically different context. Many contemporary 
theorists follow Rawls (1997) in seeking principles which are in some sense justifiable to a wide range of 
reasonable ethical perspectives. One would not expect Bentham to have done so. Rather, Bentham 
famously believed that he had defined—in the principle of utility—an evaluative standard against which 
all moral and political claims could be explained, understood, or repudiated (IPML, 12). Bentham’s views 
are clear. It is important not to skew those arguments in an attempt to apply them to questions of 
contemporary interest. Indeed, it is partly an attempt to address contemporary constitutional debates that 
has led to interpretations which overplay similarities between Bentham and deliberative democrats. As we 
have seen, Ben-Dor (2000) brilliantly and originally applies Bentham’s views to important current legal 
matters. On occasion, however, he does so by departing from what Bentham actually wrote. As one well-
known delegate at a recent conference said of Ben-Dor’s text, “it’s beautiful, but it’s not Bentham”. As 
we saw in Chapter 3, others have made a similar argument. Crimmins (2011), for instance, suggests an 
affinity between Bentham and contemporary Habermasians, implying that both are committed to a small 
group of key concepts. Interpretations like these often overlook critical differences over questions like the 
orientation of debate.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the basis of a view of what Bentham did believe about public 
reasoning, and the importance of public opinion in a democracy. Clearly, there is no single text on this 
matter which covers every question of interest. Nonetheless, I believe that Bentham does provide many of 
the resources needed for a developed response: relevant principles become clear when we examine a 
number of themes in his writing together more closely. The result may not be “beautiful” in the sense 
described above, but my present aim is that it should “be Bentham”.  
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To summarise, I believe that Bentham’s logic for democracy makes official aptitude essential to good 
governance. In turn, the moral aspect of official aptitude requires a particular form of reasoning and 
engagement from citizens. I term this “public aptitude”, and explore some of its features by drawing on a 
variety of different strands of Bentham’s thought. Public aptitude has some important features which tell 
us about Bentham’s views on public reasoning. It is critical of authority rather than acquiescent to it; it 
focuses on citizens’ own self-interest rather than the public interest. It examines language to test its 
relation to pleasures and pains; and expects to reach decisions through majority voting rather than 
deliberative consensus. The practice of public reasoning both requires and cultivates the reasoning 
capacities needed to hold public officials to account. 
 
This implies that public participation in pre-voting discussion is vital. But that discussion does not 
resemble the contemporary Habermasian ideal. Participation directed toward “public aptitude” is focused 
on clarifying individuals’ particular interests rather than transforming them; it holds no intrinsic moral or 
democratic status independent of the benefits it confers on decision-making; and takes place with no 
expectation of full consensus between participants. Let us begin by taking a look at the context for 
Bentham’s views on public reasoning: the roots of his belief in democracy. To understand Bentham’s 
views on public reasoning, we must first revisit the underlying logic of the argument he made for 
democratic reforms in his later years, and how this relates to his notion of the public interest. Critically, 
this argument emphasises the importance of “official aptitude” which, itself, relies on a form of public 
participation. As I hope will become clear, Bentham’s democratic views are therefore heavily reliant on a 
particular type of participation and reasoning from citizens: “public aptitude” is central to his account. 
 
Bentham’s democratic logic 
It was not until 1817 that Bentham published an unequivocal endorsement of the case for radical 
democratic reform. Chapter 5 of Bentham’s “Parliamentary Reform Catechism” was published in the text 
of the “Plan of Parliamentary Reform”. It summarises the argument succinctly: 
“The immediate cause of all mischief of mis-rule is, that the men acting as representatives of the 
people have a private and sinister interest, and sufficient power to satisfy that interest, producing 
a constant sacrifice of the interest of the people...the cause of this immediate cause is this, that 
these same agents are in one case unduly independent...of their principals—the people; and 
dependent upon the Corruptor General” (Bentham, 1818a:24) 
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The position, power, and incentives of officials caused damage to the public interest. Officeholders had 
historically depended on the King (“Corruptor General”) for their office and the money and status that 
came along with this, but depended on the general population for nothing. The rewards offered were 
corruptive: they influenced the will of officials in a way which damaged the public interest (Bowring viii, 
545-6 in Schofield, 2006: 142). Radical reform was needed to reverse this situation; to make 
representatives dependent on the people, and independent of the monarch. Along with delusion, which 
operated on the intellect (Ibid), corruption was a principal threat to the happiness of the community. It was 
promoted, not negated, by the secrecy of the parliamentary system. 
 
In part, this conclusion was the product of Bentham’s definition of the public interest. As we have seen, 
he held that the public interest was the legitimate end of government (IPML:12), and was part of what 
distinguished political action from private conduct in ethics: 
“Of this constitution, the all-comprehensive object, or end in view, is, from first to last, the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number; namely, of the individuals, of whom, the political 
community, or state, of which it is the constitution, is composed; strict regard”.  
(Bentham, 1983b:18) 
 
Of course, the wording that Bentham used to described the end of government changed slightly over the 
course of his career. He began by referring to the “principle of utility” in “Deontology”, and then clarified 
that this entailed achieving the “greatest happiness”; a phrase which was then expanded into “the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number” (Schofield, 2006:38). Bentham rarely referred to the public interest 
without also tying that idea back to its roots: the pains and pleasures of individuals. The care that he took 
to emphasise that individualistic definition of the public interest was significant. He believed that a failure 
to attend to the exact definition of the interests at stake in political debate caused immense damage. In the 
“Book of Fallacies”, for example, he insists that the pleasures and pains attributed to any proposal must be 
assignable in order to produce useful debate. In his essay on the “Principles of International Law” he 
reiterates that to attribute a character to nations would be harmful; for analogous reasons. Here, again, 
referring to general ideas rather than identifiable causes of pleasures and pains clouded debate rather than 
clarifying it: 
“A nation has its property—its honour—and even its condition. It may be attacked in all these 
particulars, without the individuals who compose it being affected. Will it be said that it has its 
person? Let us guard against the employment of figures in matter of jurisprudence. Lawyers will 
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borrow them, and turn them into fictions, amidst which all light and common sense will 
disappear; then mists will rise, amidst the darkness of which they will reap a harvest of false and 
pernicious consequences.”  
(Bentham, Principles of International Law, Bowring II, p.544) 
 
This emphasis on assignable references to identifiable interests is also evident in Bentham’s constitutional 
analysis. He denounced the authors of the French Constitution for using “terrorist language” (2002: 330). 
They were guilty of using abstract propositions that diminished the utility of discourse, and made good 
decision-making less likely. Indeed, Bentham suggested a direct link between how abstract the language 
used was, and how liable it was to mislead. He suggests that it is precisely because the language used 
made imprecise reference to the public interest, and related concepts, that it was prone to misleading 
citizens. That claim was generalised, to suggest that “the more abstract—that is the more extensive, the 
proposition is, the more liable to involve a fallacy.” (Bentham, 2002:320). In place of a clear explanation 
of the relevance of prescribed measures to the self-interest of individual citizens; broad and ambiguous 
reference was made to the welfare of the nation. Like vague references to the “character” of the nation, 
claims like these were “beside the purpose” (2002: 321) of real political discourse. They obscured rather 
than clarifying citizens’ view of their own interests.  
 
Through operation of the common law, Bentham also believed that references like these had undermined 
the law itself. As we saw in Chapter 3, the remedy was clear justification, explained in public according to 
the assignable interests concerned. In the “Codification Proposal”, for example, Bentham insisted that 
laws must be accompanied by a rationale, which constantly connects them to their rightful end; in 
reference to the real entities of pleasure and pain (Ibid: 245-60). In the absence of this kind of 
justification, he thought that the practical application of the law had become arbitrary. Without 
justification, the law could became a product of the way individuals felt about particular questions: 
sympathy, antipathy, or caprice. Those feelings were often shaped by their particular interests and 
prejudices. The abuse of language was an important part of the sinister sacrifice of the public interest 
which Bentham wished to prevent. It maintained a deluded, and corrupted public; without which those 
abuses could not continue. The logic behind Bentham’s belief in reform was thus that democracy was 
needed to prevent this sinister cycle. It introduced an essential measure of public scrutiny and 
justification. Bentham believed that “sinister” ends, or interests, were served when the public interest was 
sacrificed in service of the particular interests of a group or individual. 
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It is worth exploring the role of language in allowing sinister abuse a little more. In the “Book of 
Fallacies”,32 for example, Bentham identified some of the abuses of language and logic that he thought 
were to blame. There, the “fallacies of confusion”—explained in Chapter 4—defines the language that 
Bentham believed had been used by a ruling minority to conflate their own interests with the professed 
ends of public institutions. Thus, an undiscriminating use of general terms like “government” was 
observed. This permitted the service of sinister interests above the public interest, since: “This 
impropriety of speech being thus happily and successfully established, the fruits of it are gathered in every 
day” (Ibid, 260).  
 
Bentham’s views on political language are important. They provide a significant reason to believe that he 
was sceptical of public-interest-based public reasoning, under many conditions. He was suspicious of the 
potential for abuse of many abstract terms, including “government” itself. If, as seems likely, an account 
of public reasoning which aims to help voters learn about the public interest involves more extensive use 
of language which refers directly to the public interest—rather than its component parts—then, on 
Bentham’s logic, this would be more likely to deceive voters. In the first chapter of IPML (paragraph V), 
for example, he insists that “It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding 
what is the interest of the individual. A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the interest, of an 
individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to 
diminish the sum total of his pains.”  
 
This idea permeates much of his career: from his constitutional writing, to his efforts to achieve practical 
political and social reforms. In August 1793, for instance, Bentham wrote to Earl Spencer in support of 
his ill-fated plan for a Panopticon prison. Here, he again reiterates the importance of understanding the 
public interest in terms of the assignable interests of individuals, rather than more general terms: 
“No Man...can be more sensible than I am to the abuses to which the maxim that private interest 
should give way to public, is liable, and is but too frequently made subservient: as if the public 
were made up of anything but individuals” 
(Bentham, 1981: 472) 
 
This individualistic, aggregative definition of the public interest remained relatively stable through 
Bentham’s career. So too did his emphasis on the importance of precise language; which picks out 
individuals rather than abstract entities. The wording that Bentham used, however, varied significantly 
                                                          
32 http://books.google.co.uk/books?oe=UTF-8&id=KuEqAAAAMAAJ&q=abstract#v=snippet&q=abstract&f=false  
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(Gunn 1968:4). A consistent theme is that Bentham is sceptical about the usefulness of general references 
to “the public”. Through his works, he refuses to give the public or community a particular nature or 
character; independent of those of the people who composed it.  
 
From this individualistic approach, and the aggregative definition which followed from it, we might 
expect Bentham to argue that a simple aggregation of self-interested votes alone reflects the public 
interest in political decision-making. The reality of Bentham’s views was more complex. He thought that 
the public interest would be served in a community when the agents making decisions had the ability, 
information, and integrity needed to perform that role effectively. Bentham termed these properties 
“aptitude”. As Rosen (1983) and Schofield (2006: 272-303) have established, the aptitude of officials 
became an important feature of Bentham’s later writing, particularly from around 1809. The ideas it 
signified also featured in Bentham’s earlier work. For instance, the first section of the first chapter of the 
“Handbook of Fallacies” provides an analysis of claims to authority. Here, Bentham’s suggests that 
putative authority should be understood in relation to the qualities of the agents involved. The reliability 
of a putative authority on any particular question could be ascertained by understanding their intelligence, 
probity, proximity to the matter under discussion, and how faithfully their opinion had been 
communicated. Relative and adequate intelligence was required to use and process information reliably. 
Being distant from the matter in question leant itself to deficiencies of intelligence because it meant that 
the information used could be less reliable. Probity, in contrast, was a moral rather than epistemic quality. 
It reflected the ability of a person or group to pursue the principle of utility rather than interests which 
were particular merely to themselves or specific groups of people. 
 
Bentham believed that the most common deficiency of probity was simple insincerity: discrepancy 
between an opinion expressed and that genuinely held. Authority could also be undermined in deeper 
ways. Where a person’s interests were served by reaching one conclusion over another, he may pay 
greater attention to facts supporting one side than another. The will to favour one side of a debate was a 
failure of probity; the misjudgement it created a deficiency of intellect. These deficiencies meant that 
those who could control public decisions, and stood to gain from them, were likely to serve themselves 
rather than the community; unless given incentives to do otherwise. As we shall see later in this chapter, 
this idea of (“sinister”) persons or groups being able to sacrifice the interests of the community was 
central to Bentham’s view of democracy. I believe that it is also critical to understanding his views on 
public reasoning. 
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Aptitude and utility were intimately, perhaps even proportionally, connected. Bentham’s later 
constitutional writing, for example “Economy as Applied to Office”, suggests that the value of a 
government was determined by the usefulness of its laws. In turn, this depended on the aptitude of the 
officials who created them: 
“The goodness of the government will be as the aptitude of the portions of law enacted by it 
and the operations performed by it: their aptitude with relation to that same end...[and] the 
aptitude of the operations will be as the aptitude of the operators ”                                 
(Bentham, Economy as Applied to Office in 1989:4)  
 
Official aptitude was therefore critical. Bentham developed a fuller picture of how it should be defined 
and cultivated in some of his later writing. For instance, he paid great attention to the characteristics 
needed to make good decisions, and how they could be identified through measures like public 
examinations. As Rosen has noted, this reflected Bentham’s intention that the decisions made by officials 
must be more than just an unthinking reflection of the will of the majority (Rosen, 2003:196). Rather, 
competent officials would consider the longer term interests of the whole of the community; including the 
security of individuals which Bentham prized. Ideas of probity and talent in Bentham’s early writing thus 
gave way to a more developed later account of “official aptitude”. Like earlier work on probity, talent and 
intelligence, this reflected a range of different attributes required to maximise public utility. As mentioned 
briefly above, official aptitude had three aspects: moral aptitude, intellectual aptitude, and active aptitude. 
 
Moral aptitude (which was similar to earlier notions of probity) was a negative quality: the absence of a 
motivation to act in one’s own interest at the expense of all other interests. Interestingly, moral aptitude 
was not an attribute of rulers’ personality or character. Bentham’s view was not that we should expect, or 
hope for, self-sacrificial valour from officials. Rather, moral probity was a function of the situation that 
public officials found themselves in; the environment and incentives to which they were exposed. Indeed, 
Bentham believed that it was delusory and dangerous to expect good conduct from officials who were 
offered the opportunity to serve their own interests above the public interest (Bentham, 1989:266). 
Assuming their public-spiritedness in this way reduced citizens’ capacity to be aware of relevant interests; 
and to reason critically about political decisions.  
 
Bentham’s mission was thus to create arrangements whereby rulers’ natural inclination to serve their own 
interests was used to maximise—not  sacrifice—the  happiness of the community: 
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“…to place them in such a situation as that while they have no prospect of being able to 
encrease each of them his own happiness by diminishing the happiness of the greatest 
number, they have each of them a prospect of giving encrease to his own happiness by giving 
encrease to the happiness of the greatest number”  
(Bentham, Economy as Applied to Office, in First Principles...1989:14) 
 
At the heart of Bentham’s constitutional theory was the assumption that self-interest was a predominant 
motivation for individuals. Securities were therefore necessary to ensure that this motivation served rather 
than undermined the public interest.  
 
Functionaries also needed the ability to understand what would further the public interest; as well as the 
inclination to do so. Intellectual aptitude was thus essential, and was divided into two sub-categories. 
These were the scientific—necessary for an official to perform his public duty—and judicial, which gave 
him capacity to make correct decisions. (Schofield, 2006: 274). Finally, Bentham believed that officials 
needed active aptitude: the physical activity of performing their public duty, rather than simply 
understanding it or being inclined to act. Like doctors, whose “uninterrupted endeavour to afford relief” 
(Bentham, 1989:87) was fulfilled through an obligation of attendance, public officials should also be 
given minimal scope to fail to attend their office. Of these three branches of official aptitude, moral 
aptitude is most interesting in reference to public reasoning. Bentham famously proposed that an artificial 
identification of interests between the governing and the governed was necessary to maximise public 
utility (Harrison, 1983:232). The particular need for this identification of interests arose from what 
Bentham believed was the structure of interests in society, as well as an assumption that of predominant 
egoism. As we shall see, this became central to his thinking about democracy.  
 
Of course, Bentham was not always a democrat. Much of his earlier writing was directed at legislators 
rather than democratic voters. It sought to furnish them with qualities needed to make good decisions in 
the expectation that a sufficiently wise and well-informed elite could systematically serve the public 
interest. His notions of probity and talent were not, therefore, intrinsically democratic. Rather, they were 
technocratic; Bentham wanted to analyse and improve the quality of decision-making on a practical level. 
It was in this efficiency of office that he believed that greatest happiness of the greatest number would be 
realised. There was, however, a significant change in Bentham’s thought over the course of his career. 
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From 1808-9, Bentham’s commitment to fundamental constitutional reform was in place, but he did not 
publicly argue for near-universal suffrage until the 1817 “Plan of Parliamentary Reform”. The logic for 
the later Bentham’s democratic views did not hinge on an unconditional right of citizens to participate 
under all circumstances. Instead, he came to the conclusion that rulers in the real world did not have 
requisite moral and intellectual aptitude to serve the ends of the community. Misuse of power was the 
central issue. Unless subject to the incentives created by a democratic system of government, governors 
would fail to maximise public utility. To serve the people, they had to be made dependent on the people.  
 
Thus, while the early Bentham placed some trust in the possibility of an enlightened legislator, the later 
Bentham became deeply distrustful of the ruling classes. He suggested that to believe that the ruling 
classes wanted to serve the public interest would be like supposing “that it is for the happiness of negroes 
that planters have all along been flogging negroes” (Bentham, 1993:254). That colourful quotation 
captures two things. First, it reflects the transition from trust to distrust of elites, which accompanied 
Bentham’s transition to democracy. Second, it reflects the importance of class in Bentham’s democratic 
thought. He came to believe that interests were starkly divided in society: between opposing classes. That 
opposition was critical to the need for democratic accountability. The exact timing of Bentham’s 
conversion to democracy has been the source of much speculation (Mack, 1962: 409; Halevy, 1952: 147; 
Dinwiddy, 1975:683-700). In recent years, however, our understanding of how Bentham’s political 
thought progressed has been advanced substantially. Schofield’s authoritative analysis in “Utility and 
Democracy” (2006) suggests that there was no single point at which Bentham suddenly became a 
democrat. Rather, the developed constitutional theory that he started to outline in the 1820s, and the calls 
for radical parliamentary reform published in 1817 were the product of reflection on views that Bentham 
had held for decades. Using a variety of unpublished texts, Schofield (2006:109) has argued that 
Bentham’s conversion to a form of democracy was intimately related to the idea of “sinister interest”, 
which first developed rigorously in or around 1804. He describes sinister interest as bringing about “The 
critical development of Bentham’s political thought...from which he eventually drew the conclusion that 
democracy was essential to good government” (Schofield, 2006:109). 
 
Whereas moral aptitude was achieved where governors’ particular interests were aligned with the public 
interest, sinister interest was served where these two diverged and self (or group) interest was served at 
the expense of the community. The public official was peculiarly exposed to the potential for sinister 
abuses of power. Bentham explained why in Chapter 3 of the “Handbook of Fallacies”: 
“The mind of every public man is subject at all times to the operation of two distinct interests—a 
public and a private one. His public interest is that which is constituted of the share he has in the 
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happiness and well-being of the whole community, or of the major part of it: his private interest is 
constituted of, or by, the share he has in the well-being of some portion of the community less 
than the major part; of which private interest, the smallest possible portion is that which is 
composed of his own individual—his own personal—interest”  
(Bentham, Ch.3, Book of Fallacies).  
 
As this quotation—and the later idea of moral aptitude—imply, the potential for sinister abuse was largely 
a feature of the situation that public officials, rather than a product of individuals’ failures of character. 
Bentham says that, when left without recourse from others, individuals will almost always prefer their 
particular interests to those of the community. Indeed, this was something in which “there should be 
found no regret”. Rather, it was a simple feature of human behaviour. In the majority of cases, he 
believed, there would be a divergence between officials’ particular and general interests. This caused 
government to be used to serve the (sinister) interests of an elite, and for the public interest to be 
sacrificed to that end. As we have seen, he termed that sacrifice “sinister”. Bentham also saw sinister 
interest at work in the legal system. Here, too, the “sacrifices of public welfare to private convenience” 
were commonplace (Bentham, 1821a:80). There is a striking similarity between Bentham’s diagnosis of 
how jurors were manipulated, through pecuniary incentives and deception, and his analysis of rulers’ 
conduct.  
 
In both cases, he assumed that we cannot expect individuals to serve the community by consistently 
diverging from their own particular interests. To do so would be to neglect a “fundamental axiom”: 
particular interests shape behaviour and judgement. As a consequence, controlling a man’s prospects of 
future welfare conferred the ability to influence his actions: material dependence shaped judgment and 
action. Thus, possess “in your hands...the faculty of influencing that interest or welfare...[and] the exercise 
of... [their] power is...at your command” (Bentham, 1821a:16). This principle caused both public officials 
and jurors to fail in their roles. Both were placed in a situation where particular and public interests 
diverged: both pursued the former at the expense of the latter.  
 
This “fundamental axiom” of behaviour was not a significant problem for most individuals. Bentham 
believed that this group, which he termed the “ruled”, or “unopulent” at different points in his writing, had 
particular interests which largely coincided with the public interest. It was, however, a colossal problem 
for another class. Bentham held that there was much in common between the majority of the population, 
who were ruled. There was, however, very little in common between the ruled and the ruling. In different 
138 
 
texts he uses slightly different language to describe what we might now call a “ruling class” or elite. They 
were sometimes “opulent”; on other occasions they were described as “great characters in high situations” 
(1821a:263). In “First Principles...” two classes in society are characterised as “productive” and 
“unproductive” (1989: 71-2). The former referred to the working majority and the latter to their political 
rulers. In this text, the importance of these groups to Bentham’s understanding of how the public should 
reason together in a democracy begins to become more obvious: he begins to relate class to the operation 
of public opinion more explicitly. 
 
Bentham argues that the Public Opinion Tribunal (POT)—the fictitious entity which represents and 
operationalises public opinion in a democracy—is composed of two distinct segments: the Democratical, 
and the Aristocratical sections. The former constituted the majority of the Tribunal, and the latter the 
minority. Since the community was the sum of the individuals who composed it, this difference in 
numbers mattered. The opinion of the Democratical Section was always more likely to be “in the highest 
degree contributory to the greatest happiness of the greatest number and therefore in the highest degree 
accordant with the universal interest” because it comprised the majority of individuals. Critically, 
however, Bentham caveats this claim. He says that the opinion of the majority will promote public utility 
only “in so far as the conception entertained by the several Members in relation to their respective 
interests is correct” (Bentham, 1989: 68-9). 
 
Two aspects of this caveat are key to our current purposes. First, Bentham acknowledged the capacity for 
error in how interests were identified. This provides additional evidence that we should reject any 
simplistic “naive subjectivist” reading of public opinion in his political theory. It therefore also provides 
grounds to reject that aspect of the “simple” or “conventional” view described in Chapter 2. That 
important point is confirmed by Rosen’s analysis of the “Constitutional Code”: Bentham did not believe 
that the public interest was whatever public opinion happened to dictate at a particular time (Rosen, 
1983:29). Rather, its efficacy depended on the quality of the judgements made by individuals. As we will 
see, that quality was enhanced by a particular form of democratic institutions, and a particular type of 
reasoning by the people who composed the public.  
 
The second thing about this quotation that we should note is that Bentham wants members of the 
Democratical Section to have an accurate conception of their particular interests; not of the universal (or 
public) interest as a whole. The simple fact was that they—as the “unopulent”—composed the majority of 
the community. As a result, individuals within this majority could reflect on, and understand, their 
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particular interests. By doing so, they would, by weight of numbers, also reflect the public interest. This 
followed since: the unopulent had largely similar interests in light of their similar circumstances (relative 
to those of their rulers); and the interest of the public was nothing more than the sum of the interests of the 
individuals who composed it. This meant that the interests of the majority could not meaningfully diverge 
from those of the public. In contrast, the interests of a minority—particularly one with different relative 
circumstances—could readily diverge from those of the public. Consequently, for the majority at least, 
effective public opinion requires a genuine reflection of particular interests; not deliberative 
transformation away from them. This is perhaps to be expected. After all, we have seen that Bentham 
found no cause for regret in individuals’ preference for their particular interests over the universal interest.  
 
In contrast, individuals who composed the Aristocratical Section were a mere minority of the whole 
community. They came from “the ruling and otherwise influential few: of the highest ranks of 
functionaries in the state, with the addition of such other classes whose particular interests are in a league 
with theirs” (Bentham,1989:69). Bentham assumed that they, like anyone, would form opinions and 
behaviours which reflected their particular interests. Their actions will “...therefore be in each instance 
determined by the interest common to the Members of this Section”. The great danger was that the 
particular interests of the Aristocratical Section radically diverged from those of the rest of society: 
“...in a great, not to say the greatest, part of the field of morals including that of legislation the 
interest common to the Members of this narrow Section is in direct opposition to the interest of 
the more comprehensive Section” (Bentham, 1989:68-9) 
 
Bentham thus asserted a “diametrical opposition” between the interests of these two classes (1989:70). 
The interests of the Democratical Section generally aligned with those of the community as a whole, by 
weight of numbers. In contrast, those of the Aristocratical Section usually ran against those of the 
community: they were a minority, in unusual circumstances. 
 
In order to serve the public interest, therefore, effective public opinion required an accurate conception of 
respective interests from the (Democratical) vast majority of the community and far less input from the 
(Aristocratical) ruling elite. For this reason, Bentham suggests that Aristocraticals may contribute some 
intellectual aptitude to the operation of public opinion (as more formally characterised by the later Public 
Opinion Tribunal). They should, however, have no significant say over its judgements. Aristocraticals 
thus remained part of the wider public; but they were a small part whose interests were likely to be 
outweighed. Thus, when Bentham considers the function of the Public Opinion Tribunal in his 
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“Constitutional Code”, he implies that Aristocraticals could contribute intellectual aptitude to debates, but 
were—by definition—unlikely to contribute moral aptitude: their interests diverged too radically from the 
public interest. This principle was reflected in the constitution of sub-committees of the Tribunal.  
 
When these sub-committees were formed, Bentham prescribed that they should include only a minimal, 
minority representation for the Aristocratical Section. This would ensure that the community could benefit 
from whatever knowledge and judgement that group could bring to bear. Minimal representation would 
also ensure that Aristocraticals could not affect or direct the POT’s overall decisions (1989:74). This 
measure thus reflected the importance of both intellectual and moral aptitude to good decision-making. 
Bentham’s aim was to ensure that the findings of the POT served the public interest as reliably as 
possible, despite a pronounced divergence of interests between classes of citizens. 
 
The fundamental opposition of interests that Bentham identified between classes thus meant that there 
was not so much a single “public”. Rather, there was something closer to a majority “public”, and an elite. 
Different discursive rules applied to each group, to reflect the fundamentally different interests that they 
held. In describing the role of different groups in the operation of public opinion, the later Bentham never 
lost sight of his view that members of the ruling elite may only be expected to prefer their own particular 
interests when these diverged from those of the community. In the “Constitutional Code”, for instance, 
Bentham expected each member of the Aristocratical Section to behave in ways which served their 
particular interests; to “give his support to all things the tendency of which is to give augmentation to that 
quantity—to all laws, institutions, customs, opinions, prejudices, desires, hopes, fears, in so far as the 
tendency of them is to give existence to that effect” (Bentham, 1989: 73). 
 
These two classes marked out the background of those who constituted the Public Opinion Tribunal 
(POT), but they also influenced how they should contribute to its effective operation. It would have been 
very strange if Bentham had expected the (Democratical) majority of the public to transform their 
preferences through participation in the Tribunal. After all, he believed that their particular interests 
already coincided with the general interest. Society thus required from them an accurate conception and 
expression of their own interests, rather than a public-spirited transformation away from them. Of course, 
the same could not be said for the (Aristocratical) ruling few. As a consequence, different rules promoted 
the public interest in respect of these two different classes. Where Bentham wished to adduce a genuine 
reflection of particular interests, he accorded secrecy. When he wished to push particular interests toward 
greater conformity with the general interest, he advocated publicity. Voting in secret was useful in the 
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former case; public voting in the latter. When thinking about the rules of discourse and reasoning that 
Bentham thought appropriate to the Democratical Section, his view on the secret ballot is particularly 
instructive. That argument reaffirms just how far Bentham’s views were from what those endorsed by 
many Twentieth Century “stronger” deliberative theorists. He suggested that the POT should address 
“public” matters rather than the private conduct of individuals (1983b:37). 
 
As we have seen, Bentham’s advocacy of secret voting is well known. Participants in contemporary 
debates do not, however, always appreciate just how insistent, consistent, and important his arguments on 
this matter were. Through the 1790s and 1800s, his views on many important questions changed. In 
arguing for parliamentary reform, for example, Bentham endorsed different configurations of 
qualifications for the right to vote, and a significantly different scope for the franchise. His belief in the 
value of reform itself was radically affected by developments in France following that nation’s revolution 
(Schofield, 2006:78-109). It is well known, too, that Bentham’s beliefs on the rights of women (Ball, 
1993), the desirability of democracy (Mack, 1962), and many other matters changed over time. It is 
therefore striking that Bentham—as far as we can see—never advocated public voting. This comes despite 
the fact that it was a popular view at the time (Park, 1931). The rationale for the secret ballot is, therefore, 
absolutely central to understanding Bentham’s view of democracy. It is essential to his conception of the 
value of voting that “public happiness...is in this instance better promoted in every point of view by 
keeping the votes secret than by rendering them public.” (Bentham, 2002:430) 
 
Bentham’s reasons for objecting to public voting echoed his view of class, and of participation in the 
POT. The standard objection to secrecy at the time was that: 
 
“The practice of voting by ballot has an immoral tendency: it affords a screen to cowardice. A free 
man and Englishman ought to declare his choice boldly, without respect of persons, or fear of the 
consequences to himself” (Bentham, 2002:429). 
 
He objected to the idea that the practice of voting should be designed to assume that voters would act as 
they should, by voting for the public interest, rather than how they could act. The belief that individuals 
should vote on the basis of the public interest—irrespective of the consequences to themselves—thus 
supposedly leads to the conclusion that voting in public is justified; to allow individuals to discharge this 
‘duty’. Bentham’s rejection of that view is clear. He insists that procedures like voting should be designed 
around the likely behaviour, not optimistic hopes around the way people might ideally behave: 
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“In our dealings with mankind we ought to square our measures not by what they ought to be but 
by what they are. Am I to leave my house-door perpetually open, because all men ought to be 
honest... because no man ought to enter my house and steal? Merely because such is a man’s 
duty, ought I to place a man in a situation in which it is certain that he will not do his duty?” 
(Bentham, 2002:430) 
 
Thus, even if voting to reflect the public interest were desirable, Bentham did not believe that this would 
justify a public ballot. This would present citizens with unnecessary temptation to neglect their duty. 
Instead, he believed that we should design constitutions round realistic expectations of individual 
behaviour; to mitigate the harm that abuses could cause. 
 
Of course, “realistic expectations” of citizens can be understood in a variety of ways. Bentham’s own 
view is clear. As he famously argues at the start of IPML (Ch1, XI), assuming behaviour on the basis of 
self-interest is a more reliable basis for designing institutions and processes than alternatives. Indeed, 
Bentham was equally clear that the individual citizen had a duty to serve the public interest. Before 
voting, he gained the status of “being a trustee for his Co-electors as well as for himself”. This entailed 
that he should “act in conformity to the public interest in preference to any private interest of his own”. 
Bentham believed that this duty was often useful in many circumstances. It was, however “perfectly 
useless in all cases where either it is his own private interest only that the case requires he should pursue, 
or whereby acting in pursuit of his own private interest he acts as much in conformity to the public as if 
the public interest was the direct object of his pursuit” (2002: 431). 
 
Voting was exactly such a case. By acting in pursuit of his own interests, the voter advanced the public 
interest; as much as he would have done by directly pursuing the public interest itself. For Bentham, the 
connection between self-interested voting and public-interested outcomes was no accident. It was a 
necessary consequence of the fact that (IPML:1), the interest of the community is nothing more than the 
interests of the individuals who compose it. As a consequence: 
 
 “... It is impossible the majority of grown persons in a nation can have each of them an interest 
distinct from that of the whole. They have not naturally of their own any such separate interest, 
and in whose power should it be to give it them?” (Bentham, 2002: 431, italics added) 
 
Bentham’s views on this question were clear: the necessary connection between self-interested voting and 
public interested outcomes made public interested voting unnecessary:  
 
“While he acts [votes] in secret he is at free liberty to do what he thinks right and for his interest 
(which in this case are but two phrases for the same thing)” (Ibid).  
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Further, he argued, encouraging voting in public—in an attempt to promote public-minded participation—
would be dangerous. It would expose voters to influences that work against the public interest: 
 
“Expose him to the public eye, what will be [the] consequence? You expose him at the same time 
to the eyes of some individual or individuals who have an interest of their own opposite to the 
interest of the public and who have it in their power to make you suffer if you do not give 
preference to theirs, or what comes to the same thing, an opinion or caprice of theirs”  
(Bentham, 2002:431, italics added). 
 
Public voting thus made the mass of ordinary—“unopulent”—voters, who by dint of their similarity in 
circumstance and scale of numbers, had much in common, vulnerable to the influence of others who could 
make them vote in ways which do not reflect their own interests. In the terms later put forward in the 
“Constitutional Code”, publicity at the ballot box would make the Democratical Section subservient to the 
Aristocratical Section. It would enable the rich and powerful to manipulate the votes of those who depend 
on them for a living.  
 
As we have seen, the threat was similar to that Bentham had diagnosed in juries. Jurors could be corrupted 
if placed in a situation where serving their particular interests meant neglecting the public interest. So 
voters could also fail to serve the public interest when given incentives to do otherwise. There was, 
however, a crucial difference between voters and jurors. Voters could serve the public interest by 
considering their own interests, but jurors needed to consider the merits of a case impartially to do so. The 
key, in both cases, was to ensure that incentives offered to the individual charged with making a decision 
coincided with measures that serve the public interest, rather than diverging from it. In each situation, 
Bentham wished to design procedures which worked with the natural self-interest of individuals; 
producing better outcomes by taking account of their circumstances. 
  
Effective voting, for Bentham, required the millions of people who shared common, or ordinary, 
circumstances to vote according to their own interests. Aggregation would then recognise what they had 
in common, and produce results which serve the public interest. Barriers to effective voting—like the 
public ballot—placed obstacles between the self-interest of “ordinary men” (1821a:221) and the ways in 
which they could vote. These barriers could be understood in terms of the principles that affected 
individual conduct:  
 
“Three principles, the selfish, the dissocial, and the social, share the dominion of man’s conduct. 
Where the first two are out of the way, the latter will carry everything before it. No matter how 
weak it is, it will shape compleatly the course of every man’s conduct, while it acts alone. What 
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should hinder a man from voting for the candidate whom he deems the fittest, when there is no 
advantage to be got by voting for any other? What should induce him to vote for any other 
candidate than him whom he really deems the fittest, when there is no advantage to be got by it?” 
(Bentham, 2002:431). 
 
The central task ahead of those designing democratic institutions and procedures was thus to mitigate the 
influence of selfish and dissocial influences on actors’ conduct. Doing so would enable actions, and 
outcomes, which serve the public interest. 
 
Specifically, those who depended on landowners for their living would feel pressure to vote in accordance 
with those “sinister” interests rather than their own; for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise. 
Public voting thus pressurised the ordinary voter to neglect his own interests at the ballot box for fear of 
retribution. This meant that those with financial status were likely to benefit from public voting: not the 
majority or, consequently, the community. As a result, “the only security for genuineness of suffrage” was 
secret voting (Bowring, iii, 599). Note that unlike “stronger” deliberative democrats of the 20th Century, 
Bentham wanted votes to be genuine rather than the product of transformation of preferences.  
 
He believed that effective voting reflected voters’ particular interests rather than being the product of a 
type of deliberation which transformed underlying preferences beyond self-interest. The vital question 
was therefore whether individual voters had a correct conception of their particular interests, and whether 
they were put in a position (secrecy) to genuinely reflect them; not how public-interested they could 
become before voting. This account of secret voting thus complements Bentham’s later writing on the 
Public Opinion Tribunal (1989: 68-9). In both cases: the individual’s actions were directed by “his own 
interest meaning according to his own conception of it, to the conception correct or incorrect entertained... 
at the moment of action” (Bentham, 1989:68). 
 
The idea of “correct” and “incorrect” conceptions of interests runs through many strands of Bentham’s 
work. It underscored his rejection of any claims to infallibility in his political and religious writing, and 
was grounded in his epistemology. Bentham believed that the indirect or inferential relation between 
physical entities and our understanding of their existence was an inevitable source of error. It relied on 
“judgement, ratiocination, which is liable to be erroneous, and in experience is very frequently found to be 
so” (Bowring, viii 224). Fundamentally, therefore, since inference was required to gain an awareness of 
even the simplest external event, and inference was prone to error, so even these simple claims had to be 
treated with care. Their relation to the real (external) world had to be questioned and verified: “Simple 
perception is not capable of erring, no, nor sensation neither. But judgement is, on the part of every 
person, and on almost every occasion exposed to error” (Bowring, viii, 320). The number of “infallible” 
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perceptions that could take place was, therefore, extremely limited. The only simple perceptions in which 
error could not be found were those regarding the direct perception of one’s own experience; including 
one’s own utility: the direct sensation of pleasure or pain.  
 
In contrast, aspects of language that supposedly refer to “real” aspects of the external world had to be 
criticised by those using language in order to test their relation to the real world, and hence—given the 
assumption regarding true beliefs’ utility above—their usefulness. On questioning the inferential process 
by which a supposedly “real” entity referred to an external object or event, if one was unconvinced of the 
inference’s validity, the noun-substantive “in question [would]... not represent a real entity, but a non-
entity” (Schofield, 2006:17). On these grounds, error was to be found in many places. One of Bentham’s 
reasons for railing against Church of England doctrine was that its authors “as men...are but fallible” 
(1818b:36). In part this was inevitable. As Bentham asserted in the “Table of the Springs of Action”, “no 
human act ever had been or ever can be disinterested” (1983c: 99), and “judgement—opinion—is liable to 
be acted upon, influenced, and perverted, by interest” (1983c:111). Bentham generalised that claim in the 
“Rationale of Judicial Evidence”: 
 
"I have no great opinion of infallibility; and if it were necessary to believe in it, I would go to 
work by degrees, and begin with the pope’’  
(Rationale of Judicial Evidence in Bowring, vi,3, 5, quoted in Schwartzberg, 2007:564) 
 
This idea of fallibility of judgement was therefore intimately related to whether individuals held “correct” 
or “incorrect” conceptions of various interests; including their own. It also produces a fascinating tension 
between Bentham’s epistemology, and his writing on public opinion. On the one hand, he suggested that 
all judgement is inevitably fallible. Consequently, he rejected the idea that any individual could be 
infallible. On the other hand, he had great optimism about public opinion in general; particularly in the 
“Constitutional Code”. In places, that optimism seemingly overwhelms the potential for error identified in 
his epistemology. For instance, Bentham asserts that the variance between the dictates of public opinion 
and those of the Greatest Happiness Principle will become less and less numerous over time until they are 
in complete conformity with one another: 
 
"Even at the present stage in the career of its civilisation, [public opinion’s] dictates coincide, on 
most points, with those of the greatest happiness principle; on some, however, it still deviates 
from them: but, as its deviations have all along been less and less numerous, and less wide, 
sooner or later they will cease to be discernible; aberration will vanish, coincidence will be 
complete”. (Bentham, 1983b:36)  
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Bentham is thus acutely aware of the capacity for error in individuals’ judgements, but also extremely 
optimistic about the public opinion they created, in aggregate. He is at once wary of the fallibility of 
public opinion, yet reliant on its apparent infallibility.  
 
On this question, as on others, there is no reason to assume that all of the views Bentham expressed over 
the course of his career were necessarily consistent with one another. After all, Bentham changed his 
mind about a number of important matters. These included the extent of the franchise, and even the 
necessity of democracy itself. That said, this particular tension is perhaps less substantial than it first 
appears. Consider Bentham’s suggestion that public opinion is infallible in the “Constitutional Code”. It 
would be a clear contradiction if Bentham had said that a single person, like the monarch, generated 
public opinion, and was incapable of error. As we have seen, his epistemology implies that this would be 
impossible in reference to judgments about the external world, if not sensory experience. It was for 
precisely this reason that he mocked authors of the French Constitution in “Necessity of an Omnipotent 
Legislature” for their tacit assumption that no amendments to their work would be required: “Blessed fruit 
of a wisdom which proclaims itself infallible! Blessed state of the government of a great empire” 
(Bentham, 2002:270). 
 
Of course, public opinion was not, for Bentham,  like this. It was not generated by—or ascribable to—a  
single person. Rather, public opinion was what individuals believed the whole of their community to 
think. Bentham also believed, as we have seen, that it was impossible for the majority of individuals in a 
community to have an interest which was opposed to that of the community: after all, the former defined 
the latter. His claim that public opinion was infallible could be understood in the same way. If a 
community’s interest was nothing but the sum of the interests of the individuals who composed it, then 
how could the opinion of the majority of that community—properly constructed, informed and 
expressed—possibly diverge from the interests of the community?  
 
Elsewhere in the “Constitutional Code”, Bentham also says that public opinion is “incorruptible”. This 
might sound like the statement of a naive relativist; and reinforce some of the criticisms that Hart lays at 
Bentham’s door. Again, this claim is, however, less surprising if we reflect on what corruption meant for 
Bentham. He famously castigated the ruling elite as a source of corruption, and described the King as the 
Corruptor-General (Schofield, 2006, 42). Bentham criticised the monarch for distributing peerages to 
promote his own particular interest.  
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This was sinister interest made manifest in corruption: “reward, becomes corruption when applied to a 
sinister purpose, when applied to a man, in such a manner as to direct his endeavours to the doing good to 
the one or to the few, at the expense of preponderant evil to the many” (Bowring viii, 545-6 in Schofield, 
2006: 142). In a sense, this kind of patronage was the opposite of the secret ballot. Voting in private 
enabled a genuine expression of individual interests by the ordinary majority of voters. In contrast, 
corruption by patronage made the votes and decisions of influential men subservient to those who had 
patronised them. The former removed—or mitigated—the dissocial or selfish principles governing 
individual behaviour; the latter exploited and exacerbated them. The idea of corruption was thus related to 
incentives. It entailed their used to benefit a “sinister” few rather than to the community at large.  
 
In this context, it is perhaps less surprising that Bentham later deemed public opinion incorruptible. If it 
reflects the interests of the individuals who compose the community, what incentives could be offered to 
its constituent members to corrupt them? A relatively small payment or bestowal of prestige might be 
enough to corrupt a single peer. The corruption of public opinion at large, however, would require a 
majority of people in the community to be given an incentive to serve a particular interest. Of course, if 
the interest of the community is nothing more than the sum of the interests of the members who compose 
it, then the act of providing a strong incentive to a majority of individuals—who themselves create public 
opinion—would itself render a measure in the public interest, by definition. Thus, while public opinion 
might be subject to delusion and confusion, it could not be “corrupted” in the way that a single peer, 
receiving prestige from the Monarch, could be.  
 
It is clear from the role described for the Public Opinion Tribunal (POT) in the “Constitutional Code” that 
Bentham believed public opinion was absolutely critical to the success of a democracy. It operated in 
parallel with voting, as well as through it. He officially recognised public opinion as a formal part of the 
constitution, and lauded its influence. Public opinion is said to be progressive and incorruptible; to be the 
best hope of good governance; essential to the success of democracy. Bentham believed that history 
showed public opinion had the capacity to influence the behaviour of public officials. Its effects could be 
observed even where formal democratic institutions were absent. Thus while “rulers are by the unalterable 
constitution of human nature, disposed to maximize the application of the matter of good to themselves” 
(1983b:20), historic abuses had not always been as great as they might have been. This applied even to 
states ruled by monarchs with unlimited constitutional power, and is worth quoting at some length: 
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“As to moral responsibility, imperfect as it is, this species of security against misconduct is the 
more necessary to be brought to view, inasmuch as, in monarchies in general, were it not for this, 
there would be no responsibility at all: and, in other words, the monarch would be altogether 
without motives for compliance with the laws, even with those of his own making, which are, at 
all times, such as, and no other than, it is agreeable to him to make. It is by this source of restraint 
alone, that the English form of government—a mixture, composed of monarchico-aristocratical 
despotism with a spice of anarchy—has been preserved from passing through the condition of 
France, Russia, and Austria, into that of Spain and Portugal. Even without the assistance of a 
posse of his own creatures, acting under the name of a parliament—he may kill any person he 
pleases, violate any woman he pleases; take to himself or destroy any thing he pleases. Every 
person who resists him while in any such way occupied, is, by law, killable, and every person 
who so much as tells of it, is punishable. Yet, without the form of an act of parliament, he does 
nothing of all this. Why? Because by the power of the Public Opinion Tribunal, though he could 
not be either punished or effectually resisted, he might be, and would be, more or less annoyed.” 
(Bentham, 1983b:25) 
 
This clearly confirms that Bentham saw the outputs of public opinion as more than just whatever voters 
happened to express at the ballot box. It was a critical and essential security against misrule: a protection 
against abuse of public office. Whilst imperfect, and insufficient by itself, the opinions that the masses 
held of their rulers could exert some influence over their conduct. By doing so, it could improve 
governance. That security was principally exercised by encouraging the moral responsibility of rulers. As 
we have seen, Bentham understood this responsibility or “moral aptitude” in terms of an alignment 
between self-interest and the community’s interest; not as the cultivation of officials’ virtuous character. 
Public opinion was important for precisely that reason: it was able to produce greater moral aptitude in 
public officials through what Bentham called the moral sanction, which operated through public opinion.  
 
There was therefore a clear relationship between the responsibility with which governance was conducted, 
and the power of public opinion: “appropriate moral aptitude must be considered as exactly proportioned 
to the strictness of the functionary's dependence on public opinion” (1983b:174). Good governance had to 
be induced via a situation which made officials dependent on the public. This required publicity around 
government and the effective operation of public opinion. The Public Opinion Tribunal (POT) illustrates 
this point. The POT was to advance the happiness of the community through public meetings and 
publications; the most important of which were newspapers. It had a series of sub-committees to reflect 
different aspects of its role. As we have mentioned briefly above, its contribution to making officials 
dependent on the people was made through four distinct functions: Statistic, Censorial, Executive, and 
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Melioration-Suggestive (1983b: 36-8). Each of these tells us something about the kind of role that 
Bentham wished public opinion to play. 
 
In its Statistic capacity, the POT collected facts and evidence to inform the judgements its members made 
about the conduct of representatives. It is fair to conclude from this that Bentham placed significant 
importance on the need for public opinion to be sufficiently informed. His writing about the Tribunal does 
not suggest he held a view that expressed preferences can be blindly aggregated at the ballot box. Rather, 
he was attentive to the need for a sufficient volume and quality of information to be available before 
citizens made political judgements. 
 
The Censorial function was a matter of forming judgements; principally about officials’ conduct, policies, 
and other relevant questions. Members would then express approval or disapproval—approbation or 
disapprobation—according to whether conduct or policy was considered useful or detrimental to the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number. Bentham believed that the judgements formed by the Tribunal 
had great potential power. In “Political Tactics”, for example, he suggests that the “tribunal… is more 
powerful than all the other tribunals together... [and] always decides the destiny of public men” (Bentham 
1999: 29-34 in Schofield, 2006:260). It was therefore very important that the Tribunal accurately 
understood whether officials’ conduct was advancing or retarding the interests of the community. A 
failure to understand pleasures and pains, and how they related to political conduct and policy could cause 
public opinion to impede progress rather than promoting it. The judgement of the public was thus critical. 
It held the capacity to direct the power of the POT; either accurately or inaccurately. The concept of error 
in the formation of individual judgements, and public opinion was thus very important to Bentham’s 
account of democracy. We shall return to that important question later. 
The Executive function enacted the judgements of the POT. It created rewards and punishments by 
enforcing the will of the people through the moral sanction. As we explored in the previous chapter, Ben-
Dor advances a very particular interpretation of this function. He suggests that the POT was to apply the 
moral sanction to all members of the community. By doing so, it would promote consensus by better 
aligning the incentives of individual citizens with those of the whole community. I do not believe that this 
reading is supported by references to the POT; either in the “Constitutional Code” or in Bentham’s 
correspondence and other work. Some examples may illustrate this point. In 1823, Bentham wrote to 
Simon Bolivar to recommend constitutional reforms for Columbia. This was one example of the 
significant efforts Bentham made to ensure that his ideas for reform had a practical influence around the 
world. This letter was written relatively late in Bentham’s career: six years after the publication of the 
“Plan for Parliamentary Reform”. Consequently, it also provides an interesting insight into how Bentham 
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thought his ideas should be applied in practice. Addressing Bolivar as Columbia’s liberator, Bentham 
argued that a free press was essential to good governance because: 
“Only from such sources can the citizens... form any tolerably well-grounded judgement on the 
question whom to choose for Representatives, or, in their quality of Members of the Public 
Opinion Tribunal, on the question of what measures and arrangements to disapprove, what to 
approve, what persons, and in particular what functionaries, to punish by their disesteem, what to 
reward by their esteem. But, as the principal use of all such publications is, to serve as a bridle to 
the force of sinister interest in the breasts of rulers”. (Bentham, 2000:254-5) 
 
For Bentham, the “principal use” of publicity was to restrict the operation of sinister interests in 
government rather; not to create deliberative consensus. Thus, while Ben-Dor portrays the POT as akin to 
the conditions for the formation of Habermasian consensus, I do not believe that the way Bentham 
explains its workings corroborates this reading. In this quote, as elsewhere, we see that Bentham 
emphasises the importance of both citizens’ votes, channelled through formal democratic institutions, and 
the application of the moral sanction through the Public Opinion Tribunal as a security against misrule. It 
is clear that the operation of the POT has a significance beyond its influence on the way that citizens vote. 
That significance—through use of the social sanction—was however described as a security against the 
abuse of power; not as a driver of consensus. 
 
There is more evidence to reject a stronger deliberative interpretation of the POT in “Economy as Applied 
to Office”. There, Bentham paints the Public Opinion Tribunal as a majoritarian numbers game; not a 
deliberative forum that generates consensus. The argument Bentham makes here to describe the value of 
the POT resembles the aggregative logic of thinkers like Condorcet (1785) rather than the deliberative 
views of later Habermasian thinkers. He suggests that the decisions of the POT should be understood as 
those of the majority of its members, and distinguished from the contrary views of a minority. 
 
Bentham suggested that no correct decision could ever be known with certainty. The value of the POT 
could thus be understood in terms of probability. Given appropriate conditions, the probability of a 
majority of participants being right, was generally greater than that of a dissenting minority being correct: 
“The tribunal of public opinion having for its members the majority of all such individuals as take 
cognizance of the individual case in question, the decision capable of being in a state of contrast 
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with and opposition to the decision of such majority can not be any otherwise than the decision of 
the smaller number”. (Bentham, 1989:57) 
 
Again, there is little here to suggest that Bentham expected members of the POT to achieve the kind of 
full consensus later described by Habermas. Rather, the implication is that the POT will always reflect the 
numbers involved and, perhaps even that a residual minority view is to be expected, not discouraged. 
Bentham therefore describes public opinion as a more reliable source of correct opinion than individual 
judgement. The basis for its reliability was to be found in provision of appropriate information—as the 
Statistic function of the POT implies—but principally in the weight of numbers held by the majority. 
Contemporary writers have referred to a similar principle as the “miracle of aggregation” (Page & 
Shapiro, 1993). 
 
Similar arguments can be found elsewhere in Bentham’s constitutional work. In the “Necessity of an 
Omnipotent Legislature”, for example, he again implies that the value of public opinion is in part derived 
from the weight of numbers producing it, and the increased chance of correct opinions that this generates: 
“…he who, in judging of the course that will be taken by public opinion, follows the light of 
reason, will but too often miss the mark: but his chance of hitting it will at least be less bad than 
were he to take for his guide the ignis fatuus of caprice”   
(Necessity of an Omnipotent Legislature, in RRR, 2002:276).  
 
While imperfect, public opinion thus provided more reliable judgements than available alternatives. The 
rules that Bentham outlines for the Tribunal tell us more about how he thought the public should reason 
together. The POT was to operate as a source of moral aptitude in public officials by exercising the moral 
sanction. It was to have an unlimited membership; including anyone who could be affected by, or be 
cognizant of, the issue in hand. Bentham therefore believed that individual qualifications were 
unnecessary for members to make a valuable contribution to the Tribunal’s judgements.  
 
This is an interesting view; particularly since Bentham did not say the same of voting. In the 
“Parliamentary Reform Catechism”, he began with an assumption that suffrage should be universal, 
because all interests must be advanced and considered. Quickly, however, he conceded that “if it be 
sufficiently clear that any class of persons neither are nor can be in such a state of mind as to possess the 
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intellectual fitness necessary to exercise the right of suffrage with advantage, then such a class may be 
excluded” (Bentham, 1818a:35). The right to vote was thus conditional on persons’ ability to use that 
right productively. Illiterate citizens were to be temporarily excluded while they were taught to read (Ibid: 
37). 
 
On these pragmatic grounds, Bentham also concluded that minors should be excluded, and that there were 
no clear grounds for excluding women. Bentham’s views on this question oscillated over his career. In 
“Considérations sur la Composition des États-Généraux”, he was swayed by five pragmatic arguments 
that women should not be enfranchised. One of these was that they “already possessed sufficient influence 
over males by the greater need of the latter for sexual gratification” (Schofield, 2006:86). Whilst 
Bentham’s starting assumption or “supreme principle” implied universal suffrage (Ibid), therefore; 
different groups had to be assessed according to evidence about their aptitude and, therefore, the 
usefulness of their participation. In the Public Opinion Tribunal, we find no such distinctions or 
exclusions. The “Constitutional Code” does not assess how qualified different groups are to participate, or 
how those without the required aptitude should be trained. Instead, it operates on a simple principle: 
accessibility to all concerned.  
 
The POT was inclusive in terms of reasons as well as persons. Bentham does not stipulate any detailed 
rules about the types of reasons that would qualify for consideration by the Tribunal. In fact, he explicitly 
acknowledges the importance of the POT using a wide variety of forms of communication. Rosen has 
noted that these included relevant artistic performances, as well as speeches, and the operation of the 
newspapers (Rosen, 1983:27). This inclusive description of the POT provides some important indications 
of how Bentham wished public reasoning to operate. It was open to all. It should: focus on the conduct 
and policies of government officials; collect information; and use the weight of numbers involved to 
progress toward correct judgements. To that end, Bentham also provided some indications about what he 
expected the Tribunal to achieve. Through the Statistic, Censorial, Executive, Melioration-suggestive, 
functions, the POT will speak for the public interest. The remarks I have cited suggest, however, that he 
did not expect it to do so by reaching full consensus through deliberation.  
 
So how were members of the POT to speak for the public interest, if they were primarily self-interested 
individuals? This question is not quite answered in the first volume of the “Constitutional Code”. The role 
that the later Bentham gives public opinion in speaking for the public interest thus seems to conflict with 
his conception of citizens as individualistic utility maximisers. Each individual approaches discourse—
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and voting—with the intention to maximise his own utility. How then might a single, coherent view of the 
public interest emerge from pre-voting discussion? Rosen (1983) acknowledges this as one of the 
significant unresolved questions in Bentham's text. From the mass of egoistic voices in a society, 
Bentham believes that a ‘Tribunal’ can be formed of individuals who collectively speak for the public 
interest. Bentham is clear that the POT should voice its views through a liberal press. But he does not 
explain exactly how the published views of a (middle class) writer could be expected to represent fully the 
interests of masses of working class readers. Can a self-interested journalist “speak for” the public 
interest? 
 
How might Bentham have responded to that challenge? For members of the POT it is possible that there is 
a general coincidence between their particular interests and those of the whole community. For the same 
reason that secret voting was appropriate for the Democratical Section, it may be that almost all members 
of the Tribunal can be expected to have particular interests which serve the community. For this reason, 
Bentham had conceived of voting as a reflection of particular interests rather than an effort to abstract 
away from them. That simple answer cannot, however, answer the question. Although Bentham expected 
the majority of the POT to be comprised of the Democratical rather than the Aristocratical Section, he did 
not advocate it being exclusively so. Many of the people who play critical roles in the POT—journalists 
and editors—could be middle class. After all, the expertise required to perform those roles, alone, might 
make their circumstances and interests significantly different from those of the majority of workers.33 The 
role of persons like these in representing the public interest is difficult to make sense of; given Bentham’s 
insistence that every individual would largely be directed by his own particular interests rather than an 
impartial regard for the community. There is thus an unanswered question in the “Constitutional Code” 
about exactly how we might expect the POT to speak for the public interest when it relies on particular 
people, with particular interests.  
 
Although Bentham does not explicitly answer this constitutional question, I believe other themes in his 
writing provide some potential answers. None of the individual members of the Public Opinion Tribunal 
is expected to move beyond her own interests and consider the interests of all in an impartial way. 
Bentham only made that demand of public officials. When it came to public officials, he proposed that 
legislators should make an inaugural declaration. This included a public commitment to be impartial. 
Future legislators in Bentham’s democracy would declare: 
“sincere and anxious shall be my endeavour, to keep my mind as clear as may be, of undue 
partiality in every sense... in favour of any class or individual, to the injury of any other... through 
                                                          
33 See (Rosen, 1983: 27-35). This issue is covered in more detail below. 
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self-regarding interest... against partiality in favour of superiors, to the prejudice of inferiors: of 
superiors, in whatsoever scale of comparison: opulence, power, reputation, talent, natural or 
acquired” (Bentham, 1983b:144). 
 
Here, we can see the marked difference between Bentham’s standard for members of the public and the 
officials who represent them. The former could usefully reflect and express their particular interests. 
Often, the latter should publicly commit to impartiality. Doing so would encourage them to move beyond 
their own particular interests and instead prioritise the public interest. This public commitment was 
designed to influence officials’ behaviour. It would create greater scrutiny and accountability. Similarly, 
the conduct of officials was to be the principal object of the POT; not reshaping the opinions of citizens to 
foster consensus. There is a sense here that public officials must be open to unconstrained critical 
scrutiny; this was not necessary or useful in respect of private citizens. Officials were paid for being 
“written at”, in the same way that soldiers were paid for being “shot at” (1983b:40). This is consistent 
with Bentham’s arguments on liberty of the press. As Rosen has noted, Bentham: 
 “…proposed that in place of the prevailing practice, where severe punishments were handed out 
for criticism of public officials and much smaller ones for the defamation of private individuals, 
he would reverse this order so that the private individual would be secure against libel and 
defamation, but no punishment could be imposed for criticism of a public official except for false 
or groundless defamation” (Rosen, 2003:243-4). 
 
Freedom to criticise public officials was thus critical to the success of the POT. This provides another 
reason to reject Ben-Dor’s consensus-based reading; a conclusion that is confirmed by Chapter 9 of 
“Economy as Applied to Office” (1989). There, the POT is introduced as a way of maximising 
responsibility from officials. They were expected to be subject to “reproach at the hands of the Public 
Opinion Tribunal, by which the power of the moral or popular sanction is applied as a counterforce to the 
legal power of the state”. The POT “shot at” officials; not citizens. 
 
There is reason to believe that Bentham cast the value of the POT in terms of the numbers participating 
rather than the merits of deliberation. Relatedly, individual POT members were not expected to consider 
the public interest directly when participating in discussion, or when voting. This complements 
Bentham’s argument for the secret ballot. Bentham did, however, believe that every individual had shared 
interests in the “subordinate ends” he had identified. There was an inevitable disharmony between the 
Aristorcratical and Democratical sections. There remained, however, grounds to expect some harmony 
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between the interests of all individuals. Whatever interests or preferences individuals chose to develop in 
their lives, these would be likely to be served by: security, subsistence, abundance and equality. In effect, 
these were universal interests, shared by every individual.  
 
Whilst Bentham believed that these universal interests were a reality, he did not suggest that public 
opinion would inevitably discover and reflect them in a rational way. So whilst Bentham was generally, 
perhaps too, optimistic about the progress that public opinion would make, he identified some critical 
barriers to individuals having an accurate understanding of the interests that were relevant to political 
decisions. The efficacy of government itself depended on language being used in a way which accurately 
reflected relevant interests rather than obscuring or conflating them, since “perverting the import of 
words... undermines and destroys whatever security can be afforded by the laws” (Necessity of an 
Omnipotent Legislature, in 2002: 269).  
 
As we have seen, the abuse of language had the capacity to disarm public opinion and enable sinister 
abuse of power. Critical public engagement was, therefore, needed to counter this threat, and to maintain a 
form of discourse which reflected interests rather than distracting from them. This would help to ensure 
that the POT allocated approval and disapproval appropriately: in line with the interests of the 
community. To this end, Bentham thought that fallacies were often used to deceive citizens. He defined a 
fallacy as “any argument employed, or topic suggested, for the purpose, or with the probability, of 
producing the effect of deception” (Book of Fallacies, Section 1.A). Here, too the idea of class is 
important. Bentham argued that there were distinct classes of men with the motivation to deceive others in 
pursuit of their “sinister” interests. Fallacies could operate on people’s affections, judgement or 
imagination. Bentham suggested that the principal course of action used by those who were opposed to 
measures which would serve the greatest happiness of the greatest number was “in the first instance, to 
endeavour to repress altogether the exercise of the reasoning faculty, by adducing authority in various 
shapes as conclusive upon the subject of the measure proposed” (Part 1, Book of Fallacies). Public 
opinion was thus impotent to the degree that citizens accepted these kinds of claims to authority, and 
empowered to the degree they rejected them and instead engaged critically. In reality, Bentham believed 
that the appropriate weight or authority given to a statement on a particular matter should depend on key 
factors. These were: the relevant intelligence of the person producing it; information available to them; 
their probity, and the fidelity of the means of communication used (Book of Fallacies, Ch1, ⱡ1). The 
probity of the conclusion expressed could thus show itself through the insincerity of the speaker, which 
Bentham thought was a common failing. 
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Beneath stated opinions, however, the way opinions were formed was also susceptible to improbity since 
“either the relevant means and materials are kept out of the mind; or...the attention is kept from fixing 
upon them with the degree of intensity proportioned to their legitimately persuasive force” (Ibid). In the 
Book of Fallacies, Bentham argued that the harm which fallacies could create falls into two distinct 
categories. “mischief within doors” and “mischief without doors”. The former took place through the 
deception of legislators within parliament. The latter operated through deception of “any person whose 
station is among the people at large” (Book of Fallacies, Ch. 2). Although the “Book of Fallacies” was 
meant to address deception within a parliament, therefore, it is clear that Bentham also wanted it to 
liberate members of the wider public too. 
 
Barriers to the effective public opinion could thus be considered in terms of the fallacious logic Bentham 
diagnosed. Delusion, he suggested, “has place and operates in so far as, by some erroneous conception or 
opinion, individuals, who but for the error would not be, are operated upon in such sort that they give 
support to misrule” (1989:261). Delusion thus had two vital characteristics: it operated on the will via the 
understanding and in doing so, it facilitated misrule. As we have seen, Bentham understood sinister 
interest as a source of misrule, and the sacrifice of public for particular interests as essential to its 
operation. Its effects were often similar to those of corruption; which operated instead on the directly on 
the will by offering pecuniary or other rewards or punishments. 
Over the course of his career, Bentham came to think that these “false lights” of corruption and delusion 
were near universal in reach. They operated in many areas of life, and across society. They could be 
found, for example, in his analysis of: religion, political elites, and the legal profession. Each shared a 
common object: “causing men to regard those by whom the powers of government [are possessed] as 
being every where possessed of a degree of appropriate aptitude beyond that which is every where 
possible” (Bentham, 1989:263). This unquestioning overestimation of public officials and others with 
claims to authority was inimical to the accurate understanding of interests that Bentham wished to 
promote. It created the foundations for a deluded and corrupted public that allowed sinister interest to 
dominate politics, and beyond. In the legal, religious, and political professions, the acceptance of claims 
to infallibility by members of the public disarmed and diminished the power of critical public opinion; 
allowing sinister abuses to go unrecognised and unchecked. 
 
Official aptitude was Bentham’s antidote to this problem. As we have seen, however, a key part of official 
aptitude this was the moral aptitude of public officials. Bentham believed that this depended on the 
situation in which they were placed. As a result, the later Bentham argued that we could only expect this 
kind of aptitude from officials when they were given incentives to serve the community. Famously, this 
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required an “artificial identification” of interests (Halevy, 1952: 404-6). Publicity helped to achieve this 
identification because it made the personal fate of officials dependent on the public they served. Bentham 
placed great faith in the potential of public opinion to curtail official abuses of power. He suspected that, 
when subject to appropriate publicity, public officials would rarely, if ever, be immune to its influence. 
Consequently, he suspected, even officials who appeared to be acting virtuously and ignoring the public 
repercussions of doing so were often, in reality, secretly counting the personal benefits and harms of 
doing so by “weigh[ing]... in secret the suffrages of those who resemble himself” (Bentham, 1999:29-30) . 
 
Official aptitude has been the subject of extensive recent scholarship. What is sometimes given less 
emphasis, however, is that the later Bentham believed that moral aptitude could only be achieved through 
a particular type of publicity, and reasoning from members of the public. When describing how a 
community should promote the aptitude of its officials, Bentham describes how he believes they should 
discharge that duty. In effect, this is a form of public reasoning. It enhances the quality of governance. 
Some features of this account are evident in the problems Bentham describes. Public opinion would only 
play its proper role where individuals had a correct conception of interests. That required a discourse 
cleansed of delusion, and a community free from the corruption which had emasculated the public, and 
previously made them unaware of their own true interests. In “First Principles…”, a deluded public of this 
sort is likened to a baby, who responds unthinkingly to immediate surroundings:  
 
“The baby who, as he is carried past the pastry-cook's, feels the saliva as it [is] called forth by the 
sight of a favourite cake, what should lead him to speculations about the past or future rise in the 
price of com to which the cake, if bought for him and eaten by him, will according to the value of 
it have contributed?” (Bentham, 1989:264). 
 
Critical and informed public opinion thus guarded against sinister abuses; deluded and acquiescent public 
opinion allowed abuses to continue unchecked. In the former case, it was informed by an open 
government. This provided citizens with the information they needed to form a “proper conception of 
their interest” (Schofield, 2006: 252). In the latter case, it lacked this information, and was led—without 
critical reflection—like a child; by the will of a “sinister” minority. Grounds for understanding Bentham’s 
views about effective public reasoning can thus be found in the contrast he drew between effective and 
ineffective public opinion.  
 
It was the purpose of constitutional law to replace the natural opposition of interests between political 
rulers and the public with an artificial identification of interests (Schofield, 2006:272). Creating this 
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identification—through critical public scrutiny—was the central task of effective public reasoning. The 
elements of public reasoning noted above should be understood in this light. They contribute to scrutiny 
of public officials. In doing so, they limit or prevent sinister influence. Public reasoning is thus one part of 
Bentham’s wider democratic principles. Principal among these was the attempt to create a ‘‘limitation of 
power held by those with charge of the governed’’ (de Champs, 2008: 122). This conception of public 
reasoning thus complements readings of Bentham’s democratic theory—advanced by Rosen, Schofield, 
de Champs, and others—which define Bentham’s identification of the operation of sinister interest as 
‘‘the pivot of a utilitarian analysis of the mechanisms of government’’ (de Champs, 2008: 233). Without 
sinister interests, there would essentially be no need for public reasoning; or democracy. 
 
We have investigated some of the problems that Bentham identified. The abuse of power by an influential 
elite was made possible by secrecy, and a lack of scrutiny. In turn, that lack of scrutiny was made possible 
by deception, corruption, and the abuse of language. Each of these problems points towards a potential 
democratic solution: official aptitude, fostered by public scrutiny.  Official aptitude—particularly moral 
aptitude—relied on the public; not just officials. For this reason, I will refer to the public characteristics 
which help to create official aptitude as "public aptitude”. Its aim is to mitigate the causes of sinister 
abuse that Bentham had identified, chiefly by making effective use of a dependence of public officials on 
the public they serve. 
 
Having examined some related themes in Bentham’s writing, we may now ask “what does public aptitude 
look like in practice?” The texts cited above offer some clear indications. The first volume of the 
“Constitutional Code” does not explicitly state the shape that Bentham wanted public reasoning before 
voting to take. There are, however, some important clues elsewhere in his writing. Several things are 
important here. Public aptitude is critical of—rather than acquiescent to—putative authority; it focuses on 
participants’ self-interest rather than the public interest; resolves disagreement through majority votes 
rather than full consensus; and attempts to clarify the terms of public debate by testing the language used 
by participants. The principal aim of public aptitude is to promote the official aptitude of those in 
government. Its scrutiny facilitates the alignment of particular and general interests that Bentham thought 
was essential to the moral aptitude of governors. It also has other benefits. Citizens reasoning in this kind 
of way also learn by doing so. The object of their learning is their own self-interest rather than the public 
interest.  
 
Let us summarise four key characteristics of public aptitude in turn. Public aptitude: 
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- …criticises authority and focused on participants’ self-interest. 
- …analyses legal and political language. 
- …promotes learning by citizens and encourages them to make suggestions on policy. 
- …requires and defines no account of admissible persons or reasons.  
 
The first notable characteristic of public aptitude is its orientation and nature. Public aptitude is critical 
and focused on the self-interest of participants. Its approach to putative authority should be understood as 
questioning rather than acquiescent, and self-interested rather public-spirited. This kind of thinking is the 
natural starting point for public discussion, given Bentham’s analysis of the danger of sinister delusion 
and corruption of the public. It also follows the role that he gave public opinion in his constitutional 
theory: that of a key security against the misrule. Bentham wanted the public to emerge from its docile 
state of being “Habituated to receive and enjoy the effects of the corruption...[and] delusion... without 
reflection and almost without thought” (1989:264). From the role that he gives publicity in his developed 
constitutional thought, we can also adduce two things. First, he believed members of the public had to 
liberate themselves from corruption and delusion in order to reason effectively. Second, he also believed 
that the right kind of public reasoning, and publicity around parliamentary procedure, could itself help to 
improve the efficacy of public opinion in this capacity. 
 
Confirmation of the first of these points is to be found in various places, including many sections of the 
first volume of the “Constitutional Code”. There, Bentham contends that “Without publicity, no good is 
permanent; under the auspices of publicity, no evil can continue” (Bentham, 1999:37).To this end, the 
individuals who compose the public were expected to be critical and reflective about their own interests 
and, in doing so, promote the aptitude of their rulers. This was central to identification of interests on 
which Bentham believed the value of democracy depended when exercised both through the moral 
sanction and via voting. 
 
On the second point, Bentham sometimes makes a further claim. In “Political Tactics”, for instance, he 
suggests that publicity around political hearings—and appropriate deliberation within a parliament—can 
promote a more useful form of reasoning by the public. When those in parliament deliberated in the right 
kind of way, and appropriate publicity was given to their hearings, Bentham believed that citizens, too, 
would begin to reason more productively in service of the public interest in the long term:  
“Among a people who have been long accustomed to public assemblies, the general feeling will 
be raised to a higher tone—sound opinions will be more common—hurtful prejudices, publicly 
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combated, not by rhetoricians but by statesmen, will have less dominion... A habit of reasoning 
and discussion will penetrate all classes of society” (Bentham, 1999:31) 
 
Bentham believed that the right kind of deliberation within a parliament could have a lasting, 
transformative impact on the “national spirit” (Ibid). It is in the references to the habit of reasoning that 
this would create that Bentham provides evidence of his views on what would now be termed public 
reasoning. Given the multitude of references to the negative power of publicity, particularly in the 
“Constitutional Code”, Bentham clearly believed that its role as a security against misrule was central. 
 
While reservations remain about how far “Political Tactics” can be relied upon as a reflection of 
Bentham’s views, there are passages in that work which complement this idea in the “Constitutional 
Code”, “First Principles…”, and elsewhere. As the POT suggests, the later Bentham was insistent that 
parliamentary procedures should be exposed to a great deal of publicity. He also implied that, in time, a 
culture of scrutiny and publicity would cultivate useful democratic habits and traits among the population. 
The fruits of publicity would thus be the opposite of the products of secrecy. Secrecy denuded the public 
of its aptitude: the characteristics necessary to hold officials to account. But publicity could reverse this by 
making the “multitude more secure from the tricks of demagogues” (Bentham, 1999:31). 
 
Rather than appearing in isolation from Bentham’s earlier work, his later democratic views can be seen as 
an extension of his earlier writing on deception.  The idea of a ruling class with interests opposed to those 
of the community also complements other ideas in Bentham’s writing; including his analysis of ideas of 
taste and the use of language. Delusory language was used to diminish public aptitude. It encouraged a 
passive and subservient public to ignore or acquiesce to the abuse of power. So too was the idea of public 
approval or taste. Bentham believed that ideas of good and bad taste were exploited by a ruling elite in 
order to delude the subject many: 
 
… “into believing that they “(the aristocracy) were superior, and hence entitled to rule and to 
enjoy disproportionate quantities of wealth, power, and esteem. In other words, it was the interest 
of the ruling few to appeal to ‘taste’ in order to maintain their dominance over the subject many, 
and to provide an apparent justification of the oppression which they exercised... The principle of 
taste was adopted in order to subvert the principle of utility.”  
(Schofield, 2014:97). 
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Taste was, therefore, one way in which individual judgments, and public opinion, could be led away from 
utility. It was another tool—used by the influential few—to diminish and dilute public aptitude. Doing so 
allowed greater opportunity for sinister abuse of power.  
 
Bentham’s argument for the secret ballot thus fit into wider themes in his thought. In particular, it 
complements his critique of delusions and fallacies, and the way this played into his conception of class. 
Together, those strands of his thought suggested that the disproportionate influence of a ruling few over 
the terms of public debate needed to be mitigated and controlled. This view had a specific linguistic 
element. Beyond the idea of taste, Bentham believed that elites held influence over the type of language 
used to describe different sets of preferences: this has framed debate for sinister ends. Bentham’s views on 
taste also provide another reason to reject suggestions that he wished citizens to adopt a public orientation 
in their reasoning before voting. To do so would be to expose them to a wider range of delusory 
influences—including predominant notions of taste—and misleading abstract references to the welfare of 
the community (Bentham, 2002:320). 
 
Several related themes in Bentham’s thought come together in the ideas examined above. He believed that 
corruption and delusion: stymied progress; led citizens away from a proper understanding of their 
interests; and allowed a powerful elite to sacrifice the public interest in pursuit of their own particular 
interests. In short, these abuses blunted public aptitude, and reduced the accountability of public officials. 
Systematic delusion and corruption was only possible because the public lacked that aptitude. Public 
opinion was in a baby-like state, and could be easily manipulated. From Bentham’s divisions between two 
classes in society, and his views about the incentives needed for each, we can see that he broadly 
advocated two different forms of reasoning. The Aristocratical Section was already dominant in 
parliament. There, they were to be held to account by the public. Their discussions were to be subject to 
publicity, which provided a security against sinister misrule. Their role was to be as impartial as possible 
and to consider the public interest. “Political Tactics” thus describes something akin to a contemporary 
deliberative account of parliamentary discourse. Representatives were to learn about the public interest 
from one another’s contributions, and to collect the information necessary to doing so through debate and 
reflection. For this reason, the expressed preferences on which they voted should often change during 
debate. The success of decisions of this sort was dependent on the moral and intellectual (official) aptitude 
of those taking part. Bentham spent a great deal of time specifying the types of institutions, procedures 
and architecture necessary to maximising aptitude and minimising expense.  
 
There are some similarities between the parliamentary reasoning advocated by Bentham and the “stronger 
deliberation” of contemporary theorists. Parliamentary representatives should move beyond their self-
interest; which was not inevitably aligned to the public interest. This required that they should learn about 
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the public interest, and have the intellectual aptitude to do so. It also demanded that they should have the 
moral aptitude needed to serve the community. The public was thus to act as a security against misrule by 
officials. This crucial safeguard against sinister abuses could only be secure if the public themselves had a 
type of aptitude: that required to entertain a correct conception of their own interests, and scrutinise 
officials’ conduct accordingly. 
 
Effective reasoning within parliament required publicity. Its aim was to induce an artificial identification 
of interests between representatives and the public interest. In contrast, reasoning by members of the 
public required secrecy. This was because those taking part were in the overwhelming majority: their 
particular interests were usually already aligned with those of the community. This contrast suggests that 
Bentham thought the type of reasoning required from a group of individuals was a function of their likely 
interests; not substantive claims about the intrinsic value of types of participation. Official aptitude was 
thus essentially public; but public aptitude was private, and focused on self-interest.   
 
Thus, effective public reasoning did not require the same kind of publicity. It aimed to produce genuine 
votes and opinions rather than an “artificial identification”. This mirrored Bentham’s argument for the 
secret ballot. The aim of private voting was to secure a “genuineness of suffrage” (Bowring, iii, 599). That 
enabled individuals to vote in a way that genuinely reflected their own self-interest. It gave them 
protection from the pressure created by the expectations of others in the community, particularly those—
landowners—with power over their pecuniary interests. Together with Bentham’s views about delusion, 
corruption, and the divergence of interests between the two “sections” or classes of society, this implies 
that pre-voting discussion amongst the Democratical Section should remain focused on the particular 
interests of “Democratical” individuals. Moral aptitude was thus a standard feature in the Democratical 
Section; but it had to be artificially induced among officials. 
 
These arguments imply conclusions about the type of language that should be used during public 
reasoning. Bentham thought that delusory language, instigated by Aristocraticals, was a major feature of 
much public discourse, and abstract (non-assignable) references to the public interest were prone to such 
delusion. It is, therefore, unlikely that he would have endorsed a public-interested deliberative view of 
pre-voting discussion. More generally, Bentham suggested that English law owed its obscurity to an 
“abstract way of speaking”. Of such terms, he urged his readers to “avoid them or explain them by the 
relation they bear to the real ones” (Bentham, in Harrison, 1983:252). Indeed, Bentham explicitly related 
that linguistic point to the orientation of debate in the POT. In the “Constitutional Code”, he wrote that 
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each member acts on his “primary concern [which] is to secure himself against oppression and 
depredation” (Bentham, 1983b:100; italics added).  
 
For these reasons, the kind of reasoning required as part of the Public Opinion Tribunal cannot—contrary 
to suggestions from Crimmins (2011:154-5)—be equated with the 20th Century deliberative theory of 
Habermas. This point is not always made as clear as it could be in the secondary literature. Despite 
providing the authoritative analysis of the first volume of the Constitutional Code Rosen, for instance, 
also suggests: “Bentham believes that through the...secret ballot in legislative elections, electors will tend 
to consider the public interest rather than sinister interests” (Rosen, 1983:31). It is worth clarifying, I 
think, that Bentham expected voters to serve the public interest because there was a harmony between 
their own interests and those of the community; not because he wished them to disregard the former in 
preference to the latter. This clarifies and confirms that attempts to characterise Bentham as a public-
interested deliberative theorist—proposed by Crimmins (2011) and Ben-Dor (2000)—are misplaced.  
 
Rather, the POT could be said to “speak for” the public interest in a different sense. It gives individuals 
the information and understanding they need to understand their own interests clearly, and to vote 
accordingly. Doing so serves the public interest because of the weight of numbers involved. I believe that 
this view of POT is more compatible with wider themes in Bentham’s work—the predominance of self-
interest; his deep scepticism about abstract references to the public interest—than more deliberative 
interpretations. The POT was principally a security against misrule; not an engine of consensus. It “shot 
at” public officials; not citizens (Bentham, 1983b:40). Indeed—contrary to Ben-Dor’s (2000) view—
Bentham’s work on indirect legislation was a more prominent feature of his earlier (non-democratic) work 
than his later democratic writing.  I believe that the idea of “public aptitude” better sums up Bentham’s 
aims. He wished public opinion to emerge from its “baby-like” state of unquestioning acquiescence to the 
authority of Aristocraticals; and for members of the public to hold a more accurate understanding of the 
interests at stake when political decisions were made. A critical form of reasoning, directed toward the 
self-interest of participants, was best-suited to that end; not public-spirited deliberation. 
 
Let us turn to a second characteristic of public aptitude in more detail. It should analyse language in an 
attempt to create what Bentham called an “enlightened public”. The “Book of Fallacies” shows that 
Bentham believed that false arguments could easily be accepted by members of the public and lead them 
to misunderstand their own interests and those of the community. Clearly, Bentham wanted public 
opinion to remedy these corruptive and delusory influences. The POT reflected his belief that it could do 
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so. In part, that could work through the attribution of approval and disapproval by members of the public 
to behaviour, tastes, and motivations. In reality, he believed that the opposite had historically happened. 
Disapprobation and approbation had been attributed to people and pursuits according to the interests of a 
dominant class; at the expense of a suffering subject class. Thus while the powerful were exalted in life, 
and in death, with plaudits and hagiographies: 
“…the unopulent, the undignified, are spoken and written of as less benevolent, less knowing, 
less judicious, less able, than they are. Why? even that while they have thus been rendered 
objects of contempt, less sympathy and antipathy may be excited by the oppression, depredation 
and contempt of which they are the destined objects: less sympathy towards the sufferers by the 
injury, less antipathy towards the authors of it” (Bentham, 1989:266).  
 
As seen, Bentham aimed to promote the development and enlightenment of public opinion. In future, with 
the right information and opportunities, the approval and disapproval of the public was to reflect an 
accurate understanding of the interests concerned; not just the prejudices of a self-serving few. Delusory 
language was an obstacle to that enterprise; and it is reasonable to suppose that Bentham wished public 
reasoning to address this. He believed that the inaccurate use of language in this way prevented citizens 
from having a clear and correct conception of their own interests, and those of others. Discourse thus 
needed to be cleansed of the myriad of delusory inaccuracies in language.  
 
One way to understand how the Public Opinion Tribunal “speaks for” the public interest is thus to say that 
it contributes to citizens’ understanding of their own interests. By doing so, it makes them better placed to 
use their vote effectively. Part of this role involves providing information to help people to vote “better”: 
the Statistic Function of the POT. Another part involves expressing approval and disapproval as a check 
on the ruling elite: the Censorial Function. In much of his correspondence, Bentham refers to these two 
roles as separate and complementary. Both should be directed towards the same ultimate end. But this was 
only possible if citizens understood the interests at stake; if they are protected from deluded conceptions 
of their own interests, and those of the community. Citizens themselves needed the aptitude to understand 
their interests in order to induce official aptitude in their representatives. 
 
We could thus understand the POT in terms of Bentham’s earlier work on language. It might seem an 
undue revision to put together Bentham’s work on constitutions and language in this way. This is not the 
case. Schofield (2006) has shown that Bentham’s attempts to purge legal, and political language of error 
were fundamental to his project of democratic reform. It was to combat the usurpation of the public 
political institutions that Bentham thought democratic institutions and procedures were necessary. 
Further, we have seen that there was an intimate relation between Bentham’s understanding of the 
delusion—through the abuse of language—and the political operation of sinister interest. Bentham 
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believed that delusions could be used by rulers to usurp public opinion in a similar way. This illustrates, 
for example, why delusion features so prominently in the “First Principles” Bentham wrote in preparation 
for the Constitutional Code.  
 
In that context, it would not make sense to merely allow people to vote without first giving them the 
resources to check that they can do so in a way to benefit themselves rather than their rulers. The POT is 
part of this effort. Bentham believed that a process of linguistic clarification was necessary to 
understanding actual interests; rather than misunderstanding fictitious entities. In his earlier writing on 
language, he explained that two processes were essential to understanding language, and using it 
correctly. He termed these “phraseplerosis” and “paraphrasis”. These complementary techniques aimed to 
explain the meaning of nouns which referred to fictitious entities in discourse by demonstrating their 
relationship to those which described real entities. He then used a technique which he termed 
“archetypation” to reveal the way in which he believed all language was rooted in a physical image 
(Schofield, 2006:23). 
 
As a first stage, phraseoplerosis sought to put words in the context of a proposition. Bentham thought this 
was essential to understanding their meaning. Paraphrasis could then take place, by which the meaning of 
that sentence was then translated into another sentence, which expressed its meaning using only simple 
ideas. The aim was to turn general and abstract ideas—references to “fictitious entities”—into the simple 
images which originally gave them meaning. Ultimately, Bentham believed, those general terms could 
either be understood “to raise images either of substances perceived, or of emotions” or they lacked 
meaning altogether (1977: 496n. in Schofield, 2006:24). Bentham’s references to the obscurity and 
opacity of the law; of public discourse; and of delusory influence should be understood in this context. It 
was partly in the failure to expound and understand the relationship between common abstract terms and 
the simple ideas which ultimately gave them meaning that these errors found fertile territory. Eradicating 
these kinds of mistakes—and purging language of error—was essential to creating an enlightened public: 
to realising, and practicing, public aptitude. In turn, this enlightened public was necessary to foster official 
aptitude. It is thus a reasonable assumption that this kind of linguistic analysis should be part of the 
critical analysis Bentham wished members of the public to exercise as members of the POT. Reflecting on 
language in this way, and exposing the inaccurate use of fictitious entities, would also help to guard 
against the use of fallacies. These also relied on the inaccurate use of references to fictitious entities; 
citizens who understood the real pleasures and pains at the root of political discussion would not so 
readily acquiesce to fallacious logic. 
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It was thus important that citizens should use this type of analysis to test and correct the assertions of 
public officials. Doing so would guard against the errors which had disarmed public opinion for so long. 
It would enable the POT to attach approbation and disapprobation to their conduct and policies on the 
basis of a genuine—rather than delusory—evidence. Bentham believed that intra-parliamentary debate 
had an analogous problem: it, too was replete with dangerous fallacies. Thus, the usefulness of intra-
parliamentary debate was reliant both on proceedings being publicised, and on members of the public 
engaging with proceedings in a critical and engaged way. Publicity and criticism would, therefore, 
improve the quality of debate within parliament, and the results of its decisions: 
“In a corrupt Assembly, a debate is a mass composed of one-tenth of silver drowned in nine-
tenths of an alloy composed of lead and arsenic. To this compound, a Book of Fallacies aptly 
constructed would be an appropriate test. Applied to it, the arsenic would fly off in fumes: the 
lead would sink: the lucid bullion would be left pure.”   
(Bentham, “First Principles…”, 1989:65)  
 
The process of linguistic clarification could be construed as part of a wider learning process. Bentham was 
not an advocate of public-interested deliberation; for the reasons stated. There is evidence, however, that 
he wished citizens to learn from one another before voting. It should thus be noted that public aptitude 
helps citizens to learn from one another, and to make suggestions regarding policy. Thus while some 
aggregative democrats follow Condorcet (1785), and model voters as independent inputs to a democratic 
equation, Bentham—in Political Tactics (1999) at least—explicitly rejects that approach: 
“This idea of absolute independence in the voters is absurd...the secret mode of election does not 
diminish the influence of mind on mind” (Bentham, 1999:146) 
 
Although Bentham accepted the utility of this interaction, it was critical that it should take place through 
the influence of “mind on mind”. Unlike corruption—influence upon the object’s will—or delusion—
influence on the will through deception of the understanding—persuasion was an acceptable and useful 
part of debate. Public opinion should have a positive role in a functioning democracy. The POT thus 
operated in a “melioration-suggestive” capacity; making positive proposals, as well criticising official 
conduct. Less is said about this positive role in the “Constitutional Code” than its critical capacities. I 
think that it is important to acknowledge, however, that Bentham’s views did not preclude citizens 
learning from one another through discussion before voting.  
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There is another reason why learning through public reasoning could be important. Individual citizens 
could have privileged information about their own motives and interests that could only be shared through 
such interaction. One of Bentham’s arguments against colonialism illustrates this point. In “Emancipate 
your Colonies!” Bentham advanced a series of arguments for decolonisation. One of these was an appeal 
made to the National Convention of France in 1793. It asked readers to consider whether colonial rule 
could be better for those ruled over than self-government. For Bentham, the answer was a definitive “no”. 
In part, he had an epistemic rationale for that conclusion. Colonial rule asked colonisers to “govern a 
million or two of people you don’t care about...a set of people whose beliefs you know nothing about” 
(Bowring, II:4). In this sense, Bentham implied that government has to be close to the individuals it 
affects, to serve their interests. Decisions taken without sufficient information or understanding—like 
those of French legislators over the affairs of distant sugar colonies—would fail to promote utility. 
 
Finally, unlike many contemporary deliberative accounts, public aptitude notably does not define the 
“admissible” persons or reasons required for public reasoning. As we have seen, Bentham saw the POT as 
an inclusive body with universal membership and no particular requirement for the types of reasons it 
should consider. The description of the POT relies on people participating to judge the relevance or 
admissibility of arguments rather than stipulating those ideas from the start. Bentham does not define the 
types of reasons that are (in)admissible for the POT’s consideration. Rather, he says that anything with 
relevant content will contribute to the Tribunal’s judgements. A broad and inclusive notion of admissible 
modes of communication is adopted. This includes plays and works of art. Consequently, there is no 
prescribed test of “reasonableness” or rationality for citizens to consider before they reason together.  
 
Of course, Bentham did believe that the POT should reach conclusions based on the pleasures and pains at 
stake. He did not, however, pursue that goal by stipulating that citizens had a duty to only present certain 
types of reasons; or that only suitably qualified persons should participate in pre-voting discussion. 
Bentham’s views on public reasoning are thus permissive in a way that few contemporary deliberative 
democrats are. Indeed, his argument “On the Liberty of the Press” suggests that he generally believed in 
the utility of false arguments. Thus when rejecting state censorship (Bowring i: 575) he cited grounds 
later made famous by Mill: 
"The true censorship is that of an enlightened public, which will brand dangerous and false 
opinions, and will encourage useful discoveries" (Bowring 1, 538) 
 
Conclusion 
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To recap, I believe that the conventional reading of Bentham underplays the importance of pre-voting 
discussion in his work. In contrast, the participatory reading does acknowledge the significance of public 
participation before voting. In doing so, however, it departs from some important principles in Bentham’s 
writing, particularly the predominant self-interest of citizens participating which lends itself to a self-
interest-orientated view of public reasoning.  
 
In this chapter, I have laid out some themes in Bentham’s thought, and tried to suggest that a different 
understanding of public reasoning is tenable. This “hybrid view” sits between the conventional and 
participatory interpretations, and shares some characteristics with each. It concurs with the conventional 
view that that public interest can be reached through aggregation. Consequently, citizens should 
principally seek to understand their own interests before voting. It also agrees with the conventional view 
that public reasoning should reflect the public interest primarily through weight of numbers; not via 
consensus reached through transformative deliberation. Indeed, the idea of deliberative consensus runs 
counter to Bentham’s belief that abstract references to the public interest were liable to deceive. 
 
The hybrid view also agrees with participatory accounts that there is an important place for pre-voting 
discussion in Bentham’s account of democracy. That place can be understood in terms of what citizens 
can learn from one another through participation. Unlike participatory theorists, however, the hybrid view 
does not expect discussion between citizens to create consensus before they vote. Nor does the hybrid 
view expect that individuals should have to “move beyond” their own interests in pre-voting discussion. 
Instead, it is driven by the need for citizens to clarify their understanding of their own interests before they 
vote; for them to have the “public aptitude” needed to secure the official aptitude of their representatives. 
This complements Bentham’s view that public officials can only be held to account by individuals who 
understand their own interests. Together, these individuals compose a “tribunal…which decides the 
destiny of public men” (Bentham 1999: 29). That Tribunal should be critical of how power is used in the 
public’s name. This principle reflects the story of Bentham’s conversion to democracy. That transition 
itself hinged on the idea that sinister interest must be negated through accountability to the public.  
 
Under this “public aptitude” view, citizens should examine the conduct of public officials and ask whether 
that conduct serves their interests. Their answer to that question should then be expressed through 
opinions shared with peers, and through political action; including voting. Public reasoning thus reflects a 
kind of public aptitude. It actively criticises the conduct of public officials, and the language used to 
describe political action. It seeks to remedy the ills which Bentham thought plagued government. Its aim 
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in doing so is to make officials dependent on the public they serve. Having outlined key features of this 
view, we shall--in Chapter 5—assess some of its strengths and weaknesses. 
 
  
170 
 
Chapter 5. Implications of the hybrid view 
“The military functionary is paid for being shot at.[the public official] is paid for being 
spoken and written at”  
(Bentham, 1983b:40) 
 
Introduction 
So far, we have examined principles found in Bentham’s work without considering their strengths and 
weaknesses fully; or the contribution they could make to the contemporary debate on public reasoning. In 
this chapter, I want to make progress in that regard by taking a closer look at these principles and some 
potential objections to them. I believe that the “hybrid” account corrects some misunderstandings about 
Bentham’s own views, but it also has some implications for contemporary theory. In particular, it 
illustrates how much common ground there is between deliberative and aggregative democratic types of 
theory. Understanding this point should lead us to question some of the critiques of respective theories 
levelled by writers from these competing approaches. Of course, the conclusions drawn in this chapter 
will depend on precisely which construal of Bentham we consider. In particular, it is important to 
distinguish between the views that Bentham himself outlined, and broader “Benthamite” principles 
inspired by them. I will consider these two views separately: those of Bentham, and those which are 
Benthamite. 
 
What is relatively novel about the broad “hybrid Benthamite” approach I have outlined is that it is 
aggregative and also suggests that preferences can be improved through dialogue before voting. I think 
that this points to a wider trend in the contemporary debate: there is important common ground between 
aggregative and deliberative theory. Additionally, it also illustrates that an account of public reasoning is 
possible, which both explains the value of pre-voting discussion; and escapes accusations of deliberative 
paternalism in doing so (Posner, 2004). Thus, deliberative theorists traditionally explain the importance of 
discussion by recourse to some fundamentally moralised notions; or by stipulating procedural conditions 
for preference-(trans)formation. Doing so convincingly explains why one should consider pre-voting 
discussion an important feature of democracy: it “improves” preferences in relation to these prescribed 
standards, or through these procedures. The danger of such standards is, however, that they can sometimes 
imply that citizens’ preferences are merely the result of deliberative failings (Waldron, 1999:111). 
Expectations of this sort may, therefore, contribute to something of an elitist perspective on citizens’ 
preferences, and a related potential for them to be manipulated during pre-voting discussion. In this thesis, 
elites are considered to be individuals or groups with influence on debate that cannot be justified by the 
171 
 
number, or expertise, of people involved. The hybrid reading of Bentham is unusual because it provides 
an explanation of the value of pre-voting discussion, but does so in reference to citizens’ self-interest, 
rather than moralised terms of discourse, or the public interest. As a result, it may be less susceptible to 
the critique of deliberative democracy proposed by writers like Posner.  
 
Common ground in the contemporary debate is easy to miss. Some aggregative democrats deride 
deliberationists as naïve believers in a set of ideal discursive conditions which may never obtain (Posner, 
2004). Deliberative democrats often claim that their approach is essential to understand all but the thinnest 
conceptions of democratic procedure (Barber, 2003:198; Fishkin, 2008). I think that those arguments over 
simplify the differences between these two approaches. This is perhaps a result of how deliberative theory 
evolved over the Twentieth Century. Theorists like Habermas defined their views in contrast to a 
“liberalism” which espoused the aggregation of self-interested individual preferences. Part of his 
enterprise was thus to overcome the “egocentric viewpoint” implied by those theories through a process of 
appropriate deliberation (Habermas, 1989: 45). A somewhat binary distinction is thus sometimes implied 
by Habermasians; between the more generally justifiable political decisions produced through deliberative 
participation, and aggregative theories which are content to rely on individuals’ pre-deliberative 
preferences as grounds for collective decisions.  
 
This form of deliberation was often seen as a response to the failings of rational choice, which made 
unjustified assumptions about individual behaviour and motivation. It was sometimes understood to 
assume, for example, that the preferences individuals express should be held as fixed in respect of 
collective decisions. The role of democratic process was thus to aggregative individuals’ existing 
preferences rather than to reform them. Usually, Bentham is seen as part of this tradition. 
 
Despite this, many theories of deliberation and aggregation are perfectly compatible with one another, 
despite their development in opposition to one another. The often-polarised debate between these two 
approaches misses some important distinctions. For example, many deliberationists propose objections to 
aggregative theory based on its assumption that voting should be a self-interested activity. As we have 
seen, however, aggregative theories may or may not hold this view. The assumption of self-interest may 
apply to some rational choice views, but not many social choice approaches (List & Goodin, 2001). 
Consequently, objections to aggregative theory based on this assumption alone can be, at best, 
incomplete. The assumed motivation for voting cannot, alone, distinguish between aggregative and 
deliberative approaches. 
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Similarly, the expectation of consensus—while important—is also not enough to distinguish between 
aggregative and deliberative democratic theories. From the aggregative perspective, it may be supposed 
that all deliberative theories risk false consensus by expecting participants to reach full agreement through 
discussion. Of course, deliberative theories are more varied than that. Many Habermasians expect full 
consensus. However, other contemporary deliberative democrats—like Gutmann & Thompson—construe 
deliberation differently. They describe participation as a way of clarifying arguments and information, 
rather than resolving fundamental disagreements. This particular objection therefore applies to some 
Habermasian views, but it cannot provide a blanket objection to deliberative theory in general. These are 
just two examples to show that the distinction between aggregative and deliberative approaches is less 
binary, and less clear than often supposed. In this context, Bentham’s views could meet a number of 
objections from contemporary theorists. Below, I outline four of these challenges: the free rider problem, 
the danger of sinister interests within the Public Opinion Tribunal, questions over Bentham’s optimism 
about public opinion; and a challenge of how to deal with what Dworkin (1978) calls “external 
preferences”.  
 
I believe that Bentham’s rich and nuanced views provide a compelling response to some of these 
objections. The “free rider” problem is a good example. Some contemporary theorists allege that an 
account of public discourse premised on the self-interest of participants would be susceptible to allowing 
some participants to gain the benefits of public reasoning without the costs of participating. However, 
Bentham himself offered an understanding of self-interest which is expansive enough to respond to that 
objection. Other challenges, in contrast, are more difficult to counter using principles Bentham outlined. 
He did not, for example, comprehensively explain how the press—on which the Public Opinion Tribunal 
depended—could itself be protected from corruption by sinister interests. Given how the ownership of the 
press has developed, this is an important, though surmountable, oversight. 
 
Second, I assess some objections to a broader Benthamite view. This approach is “Benthamite” rather 
than Bentham’s. It follows the principles Bentham outlined, but does not exclusively reflect positions that 
he held. A view of this sort can be understood in relation to the four key questions, outlined in Chapter 1: 
focus, transformative power, status, and output. For the reasons outlined in Chapter 4, I believe that a 
Benthamite view should focus public reasoning on the self-interest of participants; reflect and clarify 
preferences rather than transforming them through deliberation; ascribe no particular moralized status to 
discourse, and should not expect full consensus. These characteristics mean that a “hybrid” Benthamite 
view could contribute to the contemporary debate on public reasoning. In particular, it illustrates the 
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inadequacies of the binary distinction—between aggregative and deliberative theories—used by so many 
modern theorists.  
 
In a contemporary context, this broader view would also be subject to some important challenges. I 
examine three of these, regarding: power structures, the aggregative mechanism, and potential for a 
tyranny of the majority. Again, there is a convincing Benthamite response to some of these objections. It 
has been suggested that aggregative views which reflect rather than transforming individuals’ preferences 
reinforce existing power structures (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). I defend a Benthamite view against 
this objection. The kind of inclusive and critical dialogue that Bentham wanted to create provides 
opportunity for citizens to question and reform existing power structures. Indeed, the quotation at the start 
of this chapter illustrates that this critical approach is fundamental to Benthamite public reasoning. 
 
Challenges to Bentham 
The principles I have drawn from Bentham have some obvious implications. They challenge the idea that 
aggregative accounts of democracy say little about the importance of pre-voting discussion. They should 
also make us think carefully before assuming that supposedly aggregative democrats have little to say 
about the context for preference formation. Bentham himself distinguished between an accurate and 
inaccurate conception of individual interests. Nonetheless, self-interest-based views of democracy are 
relatively rare in the contemporary debate. One reason for this is the “free rider problem”, which has been 
a prominent issue in both contemporary economics and political science.  
 
It is argued that when a group creates for itself a shared or common good, “each member of the group will 
have a strong tendency to be a ‘free rider’… to contribute little or nothing toward to cost of the good, 
while enjoying its benefits as fully as any other member of the group” (Kim & Walker, 1984:3). This is 
said to be a particular problem for democratic accounts which argue that individuals have self-interested 
reasons for participating in the democratic process. Many contemporary accounts of the free rider problem 
focus on pollution or voting (Downs, 1957). If individuals vote for self-interested reasons and, by doing 
so they help secure some common goods, it is problematic that they could free ride. They may benefit 
from the results of democratic governance without contributing, for instance by voting. The objection here 
is that a self-interested account of voting cannot plausibly ask voters to do something they have no self-
interest in doing (vote), particularly when that activity is so fundamental to democracy.  
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The same accusation could be made against Bentham’s view of public reasoning, with two implications: 
incoherence, and impracticality. First, a coherent democratic theory which presumes individuals’ self-
interest cannot, perhaps, ask individuals to participate in a political process when they have no self-
interested reason to do. Second, free-riding might be a practical problem. It could make the public 
disengaged and thus prevent effective public reasoning, in Bentham’s terms. 
 
Consider how the question of coherence applies to the hybrid Benthamite view. I have argued that the 
grounds for public reasoning on Bentham’s account is self-interest. In the “Constitutional Code”, 
Bentham states that each participant in the Public Opinion Tribunal takes part to protect their own 
interests, particularly security (Bentham, 1983b:100). This complements his famous assumptions about 
the importance of self-interest to human motivation and behaviour: 
“On every occasion, the conduct of every human being will be determined by his own interest… 
meaning according to his own conception of it, to the conception correct or incorrect entertained 
in relation to it by himself at the moment of action” (Bentham, 1989:68)  
 
Assume that Bentham’s views are correct on two matters: the Public Opinion Tribunal (POT) helps to 
assure the security of all; and participation should be voluntary. In Bentham’s account of public 
reasoning, the good in question is somewhat unusual: security. The claim is that all citizens benefit from 
living in a society where public reasoning take place. This is because it holds sinister interests in check, 
and assures the security on which each individual relies in order to maximise their own utility. This 
security against misrule is a public benefit. Assume too that the group of citizens reasoning is likely to be 
large: Bentham gave the POT a universal membership. In large groups, it is likely that overall outcomes 
will not depend on the input or participation of any single individual. By the same token, an election result 
is very unlikely to be determined by any single voter (Downs, 1957).  
 
It is likely that assuring the security of all through public reasoning will depend on enough citizens 
participating to make public reasoning effective, rather than on every individual citizen necessarily doing 
so. Bentham himself anticipated that the number of people participating in the POT would fluctuate: “the 
number may be of any magnitude not exceeding the sum total of the adequately adult members of the 
community” (Bentham, 1990:121). Each individual citizen therefore faces a choice: participate in public 
reasoning at a particular time, or decline to do so. From a self-interested perspective, there could be no 
incentive to participate. After all, group outcomes will not be affected by any single individual. The 
benefits of others’ public reasoning will be available, irrespective of whether I take part. Participation also 
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has costs for the individual. Collecting relevant information, then making judgments and expressing 
decisions takes time and effort which could be spent pursuing other personal goals. Oscar Wilde 
reportedly said that “the problem with socialism is that it takes too many evenings”. We could forgive a 
member of the Public Opinion Tribunal for thinking the same of public reasoning. Bentham believed that 
the judgment of others could sometimes be trusted in debates, but never unquestioningly so 
(Schwartzberg, 2007). The costs of collecting evidence may thus be mitigated by others doing some of 
this work for the community, for example POT committee members. But forming a judgment myself as a 
member of the public will always take some time, effort, and engagement. A purely self-interested citizen 
may therefore choose not to participate in public reasoning. It may even be rational for them to do so: 
non-participation saves personal costs and leaves benefits unaffected. Free-riding is considered a 
significant problem for rational choice approaches; including those described in Chapter 1. It could also 
be a problem for the “hybrid” reading of Bentham. 
 
The hybrid reading relies on public discussion and reflection taking place to protect and serve the self-
interest of those who participate. As I have set out, this complements some wider themes in Bentham’s 
thought. In particular, it matches Bentham’s assumption that self-interest is a good predictor of behaviour 
in aggregate. It also fits with Bentham’s individualism, and his theory of subordinate ends. As we have 
seen, IPML outlines Bentham’s famous claim that the interests of the community are nothing more than 
the sum of the interests of the individuals who compose it. This implies that citizens reasoning about their 
own interests may contribute to the public interest by laying foundations for an appropriate aggregation of 
their views. Similarly, Bentham’s extensive work on subordinate ends suggests that individuals inevitably 
have important interests in common. These can be enunciated through discussion. This, too suggests that 
clarification—not transformation—of self-interested preferences is an appropriate aim for pre-voting 
discussion. Citizens should not move beyond their interests before voting. Rather, they should clarify 
those interests and, in doing so, discover what they also have in common. While it might be better for the 
community as a whole to benefit from the security against misrule which public reasoning assures, each 
individual also has a personal incentive to free ride, enjoying those collective benefits without incurring 
the costs of participation. There is thus potential incoherence in Bentham’s account. It assumes that self-
interested individuals should participate in public reasoning, but cannot justify their participation in those 
terms. This mirrors accusations made against rational choice theories of democracy in contemporary 
debates. 
 
Free-riding also has practical implications for the hybrid view. Assume that self-interest is a good 
predictor of individual behaviour, as Bentham suggested. If there is no self-interested reason to participate 
in public reasoning, it could be that no citizens choose to take part in this essential process. Critics could 
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thus suggest that the hybrid reading of Bentham on public reasoning is unrealistic in its own terms, unless 
participation is made compulsory for a sufficient number of people. Imagine that newspapers do, as 
Bentham wished, expose malpractice amongst the governing classes as a component of the POT. That 
publicity, in itself, would not protect the community from misrule unless sufficient numbers of citizens 
take notice. Unless they do so, and are prepared to change their political opinions and voting intentions 
accordingly, the Tribunal on which Bentham relied would have no way to use its political and social 
sanctions. It would be rendered toothless. Thus, while Bentham argued that public officials were “paid to 
be…written and spoken at” (1983b:40), communicative attacks could only provide effective scrutiny in 
the presence of an engaged public; one which noticed, and helped produce, criticism of officials’ conduct.  
 
Free-riding could thus make the POT impractical; as well as incoherent. Bentham explained that the 
Tribunal should have committees with particular roles, but these alone would are not sufficient to assure 
its effectiveness without wider public participation. Both incoherence and impracticality are serious 
objections. I believe, however, that Bentham’s democratic theory provides adequate and convincing 
responses to the free rider problem, particularly in reference to public reasoning. What form might this 
response take? The first thing to note is that Bentham himself provides grounds from which we can infer 
that free-riding may not be a significant problem for his account. He believed that there was strong 
opposition of interests between the governing and the governed; and relative harmony within the 
governed, who composed the majority of the community. The harmony of interests among the governed 
could reduce the number of participants needed to produce a “sufficient” security against misrule by 
calling out bad practice. After all, fellow citizens who have the same interests as me may presumably be 
trusted more to call out abuses in roughly the same ways.  
 
Similarly, the accusation of incoherence also does not apply to Bentham’s account. Contemporary 
theorists note that free-riding is less of a problem if participation in the provision of a public good itself 
confers benefits on the participant. Although some contemporary writers, like Gutmann & Thompson 
(2004) see Bentham’s views as non-participatory, he did believe that participation in pre-voting 
discussion created wider—including moral—benefits for participants. For example, we have seen that 
“Political Tactics” casts participation in public debate as a process that enhances the character of those 
involved; as well as making sound opinions more common (Bentham, 1999:30-31). It is likely that some 
of these benefits could only be achieved first-hand. Thus, while Bentham was sometimes content for 
citizens to rely on authority of others when formulating political opinions, he also describes a form of 
active participation and debate which should permeate all classes of society. The equivalent for public 
officials was “active aptitude”: the tendency to turn up and participate (Schofield, 2006:272). 
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Turning up was itself valuable. Some of the benefits of participation could only be secured first-hand. 
Only individuals themselves had the experience and knowledge needed to ensure that their interests were 
reflected in decision making. Bentham makes an argument of this sort when he distinguishes between 
public and private decisions. He believed that citizens themselves were the best judge of certain questions. 
These questions required their direct input because those individuals’ responses to particular sanctions 
were too unpredictable for legislators account for in aggregate. This was the epistemic basis for 
Bentham’s own version of a “best judge principle”. For every individual, “the quantity of 
pleasure…which a man is liable to experience upon application of an exciting cause, will depend… [on 
his] sensibility” (Bentham, 1970:52). On matters like these, therefore, only individuals themselves had the 
understanding of their own preferences needed to make public reasoning work. For this reason, the 
success of governance and legislation depended on public participation. Without this, officials could never 
acquire a sufficient understanding of the sensibility (preferences) and behaviours of affected individuals.  
 
On this account, each individual has an incentive to participate. Failing to do so leads to collective 
decisions that ignore their own preferences (sensibilities). This is an attractive potential solution to a 
significant potential problem, but it does not quite fit with Bentham’s own account. Bentham did 
distinguish between “public” and “private” matters on the basis of how predictable individuals’ response 
to particular sanctions could be from the legislator’s perspective. He was also very clear, however, that the 
POT was to focus on public matters. These were common to all people; not just the (private) conduct of 
some individuals. Ironically, this implies that there may be no free-rider problem in relation to discussions 
of private conduct. But it does nothing to address the same issue in reference to the public questions that 
Bentham wished the POT to focus on. 
 
Nonetheless, free-riding is not a fatal problem for the hybrid view. Bentham expected the “habit of 
reasoning” cited in “Political Tactics” to benefit other aspects of participants’ lives. There is a distinct 
similarity between public reasoning in the POT and the type of instrumental reasoning that Bentham 
thought was key to individuals maximising their own welfare more generally. Maximising personal utility 
depended on having secure expectations on critical questions, and using these to make life plans in pursuit 
of one’s own welfare. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that a public process through which citizens 
develop their ability to reason effectively should also enhance their ability to make effective life plans: to 
maximise their own utility. The personal benefits of first-hand participation are thus twofold. They are 
created through the security assured for one’s own plans but also through an enhanced capacity to make 
and scrutinise those plans through effective instrumental reasoning. Whilst security against misrule might 
conceivably be enjoyed by a free-riding non-participant, the enhanced capacity to develop one’s own life 
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plans and goals cannot be realised without participation. Benefits of these kinds are likely to be learned 
through active participation; not uncritical acquiescence and, or free-riding.  
A habit of reasoning, honed through democratic participation, enhances the “utilitarian character” of 
citizens. It arms them with the ability to identify and scrutinise the connections between interests, 
information, language, and goals. In large part, maximising personal welfare depends on these 
understanding these connections and ideas: in one’s own life, as well as political life. This link can be 
seen in Bentham’s writing on education. The kind of public reasoning implied in “Political Tactics” 
continues themes from Bentham’s writing on education. In “Chrestomathia (1983a), Bentham sought to 
reform education to equip individuals to understand and pursue their utilitarian interests better. Public 
reasoning in a democracy complements that kind of education. It helps citizens to practice the critical 
faculties needed to make publicity effective as a security against misrule. Those are the same faculties 
required to understand and maximise utilitarian interests on a personal level. At the individual level, 
maximising utility takes account of personal circumstances and preferences. At the legislative level, it 
concerns more general trends. Planning one’s own life was thus a specific example of wider utilitarian 
reasoning. In IPML, Bentham describes the distinction between these two forms of decision-making. The 
difference between political and individual reasoning is one of scale, and available data: they are 
extensions of one another, rather than of a different types of thinking:  
 
 “It is plain, that of individuals the legislator can know nothing: concerning those points of 
conduct which depend upon the particular circumstances of each individual, it is plain, therefore, 
that he can determine nothing to advantage. It is only with respect to those broad lines of conduct 
in which all persons…may be in a way to engage, that he can have any preference for interfering”  
(Bentham, in Rosen, 2003:93)  
 
Public reasoning can therefore be said to create better “private” reasoning. It uses the same skills; it thus 
confers some benefits which can only be achieved through participation, and not through free-riding. 
 
To summarise, the free rider problem relies on the possibility that individuals may enjoy the benefits of a 
shared or collective good without having to contribute towards its creation. I do not think that this is a 
telling objection to the hybrid view. Bentham was clear that a major benefit of participation in democratic 
discussion and reasoning was its ability to create shared goods which benefit all, like security. He also 
suggested that there were additional reasons to participate. These include the capacity of public reasoning 
to enhance the character of those involved, and the personal benefits that these enhancements could 
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confer. Bentham’s idea of self-interest also included the appreciation of benefits to others. He thought that 
people could be moved to act by sympathy. That sentiment could also reduce the potential for free-riding. 
The status of the hybrid reading as a self-interest-based view of public reasoning, therefore, does not 
preclude the participation of individuals for sympathetic reasons. Nonetheless, the scale of scrutiny 
required did mean that some members of the public would have to rely on the work of others. This 
“committee” of the POT creates some additional challenges for the hybrid reading.  
 
The second objection that we shall examine relates to how the POT should function, and its susceptibility 
to sinister interest. That idea, as we have seen, was at the heart of Bentham’s democratic theory. It 
explained why he came to believe that an enlightened legislator could not be trusted to maximise public 
welfare without a system of democratic accountability to regulate his conduct. Sinister interest also 
influenced the form that Bentham believed democratic government should take. His objection to a 
constitutional separation of powers, for instance, was motivated by a fear that granting constitutional 
vetoes to small groups within political elites would allow them to be exploited for sinister ends (Rosen, 
2003: 232).  
 
Whilst free-riding is not a fatal problem for Bentham’s view of public reasoning, I do not believe that 
Bentham adequately accounted for how sinister interest should be mitigated in the POT. There is a 
particular issue here. Bentham did not consider sufficiently the danger that editors and journalists who 
helped run the POT could themselves be heavily influenced by the interests of an influential minority, 
rather than the majority. This is a weakness of his account. He did not acknowledge, in sufficient detail, 
that the supply of news would itself need public scrutiny and regulation to perform the role ascribed to it. 
Similarly, I believe that the demand for news may often reflect factors other than the epistemic merits of 
its content; for example entertainment value. This means that unregulated competition cannot be relied on 
to provide news sources with an incentive to scrutinise public officials, as Bentham wished them to.  
 
These challenges are surmountable. It may be that relatively uncontentious regulatory intervention can 
overcome them. In a modern context, such interventions could include: independent regulation; a public 
code of conduct for news sources; public service obligations like those imposed on some UK 
broadcasters; or public provision of some content to mitigate concerns around commercial bias. The 
problem for the hybrid reading is not that solutions like these are difficult to formulate; it is that Bentham 
himself did not seem to tackle the problem with sufficient application.  
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It is clear that Bentham did not expect sinister interest to be anything like as much of a problem within the 
POT as it had been in public office. Public opinion was to be different from the closed groups of elites 
that had made decisions in the past. The POT was to be open to any person with a relevant interest, and 
would hold officials to account through public scrutiny. The structure of interests in society also meant 
that public opinion—by weight of numbers—was less liable to sinister ends. Bentham believed that there 
was a broad harmony of interests among the general population, and a huge disharmony of interests 
between the population and their governing elite (Bentham, 1989:68-9).  
 
His belief in the opposition of interests between classes thus meant that he could expect most members of 
the POT to have much in common when considering how political power should be used. They all shared 
an interest in preventing abuses of power, and assuring security for their own life plans. Consequently, 
“ordinary” members of the POT would have little incentive to misdirect the Tribunal for sinister ends. 
They were thus different from members of the governing elite who had previously controlled public 
decisions. Unlike those officials, POT members would be likely to have particular interests which 
coincided with the public interest. Individual POT members would also have far less power than corrupt 
officials had done in the past. As one of a very large group, each individual Tribunal member would have 
a small share of control over the decisions. These characteristics contributed to what Bentham saw as the 
POT’s “incorruptibility”. As Niesen (2011) argues, this was part of the reason why Bentham believed that 
dynamic, unconstrained public opinion was necessary to the accountability of public representatives. 
Public opinion was—by its nature—less susceptible to sinister manipulation than private discussion 
within small groups of influential persons. 
 
That said, the Public Opinion Tribunal was not simply an abstract aspiration. It was intended to operate in 
real societies with real people. Bentham spelt out some detail regarding the structure that it would take. In 
the Constitutional Code, for example, he explained that:  
 
“persons considered as members of this tribunal are an indeterminate portion of the whole 
number of those of whom the community in question is composed. Those by whom actual 
cognizance is taken of the matter in question in the first instance may be considered as a 
Committee: those who in consequence of the opinions expressed by this same Committee, but 
without taking actual and particular cognizance of the circumstances of the case, join with them 
at different times in the same opinions, affections, wishes, designs and endeavours, constitute the 
body at large of which the smaller body abovementioned is the Committee. Of the Members of 
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this larger body, the number may be of any magnitude not exceeding the sum total of the 
adequately adult members of the community.” 
(Bentham, 1990:121) 
 
Whilst the POT was open to all, it would also need a committee, which took “actual cognizance” of the 
relevant question, to function in practice. This committee is an important component of how the POT 
could function: in effect, it could lead public opinion. We may therefore question how members of the 
committee could be expected to be immune to sinister influences. Bentham suggested that the committee 
could take different forms in different places. Where possible, newspapers would provide a major 
contribution: they would unearth and publicise evidence of misrule by public officials and print related 
opinions. Members of the public, in their capacity as POT members, could then exercise their judgement 
and express their views through the sanctions available to them, including the social and political 
sanctions (Bentham, 1990:124). There are some important tacit assumptions in this account. 
Optimistically, we might expect—as Bentham did—members of the public to respond rationally to 
evidence of misrule when presented with it, and punish wrongdoing. In order to do so, however, they 
require timely and accurate notification of officials’ malpractice, among other things. For that, they would 
rely heavily on the Tribunal’s committee and its members. Bentham’s view seems to assume that those 
committee members would perform their role with aptitude and probity; in the public interest. Without 
some specific governance or regulatory measures in place, however, we do not have grounds to make that 
assumption. 
 
To understand why, consider Bentham’s analysis of sinister interests among public officials. As we have 
seen, that emerged from his earlier notions of probity, and the later concept of official aptitude. His 
argument was not that officials were susceptible to sinister influence because they had a particular or 
unusual weaknesses of character. They were not in possession of a uniquely or peculiarly bad character, 
which was absent elsewhere in the population. Officials were subject to the same motivations and 
behaviours as other citizens. What made them different was their position, which demanded that their 
actions should serve the whole of the community. This gave them, unlike the majority in society, 
sufficient power and influence to pursue their own interests at the expense of the community at large.  
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Consequently, officials were constantly subject to diverging public and private interests.34 It was this 
divergence that made publicity for public officials essential, in order to bring their private and public 
interests closer together: to induce an artificial identification. Doing so would lessen the temptation to 
abuse public office which they, uniquely, were exposed to. Given the importance of that argument in 
Bentham’s political theory, we might ask: “why should members of the POT committee be treated 
differently from public officials?” Committee members do not, like public officials, directly determine 
public policy. Consequently, we may hold that the danger of sinister influence among them is reduced, 
because they lack direct control over political outcomes through legislation. 
 
Nonetheless, Bentham’s principles of public reasoning depend on committee members as key figures. 
Without them, the public would not have essential information it needed to hold public officials to 
account: it could be unaware of wrongdoing. Committee members would effectively have the power to 
provide cover for malpractice in government; to undermine or augment political careers and policies. 
Their judgements and decisions could have a significant effect on political outcomes. Consider, for 
example, how important the mere timing of a critical publication could be to how the political sanction is 
used (e.g. publishing critical content before or after a general election). Without relevant information 
before they vote, electors are powerless to punish abuses at the ballot box. Given the importance of 
editorial decisions like these, is it not likely that committee members will, like public officials, be subject 
to considerable incentives and temptations associated with such an important a position? Will they not, 
too, be subject to diverging private and public interests, which demand artificial identification?  
 
We have seen that Rosen alludes to this important issue in his comprehensive analysis of the 
“Constitutional Code” (1983:27-35). Bentham never quite explains how a middle class journalist or 
editor—with likely incentives which might often diverge from those of the majority of citizens—could be 
relied on to speak for the public interest. Of course, it follows from Bentham’s other assumptions about 
motivation that these individuals would require a high degree of moral and intellectual aptitude. Like the 
public officials that Bentham had criticised, they would need to resist sinister influence as well as 
exercising effective judgement. He thus expected some from the middle class to play an important role as 
journalists and editors of newspapers to put public opinion into operation. The problem is that while 
Bentham provided extensive explanation of the mechanisms needed to assure the aptitude of public 
officials, he provided no equivalent for POT committee members. The kind of publicity that Bentham 
insisted on for intra-parliamentary procedures might produce an identification of interests on behalf of 
public officials, but it is not quite so clear how those actually involved in the POT itself might also be 
                                                          
34 See Chapter 3 in the Book of Fallacies, quoted above on pp. 123-4 
183 
 
encouraged to display moral aptitude needed to perform their role. It could be said that Bentham’s account 
is, therefore, dangerously reliant on a relatively small number of journalists and editors; but provides no 
sufficient account of how their conduct should be governed.  
 
We could defend Bentham against this criticism: perhaps the POT itself provides an accountability 
mechanism for the conduct of members of its committee? Without some exogenous source of judgements 
necessary to operating that accountability, however, this response would suggest infinite regress. After all, 
some agent will also be needed to hold accountable those who scrutinise the conduct of POT committee 
members. Similarly, any attempt to claim that POT committee members have a different sort of character 
from others; that they are—by nature—less susceptible to sinister influence, would run counter to 
Bentham’s fundamental analysis of human behaviour. 
 
The contrast between the POT committee and other public officials is telling. Without the right 
institutions in place, Bentham thought it would be naïve to simply expect all public officials to serve the 
public interest; for example, through a sense of benevolence. In creating a Tribunal which fundamentally 
relies on members of the press, however, he seems to make an analogous mistake. On Bentham’s logic, 
the composition of the POT calls for an artificial identification of interests between key members of the 
Committee, and the public at large; but no explicit mechanism is described to achieve that identification. 
There is, therefore, a “governance gap” in the hybrid reading of Bentham on public reasoning. 
 
What responses to this objection might we consider from Bentham’s work? Well, it is worth remembering 
that the POT does not always need to operate through established newspapers; although Bentham seemed 
to wish it to do so. While the “Constitutional Code” gives journalists and editors the pivotal role described 
above, Bentham did consider alternatives. For instance, Kaino has observed that Bentham wished the 
POT to operate in countries without a developed press (2008:21). He acknowledged, for example, that in 
Tripoli, “free Newspapers [were] the matchless instruments of notification” but were not present in that 
nation (Bentham 1990: 129 in Kaino, 2008:21). In places like this, Bentham considered the role that other 
institutions could play in the absence of a developed free press. For Tripoli, this meant attempting “to use 
the two universities, the 14 judicatories and the 3,000 mosques for the purpose of notification” rather than 
the press (Kaino, 2008:21). On one level, this illustrates Bentham’s pragmatism. Whilst insistent that a 
free press was the best route toward using the POT to provide a security against misrule; he also wanted 
to harness public opinion in territories where that was not possible. On another level, it also demonstrates 
some of the weaknesses in Bentham’s account. He was elsewhere, of course, highly critical of religious 
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authority and its propensity to benefit those who ran religious institutions. Bentham suggested that sinister 
interest was a systemic problem throughout the Church of England, for example. The idea that religious 
authorities can be trusted to notify the public of misrule—without an artificial incentive to do so—is 
therefore at odds with Bentham’s other views. For the hybrid reading of Bentham’s to remain consistent, 
therefore, it is important that the means by which citizens are notified of misrule—whether that be a free 
press, universities or mosques—are themselves governed in a way which insulates against sinister 
influence. A failure to do so would demand that we assume, by fiat, that members of the Committee of the 
POT are less susceptible to sinister action than others. The absence of a practical account of how the POT 
is governed is thus a weakness in the hybrid account; despite Bentham’s pragmatism about the role that 
alternatives to a free press could play.  
 
Characteristically, Bentham foresaw some of these problems. He acknowledged the tendency of some 
newspapers to become agents of political parties, and of readers to select publications that reinforced their 
existing views (Bentham, 1990:47). He also believed that readers would naturally take an interest in 
content which affected them (Ibid: 47). Consequently, he expected newspapers that covered a variety of 
content to gain more readers than biased and narrow polemics. It is possible that the relative inattention 
Bentham paid to the governance of the POT thus reflects a wider assumption: that sinister arguments will 
be rejected in a competitive marketplace of ideas. One could argue that competition between newspapers 
should give them incentives to scrutinise government. It should reward effective scrutiny with increased 
sales, and punish poor journalism with commercial decline. After all, if citizens have such clear need for 
the scrutiny of a free press, should they not seek it out? 
 
Unfortunately, I do not think that experience of the demand for, or supply of, news content justifies such 
optimism. In the modern world, we know that decisions to pay attention to, or consume, some media 
content over available alternatives reflect a range of factors. As we might expect, the entertainment value 
of content is—and has long been—a  significant factor, for many people. The breadth of media 
publications that Bentham predicted is no guarantee that readers will pay attention to content of national 
importance—including notifications of misrule (Cutler, 1999:349)—rather than stories of more superficial 
interest, but less political importance. Consider recent experience in the United Kingdom. The UK 
broadcasting regulator OFCOM has found that rapidly growing sources like online social media are used 
by a significant minority of consumers to learn about celebrity news rather than items which traditionally 
lead broadcast and print media (OFCOM, 2015:7).  
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This could be seen as the social sanction at work. After all, readers approve or disapprove of persons and 
their conduct, as well as government policies. It is difficult to claim that such media usage empowers 
publicity as a security against misrule by public officials, however. In particular, there is no clear 
correlation between the significance of news to the public interest and the degree of scrutiny and attention 
it receives from consumers of new media. Realities like these undermine the degree to which we can 
expect a laissez-faire approach to ensure that the press, and wider media, play the public-spirited role 
Bentham wished them to. If citizens do not pay attention when an instance of misrule is exposed, they will 
not be able to secure themselves against its effects by preventing a reoccurrence. 
 
The recent supply of news has provided some important examples of “public interest journalism” 
exposing alleged malpractice by public officials. One obvious example is the revelation of MPs’ expense 
claims before the 2010 General Election. Eggers & Fisher (2011) have found evidence that this coverage 
did provoke voters to punish those misbehaving MPs who had been exposed by the media. Bentham 
might well see this as an example of the Public Opinion Tribunal at work; provoking punishment via the 
political sanction. The picture is not always this simple, however. A look at the current UK media 
landscape should serve to emphasise that the supply of news is complex. It is often heavily influenced by 
a variety of commercial factors. Bentham would doubtless be unsurprised to see commercial newspapers 
trying to maximise sales, rather than selflessly providing political scrutiny.  
 
In 2014, over 70% of UK national newspaper circulation was controlled by just three companies 
according to the Media Reform Coalition (MRC, 2014:1). Each of these companies will therefore be 
likely to have significant influence on the way political debate takes place. Each will, by its nature, also 
have a particular set of commercial and reputational incentives. Some of these companies are controlled 
by organisations with a wider portfolio of investments and interests; or small groups of wealthy 
individuals. There is no reason to suppose that those individuals or organisations should be immune to the 
kinds of sinister interests that Bentham thought could blight public decision-making. We cannot rely on 
their altruism. We cannot rely on competition to assure that the press provides effective scrutiny, because 
there is no evidence that political scrutiny is a consistently effective commercial strategy. My point here is 
not that those incentives are unmanageable, or that the barriers to an effective press cannot be overcome. 
Potential conflicts of interest within the press do, however, need to be acknowledged and addressed. An 
account of public reasoning which relies so heavily on the press to scrutinise the conduct of public 
officials, should also address the incentives to which POT committee members are subject; including 
those who run and work for newspapers. Just as we might think it naive to assume that a middle class 
journalist could speak for the public interest in a way that public officials were apparently incapable of, it 
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is also problematic to downplay the commercial incentives to which newspaper proprietors are inevitably, 
and regularly, subject. 
 
There are several potential responses to this issue. Bentham believed that exposing the deliberations and 
decisions of public officials to appropriate publicity and scrutiny could overcome, or at least control, their 
tendency to favour sinister interests. There is no reason why an analogous regulatory system for press 
ownership should be impossible. Bentham was concerned about balance in newspapers, and suggested 
that publications could alternate between editors of opposite political views. This was intended to assure 
something close balance in their coverage. Whilst the issue of sinister interests in the organs of the Public 
Opinion Tribunal does not seem like an irresolvable one, therefore, it is one which demands greater 
consideration than Bentham himself afforded, in the “Constitutional Code”. This is perhaps a 
consequence of how Bentham thought about the POT He considered it a protection against the harm that 
corrupt or incompetent governance could create. In doing so, he paid great attention to the misinformation 
and manipulation of which governing elites and public officials could make use. In comparison, he paid 
relatively little attention to the parallel—though lesser—risk of corruption or incompetence among those 
charged with making the POT a day-to-day reality. Clearly, the dangers related to sinister influence within 
the press were of less concern than those within government. Nonetheless, they require a fuller answer 
than Bentham afforded them. 
 
Let us turn to another objection; this time in regard to Bentham’s expectations of what public opinion 
would achieve. Just as Bentham believed that a free press could hold government to account, he also 
thought that public opinion would, over time, become more and more enlightened. It was partly for this 
reason that the Tribunal could be trusted to represent the public interest. I believe that there is an 
unexplained gap between Bentham’s optimism for the future of public opinion, and his awareness of the 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the individual judgments that formed it. Schofield has observed the 
grounds for this optimism was Bentham’s belief that suppression of the truth took more time and energy 
than its revelation: “It is the characteristic of error to possess only accidental existence, which may 
terminate in a moment, whilst truth is indestructible” (Bentham, in Schofield, 2006:267). This meant that 
laws motivated by sinister interest could not last forever; unlike those founded on the happiness of the 
community. Eventually, the errors on which they were based would be exposed. At that time, the truth—
which did reflect the public interest—would still be available for citizens and representatives to discover.  
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Thus, while in the past there had often been a majority in parliament to pass laws which harmed the public 
interest, often in pursuit of sinister interests, Bentham also thought that these laws could not continue 
indefinitely. They would be quickly overturned when their fallacious logical foundations were exposed. 
Without the protection of a self-serving parliamentary majority with an incentive to ignore the truth, 
public opinion was sufficient in “a single day...to unravel the web of corruption, and devote the 
corruptionists, if not to punishment under forms of law, at any rate to universal indignation and 
abhorrence, with a certainty of never more being reappointed” (Bowring, iii 456 in Ibid). Political actions 
based on sinister interests were therefore vulnerable in a way that those with a proper utilitarian 
justification could not be. They could survive only under the cover of a particular set of particular 
interests; and would fall apart under scrutiny. This could lead us to conclude, as Bentham seems to at 
points, that the progress of public opinion is inevitable. 
 
Taken literally, it is difficult to reconcile this picture –of public opinion’s seemingly inevitable march 
towards truth—with the subtlety of Bentham’s analysis of deception and sinister interest. Clearly, in other 
works, Bentham demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of the influence of powerful minorities over 
public decisions, and the terms of debate. In the “Deontology”, for instance, he describes something 
similar to what would now be understood as “selection bias”. Judgment could be swayed by pecuniary 
interests, as had been the case in the jury system.35 He wished to mitigate that problem through publicity. 
He was aware of just how easily ordinary members of the public could be led to have an inaccurate 
conception of their own interests, and provided systematic analysis of how this had been exploited by 
minorities with putative authority. As we have seen, Bentham also had radical views about the capacity of 
language to provoke inaccurate conceptions of interests, and the need for its radical reform. These risks 
demanded a critical and active public to guard against them. 
 
Given all of these factors, it is difficult to see how we could be confident that the deceptions and delusions 
built up over decades or centuries could be brushed aside quickly; or with any certainty. We know that 
Bentham thought in great depth about how politicians should be given incentives to serve the public 
interest. It would be naïve, however, to suppose that those reforms could eradicate the effects of decades 
of deception and corruption in a single day. Of course, the quotation above may just be an example of 
Bentham using a more figurative mode of writing. Nonetheless, it creates a misleading impression. 
Bentham’s analysis of deception and sinister interest suggests that unwinding the pervasive influence of 
powerful elites is likely to be difficult and uncertain; not inevitable or quick. This optimism thus creates 
an inconsistency. It is also difficult to square with contemporary research on deliberation. Indeed, 
                                                          
35 See the “Essay on the Art of Packing”, 1821. 
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theorists like Fishkin (2008) have shown that a good deal of time, effort, information, and facilitation is 
often necessary to safeguard public opinion against the kind of ill-informed conclusions that all 
democratic theorists wish to avoid. Without this necessary work, there is a constant danger that the 
conclusions of deliberation could err in any number of ways; including selective use of evidence, 
prejudice and behavioural bias.  
 
Bentham himself suggests that producing non-manipulated decisions and opinions requires careful 
planning, effort, and co-ordination. Texts like “Political Tactics” attend to this planning in some detail. 
There, as elsewhere, Bentham’s account suggests that a failure to provide the right structure and process 
for decision-making could easily undermine the value of pre-voting discussion. I find those arguments 
compelling: they acknowledge some of the many pitfalls which can befall discussion, and the need to 
overcome them in to produce justified decisions. Indeed, that line of argument follows from Bentham’s 
critique of delusion and corruption. It is necessary to attend to the procedural conditions and details of 
discussion because human judgement is vulnerable to corruption and delusion. 
 
The optimism cited above, however, does not follow this line of work. Given the complexities of the 
incentives involved in the generation of public opinion in contemporary democracies—and the efforts 
needed to promote effective deliberation—I do not think we have strong reasons to agree with Bentham 
that the onward march of public opinion toward greater enlightenment is a certainty. Clearly, there is a 
sense in which public opinion, as Bentham defines it, is immune to the corruption and error which had 
beset public officials. Those individuals were placed in situations where their particular interests 
consistently diverged from the public interest. Public opinion was different. It reflected views which were 
common to large numbers of people in the community; not a small group with particular circumstances 
and preferences. Despite this, the opposition between Bentham’s account of deception, and his hopes for 
the future of public opinion  is too binary to reflect these nuances. When considering the problems which 
had encumbered attempts at reform in the past, he was aware of significant challenges. These included 
individuals’ capacity to be deceived, the danger of fallacies and delusions, and the sinister intent of a 
governing few to exploit them. In contrast, when looking to the future, Bentham seems to expect public 
opinion to progress in a way which belies the challenges he had identified (Bentham, 1983b:36).  
 
It would be reassuring to believe that the truth is somehow “indestructible”, and that centuries of 
deception can be quickly unwound. Bentham’s own analysis of language and sinister interest, however, 
run counter to this. They suggest that progress may be won slowly, through concerted clarification of 
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language and repeated presentation of reasons; not quick revelation. Of course, Bentham did not discard 
his awareness of the faults which could hold back public opinion when he gave it a central place in his 
democratic theory. Significant among these was of “sinister begotten prejudice”. This caused a mass of 
citizens to support policies directed towards sinister interests rather than the public good (Rosen, 2003: 
243). Nonetheless, it is difficult to reconcile ideas like sinister begotten prejudice with some of the more 
optimistic claims Bentham made about the inevitability of the progress of public opinion. As a critical 
force in society, Bentham wanted public opinion to speak for the public interest rather than merely 
reflecting mass opinion (Ibid). His suggestion that it could quickly or faultlessly, eradicate errors of the 
past, is not however convincing. Rather, his epistemology suggests that constant work will be needed to 
ensure progress; particularly to assure that citizens have access to the information and opportunities they 
need to exercise their own judgement without corruptive or delusory influence.  
 
Let us turn to another objection. In “On Liberty”, Mill famously insisted that individuals should not be 
protected against things which offend them but cause no actual harm (Scarre, 2007:117). Despite this, he 
also suggested that there are many acts which “being directly injurious to agents themselves, ought not to 
be legally interdicted but which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners…[thus] may rightly be 
prohibited” (Mill in Ibid:116). This raises the question: how should utilitarians respond to activities like 
these? In particular, how—if at all—should the preferences that some citizens hold in regard to these 
activities be considered? 
 
More recently, Dworkin (1978) has presented that question as a critique of utilitarianism; based on 
“external preferences”. He gives the example of a society where some citizens have prejudiced views 
against homosexuality. Where “external” preferences are expressed regarding the behaviour of others in 
this way, Dworkin contends that utilitarians may respond in one of two ways. The unpalatable results that 
aggregating bigoted preferences might produce could be avoided by simply excluding them from the 
preferences which count according to a utilitarian calculus. Of course, the problem with this approach is 
that such an exclusion might well be arbitrary. Dworkin argues that there are no clear utilitarian grounds 
on which the fulfilment of external preferences can be said to be less valuable than that of other, more 
“palatable” preferences. 
 
Alternatively, utilitarians may include external preferences on a level footing with other preferences in 
their calculus. In the kind of society Dworkin describes, this would have obvious counterintuitive results. 
The repression of minorities could be deemed desirable if a sufficiently large number of citizens had 
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negative external preferences towards them. Dworkin thus suggests that contemporary utilitarians are left 
with two unsatisfactory options. They can either achieve consistency towards all preferences and accept 
unpalatable results; or they may exclude certain external preferences by fiat. The latter approach is 
implied by Mill’s suggestion that offence should not constitute harm. The former approach is suggested 
by the quotation above on “violations of good manners”.  
 
How might this critique apply to the hybrid account? Of course, Bentham was optimistic that public 
opinion would progress towards conformity with the principle of utility. He espoused a liberal response to 
what he called “sexual irregularities”; including homosexuality, bestiality and necrophilia. Whilst 
important, Bentham’s views on those substantive questions do not answer the challenge presented. Would 
Bentham himself have excluded or accommodated external preferences? This is an interesting question 
for utilitarianism in general; but this challenge simply does not apply to the POT as it is presented in the 
first volume of the Constitutional Code (1983b). Bentham is clear that the POT should consider public 
rather than private matters. He defined these as questions which affected the interests of all in society 
rather than a particular group. The POT would not therefore consider private matters such as the 
desirability of different sexual preferences. 
 
This is, however, a limited response. It implies that the POT should not pass judgement on the desirability 
of different preferences which are pursued in private. It says nothing, however, about other important 
questions which relate to the role of sexual preferences in the public realm. For instance, debates on same-
sex marriage relate to the public recognition of relationships rather than merely their private exercise. It is 
conceivable that public acts like these could be considered “offences against decency” on the definition 
suggested by Mill in Chapter 5 of “On Liberty”. Here, it is worth emphasising an important difference 
between Bentham and Mill. We have seen that Bentham believed that notions of taste had been exploited 
by ruling elites to manipulate citizens’ behaviour. He therefore understood taste in this sceptical light: it 
had the potential to deceive individuals and impede progress. This strand of Bentham’s thought 
complements his emphasis on the secret ballot, and the idea that public reasoning must be a critical 
process directed toward the self-interest of participants. It also complements Bentham’s quantitative 
hedonism. 
 
Mill took a different approach. He famously suggested that utility could differ in quality, as well as 
quantity. Consequently, he was more willing to accept that the preferences held by some citizens could be 
qualitatively superior to those held by others. The defensibility of that claim has been debated at length by 
191 
 
Mill scholars (West, 2004; Riley, 2010). It is not our immediate focus. Unlike Bentham’s argument, 
however, a qualitative utilitarian view does leave citizens open to accusations that they have “the wrong 
sort” of preferences. Bentham’s arguments on taste are both interesting and compelling. They suggest that 
the very notion of “superior” preferences is itself susceptible to exploitation by elites. I think that it is an 
advantage of Bentham’s account that it seeks to explain the value of pre-voting discussion while retaining 
a quantitative utilitarian approach. In other respects, Bentham’s response is, however, limited. The scope 
of the POT being limited to public matters addresses the potential problem of citizens having “nosy 
preferences” about each other’s’ lives. It does little, however, to address related contemporary questions. 
These include the role of same-sex relationships in public institutions like marriage. 
 
More broadly, some of Bentham’s other assumptions are also difficult to apply to a contemporary context. 
It might be objected that the hybrid reading is dependent on a questionable assertion that individuals’ self-
interest can be reliably aggregated to reach the public interest. Whilst Bentham did make this assertion in 
texts, most famously in IPML, I do not think that this is essential to the hybrid view of public reasoning. 
Rather, he believed that there was little need for members of the general public to consider public interest, 
rather than self-interest. This was because the division between two classes in society meant that there 
was significant harmony between the interests of members of the Democratical Section. Consequently, 
Bentham provides reasons beyond his aggregative definition of the public interest to suggest that self-
interested reasoning was required from the general public in regard to political decisions. Bentham’s 
assumptions about class are, however, more problematic. Whilst it might be true that this is a powerful 
way to understand the division of interests in society, the picture he paints of a simple division between an 
opulent and dominant ruling few and a powerless many seems too simple to accommodate contemporary 
developments. For instance, within the Democratical Section there are, today, very significant differences 
in circumstances. These might include distinctions between those who rent or own property; are in manual 
or office-based professions; live in one region of a nation rather than another. 
 
Recent social movements like “Occupy” have drawn a similar distinction between the richest 1% and 
remaining 99% of global population. Even if we do grant that this is a fundamental division of interests in 
society, it is difficult to imagine the kind of harmony that Bentham anticipates within the “Democratical” 
99% of the population. Bentham’s critique was perhaps well-suited to analysing the barriers to 
fundamental democratic reform that he encountered. But it is difficult to envisage how it might apply to 
some everyday decisions that governments encounter today, on which there are many different varieties of 
opinion across multiple classes. 
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One way to counter this objection might be to limit the scope of Benthamite public reasoning to those 
issues on which there is most likely to be a fundamental opposition of interests between a very small, 
powerful elite and the mass population. Bentham himself did not define a scope in this way. He believed 
that considering the pleasures and pains which would be created by an action was universally relevant. 
Nonetheless, we might reason that there are some issues to which the fundamental opposition Bentham 
supposes apply more readily. Most particularly, these could include the rules which directly regulate how 
political power is used: constitutional rules that regulate the actions of public officials. Bentham was clear 
that these kinds of rules should be subject to the influence of public opinion on an ongoing basis. No 
constitutional authors were infallible. Conditions in which constitutional procedures translate into effects 
on citizens’ welfare inevitably change over time in a way which is not always predictable. For these 
reasons, public reasoning might understandably be limited in scope to the kinds of constitutional 
essentials on which Rawls later focused. This would, however, be a departure from the principles 
Bentham himself espoused. 
 
Challenges to Benthamites  
Let us now consider how a broader hybrid Benthamite view might contribute to the contemporary debate. 
A view of this sort would follow the broad principles set out in the hybrid reading. It may however 
provide conclusions that Bentham himself did not express. How does a hybrid Benthamite compare to 
contemporary alternatives? In Chapter 1, I sketched out five dimensions over which contemporary 
accounts tend to vary. These refer to the: focus, transformative power, status, and output attributed to pre-
voting discussion. To understand the answer to this question, let us briefly recap the terrain that 
contemporary views inhabit.  
 
Prominent among these is Habermas, who advocates an ideal form of deliberation. In this situation, 
participants move beyond strategic action, aimed at success, to communicative action: the cooperative 
search for mutual understanding. Doing so involves realising a type of discursive equality, which gives 
every participant an equal and fair input into deliberation. Its aim is a consensus which is justifiable in 
light of the generalizable interests of all relevant parties (Habermas, 1990:89, 1996: 305-306, 308, 2001: 
34). As I have argued in response to Crimmins (2011), it would be a mistake to underplay the important 
differences between Bentham and Habermasian deliberation. Principal among these is the orientation of 
debate; which must transcend self-interest on the Habermasian model, but genuinely reflect it according to 
Bentham’s views on secret ballot and the POT. The hybrid Benthamite view has a focus on self-interest 
rather than the public interest. This view suggests that the Public Opinion Tribunal, thus public opinion, is 
directed primarily towards censure of public officials. This task—spotting bad practice by officials—
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requires individuals to understand that their behaviour is “bad for me”. It does not require them to 
consider whether it is “bad for society”, or unjustifiable according to some wider standard. 
 
Nonetheless, there are some interesting similarities between hybrid Benthamite and Habermasian 
deliberative views. Bentham wished to eradicate the influence of will on will; whether direct (corruption), 
or through the understanding (delusion). He did not want to eradicate the influence of understanding on 
understanding, which we might term persuasion. In this respect, the rejection of voters’ independence of 
one another before voting in “Political Tactics” is consistent with Bentham’s writing on corruption and 
delusion. At the broadest level, the hybrid Benthamite enterprise resembles that of Habermas. The aim is 
to allow persuasion based on legitimate reasons rather than the threat of force or misunderstanding. It 
wishes participants to learn from one another before voting. But this is a different form of learning: the 
intent is to clarify understanding of existing interests rather than to transform them. Whilst Habermasian 
deliberative democrats espouse the transformative power of pre-voting discussion, the hybrid Benthamite 
view does not. This complements principles behind Bentham’s rejection of the public ballot. In regard to 
transformative power, the benefits ascribed to public reasoning, for example in “Political Tactics”, are 
understood in terms of correcting individuals’ conception of interests; not preference change. This 
complements Bentham’s belief that sinister interests were a leading threat to decision-making and, that 
their negation was a driving force behind the need for democratic reform.  
 
The hybrid Benthamite account thus casts pre-voting discussion as something with important instrumental 
benefits. It allows citizens to practice their ability to reason instrumentally and critically. It helps protect 
against sinister abuses of power, and aims to give individuals a more secure basis on which to plan their 
own lives, and maximize their own welfare. This is different from many contemporary deliberative 
accounts. D’Agostino, (1996:57), for example, describes pre-voting discussion in terms of its ability to 
justify the exercise of political power. The hybrid Benthamite view considers the instrumental benefits of 
discussion, but does not write public reasoning into a wider justification of the state. Its role, through 
public aptitude, is to promote official aptitude, which benefits the community. 
 
Finally, contemporary views vary in regard to the outputs they expect to be created by discussion. There is 
little reason to suppose that Bentham required the kind of “stronger deliberative” consensus espoused by 
contemporary theorists like Habermas. Individuals’ interests may not overlap in a consensus, particularly 
not for the same reasons. As a consequence, the hybrid Benthamite view is content to allow persistent 
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disagreement; so long as this is based on an accurate reflection of relevant interests rather than delusory or 
corrupted discourse. 
 
In Chapter 1, I outlined some contemporary theories of public reasoning. The hybrid view shares 
significant characteristics with “weak deliberative” accounts. It values pre-voting discussion. Unlike many 
views, however, its focus is self-interest, and it does not expect anything like full consensus. What does 
this tell us about the contemporary debate? The hybrid Benthamite view illustrates how significant the 
common ground between aggregative and deliberative views is. Clearly, this construal of Bentham sits 
neither with “rational choice” aggregative theories which give pre-voting discussion no significant role, 
nor with the “stronger deliberative” views of Habermasians. It demonstrates the preference transformation 
and public orientation are not essential to providing an account of deliberation. It also demonstrates that 
aggregative accounts need not ignore the conditions of preference formation, as some deliberative 
theorists suggest. Seeing where a hybrid Benthamite view fits in relation to contemporary alternatives 
should also help us to identify some of its strengths and weaknesses. To do this, I will consider three 
challenges, and potential responses to them. These are: the accusation that it reinforces existing power 
structures; does not understand moral conflict, and cannot conceptualise manipulation. 
 
I believe that a hybrid Benthamite view of public reasoning is well positioned to counter two of these 
challenges, but less well placed to respond to the way in which contemporary theorists seek to understand 
moral conflict. Consider the first objection. Gutmann & Thompson (2004) have been among the leading 
proponents of deliberative democracy in contemporary political theory. In previous chapters, I have 
challenged the way in which they have sometimes referred to Bentham as an archetypally aggregative 
democrat. References like those are often difficult to reconcile with the democratic arguments that 
Bentham himself proposed. 
 
Some aspects of the deliberative critique of aggregative theory proposed by Gutmann & Thompson do 
raise more difficult challenges for the hybrid Benthamite view. Consider, for instance “Why Deliberative 
Democracy?”. This text suggests that aggregative democratic theories accept existing power structures in 
a way which is difficult to justify. This would be a particularly troubling accusation for a Benthamite 
account of public reasoning. After all, the later Bentham fundamentally believed that democratic 
participation was an essential source of security against sinister abuses made possible by the existing 
distribution of power in society.  
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Gutmann & Thompson claim that it is an essential feature of aggregative democratic approaches to take 
“existing or minimally corrected preferences as given, as the base line for collective decisions” (Gutmann 
& Thompson, 2004:16). They deem this acceptance of existing preferences to be fundamentally 
conservative. Those preferences are formed and informed in relation to a background shaped by the way 
society has been; not how it could, or should, be. Consequently, by accepting the satisfaction of existing 
preferences as an appropriate criterion of right, aggregative theories “accept and may even reinforce 
existing distributions of power in society” (Ibid).  
 
This claim aligns with some arguments we have encountered before. There are, for example, similarities 
between this deliberative view and some feminist critiques of utilitarianism. One such critique was 
examined in Chapter 1. Like Gutmann & Thompson, Annas (1977) also suggests that existing preferences 
are an inappropriate baseline for collective decisions because they unduly reflect existing power 
structures. In particular, Annas’ critique of Millian utilitarianism associates those power structures with 
patriarchy. On her view, Millian utilitarianism was susceptible to undue conservativism. Assessing 
outcomes in reference to existing preferences renders utilitarians unable to step back and consider the 
preferences that citizens should, or would, have; given proper deliberative conditions. In contrast, 
deliberative democrats like Gutmann & Thompson claim that the appropriate conditions of deliberation 
help citizens to move beyond initial preferences, which may unthinkingly reflect patriarchal or other 
iniquitous power distributions. The implication is that decisions made in an aggregative way—without 
deliberation—allow unfair treatment of particular groups by the state and civil society to continue in 
perpetuity. Utilitarianism would thus supposedly have allowed and perpetuated the subjugation of women 
who expressed an apparent preference for their own denial of basic property and democratic rights. The 
expressed preferences of those women, alongside those of men in the community, would be sufficient to 
justify this state of affairs.  
 
So while deliberative democracy corrects individuals’ misconceptions of their interests, aggregative 
theories are destined to amplify them to the level of collective decisions. The accusation of undue 
conservatism also has much in common a “conventional view” of Bentham, outlined in Chapter 2. That 
interpretation suggests that Bentham was content to aggregate, rather than correct, “raw” preferences. 
Contemporary theorists often imply a number of different conceptions of “raw preferences”. I outlined 
three of these in Chapter 2; prominent among these is the view that preferences are “raw” if they have not 
been formed in appropriate deliberative conditions.  
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As I hope has begun to be clear from the arguments we have examined, I do not believe that conservatism 
of this sort is a justified accusation against the hybrid Benthamite view. Bentham himself acknowledged 
individuals’ capacity to hold erroneous conceptions of their own interests. Often, implicitly and explicitly, 
the implication of this critique is that a critical form of public opinion is required to correct these 
misconceptions. Public reasoning is a process which helps to operate and form this kind of public opinion. 
It attempts to correct the delusions which cause individuals to misunderstand their own interests. The fact 
that correcting these misconceptions does not amount to preference change does not make the hybrid 
Benthamite response any less valid; unless of course, we assume from the start that a deliberative view is 
the beginning and end of what public reasoning should be. As suggested above, deliberative theorists have 
not yet provided grounds for that conclusion. Gutmann & Thompson are right to suggest that preferences 
which have not been duly considered may reflect current pervasive power structures. The hybrid 
Benthamite view I have described accepts that premise, and the idea that public reasoning is needed to 
prevent it. It rejects the idea, however, that full deliberative preference change is required for that task. 
Rather, a form of public reasoning which focuses on clarifying citizens’ self-interest, and the language 
used to describe factors on which is depends, also provides a plausible response to this challenge.  
 
More broadly, the idea that Benthamite utilitarianism allows this kind of domination has, of course, been 
around for a long time. It is closely related to a well-known critique of Bentham’s democratic theory: that 
his form of utilitarianism creates opportunity for a “tyranny of the majority”. Mill famously used that 
phrase in his introduction to “Utilitarianism". It represents an idea that constitutional checks, like the 
separation of powers and a written constitution enshrining guaranteed individual rights, are needed to 
protect the security of minority groups. In many ways, however, Bentham was not a simple majoritarian. 
He had mixed opinions about the importance of majority rule in representative democracy. His rejection 
of the separation of powers was not based on the idea that the will of the majority should not be checked, 
but on a fear that allowing a minority veto would serve sinister interests (Rosen, 2003:232). 
Rosen (2003: 232-244) has also shown that Bentham’s objections to the oppression of groups did not 
depend on whether that group constituted a minority or majority of the total population. In this sense, 
Bentham was not simply content to allow the domination or exploitation of minorities in pursuit of the 
interests of a majority. He objected to what he saw as oppression in many different territories, whether the 
majority or minority was subject to it. Bentham thus cited the oppression of the Turks under the Greeks; 
the Helots under the Spartans; the Protestants in France under Catholic rule; the Catholics under 
Protestant rule in Ireland and “in the Anglo-American United States the Blacks under the Whites” 
(Bentham, in Ibid: 233).  
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In each case, Bentham believed that oppression was harmful to both the oppressed and the oppressors, 
because it undermined security; in which everyone had a personal stake. It was only on the basis of that 
security that individuals could make plans for their lives to maximise utility (Kelly, 1990:73). Conversely, 
arbitrary rules that picked out individuals or groups for ill treatment made conditions less predictable and 
secure for everybody, even if they were intended to serve the community.  
 
The critically important role that security plays should certainly ameliorate concerns that Bentham’s 
account of public reasoning could allow minority groups to be oppressed. As Rosen notes, this is a point 
on which Bentham disagreed with conclusions later reached by some Twentieth Century utilitarians, like 
Smart: 
“For both Bentham and Mill, the disappointment of settled expectations (such as the sudden 
reduction of an individual from citizen to slave) creates such pain and is so fundamental an 
injustice that it can never be justified on grounds of the augmentation of happiness elsewhere” 
(Rosen, 2003: 236) 
 
Finally, the hybrid Benthamite account may be challenged in relation to moral conflict. Although it 
encourages citizens to question existing power structures, and encourages belief in a form of security held 
by all citizens, it also does not approach moral conflict in the same way that many contemporary theorists 
do. It is a strength of the hybrid Benthamite account that it does not expect the kind of full consensus 
demanded by Habermasian deliberation. Ironically, however, in doing so it also fails to acknowledge the 
kind of legitimate fundamental moral disagreement which is important to contemporary public 
reason(ing). It is outside the scope of this present work to decide between fundamentally different ethical 
theories. Nonetheless, we should note how essentially different Bentham’s ethics were from those of 
contemporary public reasoning theorists. There are consequently some significant barriers to 
incorporating a Benthamite conception of public reasoning into the contemporary debate. The hybrid view 
is rooted in Bentham’s writing on language and metaphysics and motivation. This has the benefit of 
meaning that we can adduce a view of public reasoning which works with Bentham’s wider corpus, rather 
than contradicting his other views. This also means that those who endorse a different view of language or 
metaphysics may not be able to accept the conclusions of Bentham’s view. For instance, many 
contemporary theories do not see knowledge relevant to fundamental questions as grounded in sensory 
experience of physical entities.  
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Additionally, many debates on public reasoning focus on the rules for considering fundamental moral 
disagreements on questions like abortion. The principles that Bentham espoused suggest that these might 
best be understood in terms of the pleasures and pains at stake, with individual citizens considering and 
clarifying their own interests in reference to information they collect through discussion. Rather than 
focusing on abstract moral rights, therefore, individuals should understand questions like these in terms of 
their own interests, and those of people directly affected. Bentham might well dismiss rights-based moral 
views on abortion or marriage as unjustified deontology: the projection of personal prejudices onto the 
canvass of others’ behaviour. Consider Rawls’ argument that arguments regarding “constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice” should reflect reasons which are justifiable to all reasonable 
persons (Rawls, 2005:214). This precludes arguments based on a particular comprehensive moral view 
which are not shared by other reasonable persons being grounds for arguments about voting on a question 
like abortion. For Rawls, this standard applies both to public officials carrying out their duties, and to 
members of the public when voting and deliberating on questions within the scope of public reason. In 
contrast, the principles Bentham suggested differentiate between these two audiences. 
 
Extrapolating from Bentham’s writing, we might conclude that there should be no a priori limits on the 
reasons which public officials should consider. Rather, they should be expected to pursue their duties with 
impartiality between the interests of all in the community, as suggested by the oath of office Bentham 
outlined in the “Constitutional Code”. Bentham’s conception of class entailed that different rules applied 
to the general public. They were expected to clarify the interests and information relevant to a particular 
decision and to engage on the basis of securing their own interests rather than in pursuit of an impartial 
regard for the interests of the whole community. A Benthamite citizen might therefore approach a 
question like abortion in this way; by considering how a change to the regulation around abortion would 
affect their own interests, including those of their family and friends. They might consider, for example, 
how the welfare of themselves and their children would be affected by a liberalisation of term limits. In 
doing do, they would be likely to question accepted notions of rights and abstract principles to test 
whether they relate to their own interests, or merely the personal, and often sinister, tastes of others. 
 
For some this might show the limitations of a Benthamite view. Whilst contemporary theorists often 
attempt to conceptualise and accept implacable moral disagreement on questions like these, the 
Benthamite approach seeks their resolution solely by reference to the interests concerned. The starting 
point of Bentham’s writing is thus inimical to much contemporary writing about public reason. Whilst 
Bentham’s premises are unlike Rawlsian views, they do have more in common with epistemic democrats 
like Estlund (2008) and Talisse (2009). These thinkers conceive of the value of democratic participation 
in terms of the accuracy of the knowledge it produces. In line with these accounts, we might try to 
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understand the accuracy of beliefs and knowledge which feed into the democratic process in more general 
terms, rather than the explicitly physicalist and utilitarian terms proposed by Bentham. This would require 
something beyond an entirely subjectivist understanding of preferences. We have seen, however, that 
there is good reason to believe that Bentham himself was comfortable with that principle, given his 
extensive writing on delusion and corruption. 
 
Let us now return to the question of manipulation, and a challenge for aggregative theories presented by 
Fishkin: 
 “...the definition of manipulation turns in part on the alternative of good conditions and good 
information... as a benchmark for comparison... These good conditions are in act, a good part of 
what I mean by deliberation” (Fishkin, 2011:33) 
 
A theme throughout this thesis has been the avoidance of manipulated outcomes from pre-voting 
discussion. We have seen that Bentham was very aware of the ability of elites to manipulate individuals’ 
judgments, yet also extremely optimistic about the ability of public opinion to overcome that problem. 
Just as some critics allege that a utilitarian view of public reasoning is unduly conservative, others—for 
related reasons—suppose that aggregative theorists like Bentham cannot sufficiently explain the problem 
of manipulation in a democracy. 
 
Fishkin has suggested that any democratic view needs to provide some account of deliberation in order to 
understand what manipulation of this sort is. In his view, manipulation is the flip-side of deliberation. It is 
what happens when individuals form preferences without the correct deliberative conditions. On this 
logic, it would be difficult to understand what manipulated agreement even is unless one can also define 
what, by contrast, effective deliberation would be. The importance of preference formation should, 
therefore, cause us to demand that “people get good information, have access to arguments on competing 
sides, and have the chance to weigh the merits of those arguments”. (Fishkin, 2011:37).  
 
Those conditions are uncontroversial, but they are also very broad. Few of the theorists we have 
encountered would deny the importance of these factors as appropriate conditions for decision making 
before voting. That said, some aggregative views, and the conventional reading of Bentham, might deny 
the need to prescribe deliberative conditions for preference formation. Instead, they take preferences as 
fixed inputs for aggregation. 
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Since manipulation of outcomes (or at least the part Fishkin draws attention to) takes place during 
preference formation, a non-deliberative view (on the definition he implies) can, by definition, have 
nothing to say about how to define or manage this problem. It is an implication of Fishkin’s argument that 
some account of the appropriate conditions for preference formation must be central to any view of how 
citizens should reason together before voting on questions which are important to the community. 
 
The participatory and hybrid views of Bentham provide significant detail about the appropriate conditions 
for preference formation. The conventional view, in contrast, provides very little detail, and instead 
focuses on defining appropriate decision making mechanisms for dealing with established preferences. It 
is a weakness, therefore, of the conventional view that it says comparatively little about the appropriate 
conditions under which citizens should consider how to vote before voting: broadly, it is a non-
deliberative view on Fishkin’s definition. The intent to “have something to say about what constitutes a 
reasonable... context for the formation of preferences” is a central feature of contemporary deliberative 
democracy (Christiano, 2002:32). Often, contemporary democrats provide an account of preference 
formation in concert with a move beyond voting on mere self-interest. This reflects an expectation that 
people should vote according to something beyond self-interest.  
 
With regard to the information provided to voters, there are two distinct levels of manipulation which 
might occur. First, there might be malign influence on the way in which voters form their preferences, 
which causes them to reflect something other than an informed and considered view of relevant 
information. Second, it is possible that incorrect information may cause individuals to draw incorrect 
conclusions after their preferences have been formed. The implication of Fishkin’s argument is that a non-
deliberative view may be able to define and counter manipulation on the second of these levels. Since it 
assumes that individuals have appropriate information on which to make choices, however, it cannot have 
enough to say about the former, deeper level of manipulation. 
 
One prominent response to that challenge is provided by deliberationists who outline discursive 
conditions that enable or provoke the type of learning which is required of citizens in a relevant forum. 
Habermas, for example, holds that the terms on which citizens interact with one another in an ideal speech 
situation precludes manipulation by definition. To this end, he famously refers to the “force of the better 
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argument”.36  This is an exemplar of appropriate influence. It appeals to participants’ sense of reason, and 
their capacity to make decisions in an informed and autonomous way. The conditions which preclude 
manipulation thus also demand that citizens should move beyond the pursuit of mere self-interest when 
they deliberate together.  
 
Rawls, in contrast, argues that citizens hold special duties towards one another when they deliberate or 
vote on questions of fundamental importance (Rawls, 2005:214). This places a duty on participants to 
appeal to reasons which are justifiable from within other reasonable persons’ reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines rather than, for example, to act strategically in an attempt to manipulate them. D’Agostino has 
proposed a purely procedural theory of public reasoning in an attempt to address what he calls 
“reflexivity” the idea that any conception of public reason must itself be somehow justified through public 
reasoning (1996). Rather than stipulating the substantive answer to this question, therefore, he outlines 
parameters for deliberation by a constitutional convention of individuals who represent real concrete 
citizens. Any reasonable individual will thus have reason to accept the parameters of their representatives’ 
deliberation since she will “see in these rules a reasonable basis for collective decision” (D’Agostino, 
1996: 161). This procedural approach thus defers the task of determining how citizens should reason 
together to delegates. Delegates to the convention are meant to better reflect a rational consideration of the 
interests of concrete individuals: they do the deliberation that citizens would do under ideal conditions. 
Here too, there is a move away from mere self-interest. The convention requires: a “public” (not self-
interested) orientation; some agreed exemplars of public reason; a diversity of conceptions of public 
reason; and “reasonable” rules of order for deliberation (1996:161). 
 
The hybrid view of Bentham falls under this, admittedly very broad, family of approaches. It is 
“deliberative” in the wide sense Fishkin implies. It seeks to define some conditions under which 
participants should deliberate with one another. It explains the ways in which it is appropriate, and 
inappropriate for them to influence one another before voting.  
 
Many non-deliberative views of democracy are also concerned with the information that citizens have 
access to before voting. It is a typical assumption of social choice theory that individuals express their 
preferences in conditions of appropriate information. Some cases of potential manipulation, can be simply 
understood in these terms. Deliberately providing voters with misleading or incomplete information just 
before they vote can lead them to draw errant conclusions from their existing preferences. Manipulation 
                                                          
36 Habermas (1996), Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
Chapter 7.  
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of the process through which citizens actually form their preferences may be more difficult for some non-
deliberative views to conceptualise, however. Consider, for instance, social choice theory, which is often 
considered a paradigm case of non-deliberative approaches. It is a starting assumption of most views of 
this kind that the preferences of participants, which need not be self-interested, are fixed. Rather than 
transforming through a political process of deliberation like that described and tested by Fishkin, agents 
are supposed to be endowed with fixed preferences (Elster, 1986:105).  
So, social choice theorists may be able to identify and explain manipulation which occurs at the point 
where citizens consider how to vote based on their underlying preferences. The effects of false technical 
beliefs, induced through poor information have been modelled for exactly this reason (Austen-Smith, 
1992). When it comes to manipulation before this, when citizens are actually forming their preferences, 
however, social choice may have something of a blind spot. Any account which assumes these 
preferences as fixed and attends to how they should be aggregated rather than formed or revised is likely 
to be less equipped to satisfactorily explain what is troubling about individuals being manipulated at this 
prior stage. 
 
This is a problem for the conventional view of Benthamite public reasoning. As we have seen, that 
interpretation focuses on aggregating citizens’ preferences through voting and says little about how those 
preferences should be formed. It attends in great detail to how democratic institutions should operate, and 
rules by which representatives should be held to account, but relatively little to the discursive conditions 
in which citizens should form their views on important matters. It shares a ‘blind spot’ for manipulation at 
this earlier stage with some accounts in the social choice tradition. A hybrid Benthamite view is 
somewhat different. It does provide an account of the information and conditions that citizens need to 
make appropriate decisions, but not along the deliberative lines commonly proposed in contemporary 
debates. 
 
Similarly, many deliberative views ask citizens to consider more than self-interest when deciding how to 
vote, because their conception of quality deliberation embodies notions of public-spiritedness, or 
impartiality. This does not, however, mean that deliberative views must in any way rule out arguments 
which present claims based on self-interest playing a role in deliberation. What emerges from this 
complex picture is that the challenge implied for non-deliberative theories by Fishkin, in his contribution 
to “Manipulating Democracy” (2011) at least, is not as conclusive as it appears. The conditions he puts 
forward are extremely broad (some broad conditions of appropriate information, access to arguments on 
competing sides, and the chance to weigh those arguments). In reality they may be satisfied by a variety 
of theories; including those customarily referred to as both “deliberative” and “aggregative”. 
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Elsewhere, Fishkin builds these conditions into a more comprehensive picture of deliberation. The crucial 
question for us is whether the hybrid Benthamite account meets these conditions. I believe it does. 
Bentham wrote extensively about the level of information and clarity of information needed for 
individuals to understand their own interests. The POT demonstrates his concern with citizens being 
provided with balanced information and arguments on which to determine their political views. His 
writing on sinister interests, deception, delusion, and the need to root out fallacies all suggest a 
determination to furnish individual citizens with the information and conditions they needed to reach an 
accurate rather than deluded conception of their own interests. Of course, contemporary theorists might 
question various aspects of these views. It would, however, be unfair to suppose that Bentham did not 
provide the conceptual resources needed to define what manipulation is. 
 
Thus, while Fishkin himself builds his own particular account of deliberation, there is nothing in the 
critique cited above which suggests that public spirited, Habermasian deliberation is required to 
understand what manipulation is. Rather, Fishkin sets the definition of deliberation at a low level: there 
should be some account of the appropriate information, balance of arguments on either side, and a chance 
to weigh those arguments, which citizens need to reach a conclusion before voting. The hybrid 
Benthamite account meets that test. It proposes that individuals require the chance, through operation of 
the Public Opinion Tribunal, to gather evidence, exercise the political and moral sanctions, and clarify the 
understanding of their own interests before voting. This view does not resemble contemporary 
deliberation. Nonetheless, it does offer a view of the legitimate conditions under which individuals should 
consider their preferences before voting. These are the conditions needed for citizens to understand their 
own interests, free from delusion and fallacious logic. In defining these conditions, the hybrid Benthamite 
view also defines their opposite: manipulated outcomes.  
 
So, whilst the conventional view of Bentham has similarities with some examples of contemporary social 
choice theory, and the participatory view resembles some examples of contemporary deliberative 
democratic theories, there is a third alternative. The hybrid view of Bentham could, like the conventional 
view, hold that individuals should vote according to their self-interest at the ballot box. Like the 
participatory view, it could also acknowledge that it is necessary to stipulate appropriate conditions for 
preference formation; rather than merely aggregating expressed preferences and ignoring the conditions 
under which they were formed.  
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This reflects the fact that there is real common ground between aggregative and deliberative democracy. 
Benthamites cannot be deliberative in the sense that Habermasians are. They do not espouse preference 
change through a process of deliberation. Nonetheless, the hybrid view does prescribe some conditions 
under which individuals should consider their preferences before voting. It is not content to unthinkingly 
aggregate whatever expressed preferences pop up from a society by chance. Unlike some of the examples 
of contemporary deliberative democracy mentioned above, however, it would ask citizens to consider 
self-interest before voting and rely on the aggregation of votes at the ballot box, rather than the 
transformative power of deliberation, to produce decisions which reflect the interest of the whole 
community.  
 
The three broad Benthamite options in response to the challenge identified by Fishkin thus complement 
three broad responses put forward by contemporary democrats:  
 Conventional Benthamite (self-interested) 
 Participatory Benthamite (non- self-interested participation) 
 Hybrid Benthamite (self-interested participation)  
 
We have seen that the many putatively deliberative accounts of democracy call for individual voters to 
vote according to the public interest and for the prior process of discourse between citizens to reflect 
conditions necessary to their doing so effectively. What is critical about Fishkin’s own definition of 
deliberation, however, is not that it is focused in some way on the public interest. Rather, his argument 
turns on the conditions of preference formation; not orientation. It is, therefore, a warning against blind 
aggregation taking place without attention being paid to deliberative conditions before voting. So, while it 
seems implicit in much writing on deliberation that participants should aim to advance something more 
than their self-interest, this need not be the case.  
 
Instead, what enables such views to reduce scope for manipulation is their ability to account for 
appropriate conditions of preference formation and, by extension, to rule out inappropriate conditions 
which allow citizens to be manipulated. Whilst it could be seen as a criticism of the conventional 
Benthamite view of public reasoning, therefore, the accusation does not affect the participatory or hybrid 
views to the same degree.  
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Having examined some potential objections to the hybrid Benthamite view, let us now consider some of 
its potential advantages. Below, I argue that a self-interested view of public reasoning has some important 
advantages over alternatives: false consensus, salience, and exclusion. 
 
False consensus 
False consensus may be a significant problem for some deliberative views, and less of a problem for 
others. While there can undoubtedly be significant benefits to well-conducted deliberation, deliberative 
democrats also acknowledge that common problems encountered by citizens can undermine its value. 
Important among these is false consensus; the idea that putative agreement can be reached between 
participants which does not fairly reflect their own sincere and committed consideration of relevant facts 
and reasons. 
 
False consensus may happen for a number of different reasons, for example because “some 
communication [is] systematically distorted by power” (Young, 2001: 685). Deliberators may therefore 
unknowingly reflect the influence of powerful interests in the way they communicate with one another 
and reach conclusions which are not genuinely justified. False consensus thus makes deliberation more of 
an act of theatre than a genuine exercise of reflection.  
 
The potential problem of manipulation thus applies most to those “stronger” deliberative views, which 
expect full consensus, and least to those “weaker deliberative”, “social choice” aggregative and “rational 
choice” aggregative views for which this type of full agreement, reached through productive deliberation 
between citizens, is inessential to good decision-making. 
 
This expectation of agreement, or consensus, between deliberating citizens is particularly important to the 
“stronger deliberative” views we have examined. For views of this kind, consensus plays an important 
role in explaining the normative value of pre-voting discussion. While useful in that respect, however, the 
expectation also has the capacity to make manipulated consensus more likely. Citizens may feel particular 
pressure to conform to an established or majority-held view when they know that deliberations must reach 
agreement at a specified time. Less influential deliberators may be bullied into agreement as the need to 
reach consensus becomes more urgent. Under such conditions, a tendency to promote conformity may 
undermine deliberation (Przeworski, 1998:147). Deliberative democrats often acknowledge this risk 
(Fishkin, 2009:86). 
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The consequence of these kinds of social pressure in deliberation, therefore, can be to deny citizens the 
input they should have. It can also enhance the control of elites over outcomes. Fishkin’s own research 
suggests that those with the ability to use social pressure to shape deliberative outcomes are often those 
who benefit from the status quo (Ibid).  
 
False consensus is a particular danger in "stronger deliberative" theories because they define an ideal of 
deliberation which should result in consensus when conducted properly. The view that full consensus is 
the appropriate result of ideal deliberation is likely to create expectations amongst participants. They may 
feel, for example, that failures to reach agreement are somehow the result of some form of “deliberative 
pathology, such as the lingering taint of self-interest” (Waldron, 1999:111). "Weaker deliberative" 
theorists go some way to assuaging this concern because they accept that deliberation, even perfectly 
conducted, will often not result in agreement. This acknowledgement means that an expectation that 
lingering disagreements are some kind of deliberative pathology or fault of those involved should be less 
common. Similarly, “social choice” aggregative and “rational choice” aggregative views are also unlikely 
to promote false consensus through the expectation of agreement because they readily acknowledge the 
importance of aggregation as a closing mechanism for many real world decisions.  
 
By placing a greater emphasis on counting than talking, aggregative theories thus attempt to give each 
citizen an equal input via elections rather than through ideal discursive conditions (Waldron, 1999:110-
16). Counting votes thus aims to ensure a formal equal say for each citizen, and has the advantage of not 
relying on less demonstrable deliberative norms being present before voting to ensure that talking is not 
manipulated. Of course, talking could still be manipulated in such a situation but this will have a less 
damaging effect on a democratic theory the less that it relies on deliberation to change preferences. An 
advantage of emphasising counting over talking in this way is that it is likely to be less open to the kinds 
of social conditions that might make dissenters believe that their views have not been adequately heard:37 
 
Aggregation “allows those on the losing side to hold on to their integrity” because their views 
have been treated seriously, and with as much respect as others’ but have been outweighed”. 
(Bellamy, 2009:106) 
 
                                                          
37 Of course, deliberationists, too often advocate counting votes, but the extensive role they afford deliberation before voting nevertheless 
provides more possible opportunities for elite manipulation 
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By placing more emphasis on counting, and less on talking, therefore, we make dissenters less likely to 
believe that they only lost votes among peers because discursive conditions were manipulated. This 
advantage comes at a price, however. Aggregationists eschew “epistemic moralised” deliberation: the idea 
that discussion before voting has a particular moral status beyond its instrumental benefits. As a result, 
they cannot claim the supposed advantages of that kind of public deliberation. Primary among these 
claimed advantages is citizens’ increased regard for the public interest. According to some deliberative 
theses, orientating deliberation towards the public interest creates the expectation that arguments should 
be justified in more “public spirited” terms. Deliberation thus has an important benefit: the expectation of 
“public-spirited” deliberation controls elite power because justifying arguments during public deliberation 
gives incentives for officials to appear impartial i.e. appeal to the public interest. 
 
The hybrid Benthamite approach sits between these two groups. Like aggregative theories, it does not 
value or expect full consensus from participants, so should be less susceptible to false consensus. Like 
some deliberative theories, however, it also acknowledges the importance of describing appropriate 
conditions for the formation of preferences. In doing so, it goes some way toward explaining the value of 
pre-voting discussion. Importantly, the hybrid Benthamite view is also different from many accounts of 
deliberation in that it expects citizens to consider their own interests before voting. I believe that a self-
interest-orientated debate should reduce expectations of consensus. 
 
Theorists of deliberation often draw a direct link between expectation of consensus and the danger of false 
consensus. Where consensus is required, or overwhelmingly expected, participants are more likely to feel 
that they have to agree to a collective decision that they do not believe is truly justified. Fishkin, for 
example, expresses a particular concern that the expectation of agreement can distort deliberative 
outcomes; that “the necessity of a consensus will require something closer to false consensus—like a jury 
verdict reached under great pressure for a decision... despite sincere misgivings” (Fishkin, 2009:86). 
Some legal and political scholars, sceptical about the benefits of deliberation, have suggested that the 
effects of distortions like these critically undermine the learning that deliberating together produces. 
Posner argues, for example, that deliberative democratic theory is likely to load the terms of debate to 
favour particular outcomes (Posner, 2003:130-140).  
 
The kind of pressure which Fishkin alludes to is a well-known danger of jury deliberations where a 
unanimous verdict is required. This scenario was famously represented in the 1957 film “Twelve Angry 
Men”. The film depicts a jury required to reach a unanimous verdict on the guilt of a young Spanish-
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American man accused of murdering his father. Deliberations begin in a febrile environment, with the 
majority of jurors taking the initial view that the defendant is guilty. The knowledge that a unanimous 
verdict is required, and that a dominant view prevails within the jury places those jurors who dissent from 
the majority view under immense pressure to conform. It can lead, as in this fictional case, legitimate 
questions to be dismissed out-of-hand:  
Juror number 7: “Well, what's there to talk about? Eleven men in here think he's guilty. No one 
had to think about it twice except you”  
 
In cases like these, deliberation may harness an unthinking conformity to expressed views of other 
participants rather than a genuine opinion reached on the basis of relevant evidence. As deliberative 
theorists acknowledge, the risk of false consensus is related to an expectation that participants should all 
agree with one another once deliberation has been properly conducted. A jury deliberating under the 
requirement of unanimity is one example of this kind of expectation. A minority of dissenters is seen as 
an inconvenient obstacle to a wider group which needs to reach a collective decision. Expectations of this 
sort make it more likely that legitimate views will go unconsidered, that legitimate concerns will not be 
voiced and that false consensus will result on important questions.  
 
Of course, there are some important differences between jury deliberation and reasoning in the wider 
public. In the wider public, individuals may rely on the media and other general sources of information 
rather than a small group of individuals. The secret ballot may also insulate voters from social pressure 
exerted by their peers, so reduce the risk of false consensus. If the danger of false consensus is related to 
the expectation of agreement, then other factors are also likely to be important. In particular, the object of 
deliberation may well affect whether participants and observers expect agreement and whether they 
believe it to be valuable.  
 
Remember that the hybrid Benthamite view is not “aggregative” in the sense that it neglects the 
importance of pre-voting discussion. Nor is it deliberative in the sense proposed by Habermas, which 
implies that full consensus on generalizable interests should result from discourse. It defines some 
conditions of appropriate information and reflection before voting. It does so, however, to allow 
participants to collect information and clarify and understand their own interests rather than to transform 
their preferences towards the public interest. The object of pre-voting discussion is thus clarifying self-
interest. I believe that this has some important implications for the problem of false consensus.  
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Jurors, or voters, subject to a high risk of false consensus usually deliberate on the same question. As a 
result, dissenting minorities must directly contradict the views of a prevailing majority in order to freely 
express their opinion. Dissent requires the accusation that the majority is mistaken. Deliberation regarding 
a shared question, like the guilt or innocence of an individual, or whether a proposal advances or hinders 
the national interest therefore heightens the risk of false consensus because it demands more of minorities 
who wish to dissent against a prevailing view.  
 
The picture would be different if discussion were directed towards individuals’ self-interest rather than a 
single common object, like the public interest. As Goodin has noted, most Western societies are willing to 
accept the notion that individuals should usually be regarded as the best available judge of their own 
interests. Thus, “Usually (not always) each individual is probably (not necessarily) the best judge of his 
own interests” (Goodin, 1995: 127). Therefore, if public reasoning is directed toward self-interest, the risk 
of false consensus changes significantly. The best judge principle implies that dissenting minorities 
cannot so readily be told that their preferences are wrong, any more than one consumer can tell another 
that they are wrong to like raspberry more than chocolate ice cream. This is particularly the case if we 
adopt, as Bentham did, a quantitative form of utilitarianism, which rejects the notion that some 
preferences are superior to others. 
 
Participants in hybrid Benthamite public reasoning are not told that they must reach agreement; or that 
they must all consider the same question. Rather, they are encouraged to consider information in relation 
to a matter on which they are the best judge: their own interests and preferences. Following discussions, 
they then vote in secret, since this is “the only security for genuineness of suffrage” (Bowring, iii, 599). 
Focussing on self-interest means that each individual voter considers a slightly different question. On this 
matter he or she is likely to have more information and experience than others. In these conditions, it 
should be easier for minorities to dissent, and to register their legitimate concerns at the ballot box. 
Conversely, it should be more difficult for majorities to, deliberately or unwittingly, pressurise dissenters 
to conform.  
 
In this regard, the hybrid Benthamite view, which emphasises voting in secret and individual reasoning on 
the basis of self-interest, is an extension of some contemporary deliberative views. The reasons cited by 
deliberative democrats like Fishkin for preferring a mode of deliberation which does not seek full 
consensus are also reasons to think that a self-interested mode of public reasoning will be less susceptible 
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to manipulation through false consensus than public interested alternatives. Individuals need the 
opportunity make their own mind up without excessive social pressure. This is aided by a self-interested 
conception of public reasoning and impeded by public-interested reasoning. Asking citizens to deliberate 
together on the public interest, or something approaching it, is more liable to generate an expectation of 
agreement than asking them to deliberate regarding their own interests; there may be as many correct 
answers to the latter as there are people participating. Deliberative views which ask citizens to consider 
what serves their own interests therefore hold the advantage that they are less likely to create the social 
pressure which provokes false consensus. The format of deliberation in juries may lend itself more to false 
consensus than that of deliberative polling with confidential questionnaires. So too, should deliberation on 
self-interest—by individuals who then vote in secret—be less likely to encourage social pressure which 
undermines the outputs of deliberation. 
 
The hybrid Benthamite view thus sits alongside the forms of non-Habermasian deliberative democratic 
theory which try to mitigate the danger of false consensus and promote opportunities for legitimate 
dissent. Fishkin’s (2009) “When the People Speak” (2009) is a prominent example of this. He 
acknowledges that it is a genuine problem for deliberation and could undermine the value of its outcomes. 
He looks at empirical evidence of where false consensus tends to distort the quality of deliberation, and 
finds that “most of the empirical literature supporting [these] distortions...comes from jury studies” rather 
than analyses of deliberative poll (DP) or other forums. He contends that there are critical differences 
between these two contexts. Those differences reflect the fact that Deliberative Polling was deliberately 
designed to reduce the danger of false consensus—by insulating individuals against undue social pressure: 
“A jury arrives at an agreed verdict. The necessity for such agreement creates social pressure for 
consensus. By contrast a DP solicits opinion in confidential questionnaires and tries to avoid any 
pressure for consensus...A jury does not have moderated discussion. The jury foreman is a leader 
but not a moderator...” (Fishkin, 2009: 129-30) 
 
Fishkin’s mode of Deliberative Polling is thus designed to shield participants from the social pressure 
which can engender false consensus. It does so by: reducing expectation that full collective discussion 
should create full agreement; allowing individuals to express views in private; and facilitating discussion 
to try to allow more equal participation and influence. Bentham, of course, had similar concerns. These 
were central to his advocacy of the secret ballot. He wished to protect voters from local landowners’ 
undue influence. In Fishkin’s account of deliberation, confidential questionnaires play the same role as the 
secret ballot did for Bentham. Both allow individuals to register their views without the influence or 
judgement of peers. There are striking similarities between Bentham’s objection to public voting, and 
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Fishkin’s objection to public consultation. The former warns that …“Expose him to the public eye…[and] 
You expose him at the same time to the eyes of some individual or individuals who have an interest of 
their own opposite to the interest of the public and who have it in their power to make you suffer if you do 
not give preference to theirs” (Bentham, 2002:431, italics added). The latter warns that “Public 
consultations that seek agreement… expose participants to social pressure to reach agreement. It is a far 
better guarantee to avoid consensus-seeking processes and to gather the opinions, before and after, in 
confidential questionnaires or secret ballots” (Fishkin, 2011: 38) 
 
The hybrid Benthamite view accepts this concern, and extends it by defining the object of public 
reasoning as the clarification of self-interest, thus further reducing the danger of false consensus. 
Similarly, “weaker” deliberative theorists, like Gutmann & Thompson (2008) share the contention that 
deliberation should not be expected to produce full consensus. For them, deliberation is valuable even 
where consensus is impossible, because it clarifies positions and builds reciprocal relations between 
citizens. False consensus is, however, a particular danger in "stronger deliberative" theories because they 
define an ideal of deliberation which should result in consensus when properly conducted. These 
accounts—because they create an expectation of consensus—always seem more likely to create 
accusations that deliberators have somehow “failed” when disagreement persists. I believe that this is 
because they are more willing to evaluate and criticise the preferences that citizens form; or the conditions 
under which they are shaped. Accusations of that sort are likely to disadvantage those with dissenting 
views (Waldron, 1999:111). 
 
Exclusion 
Related to the danger of false consensus is that of exclusion. Public-interested modes of public reasoning 
often create expectations of the types of reasons and persons which should prevail in key discussions 
before voting. Like the expectation of consensus on the public interest, these demands risk excluding 
legitimate dissent.  
 
One of the great advantages claimed for contemporary deliberation is that it encourages “we” rather than 
“I” thinking from citizens (Mansbridge, 1991: 7-8). What is potentially troubling about this contention is 
that encouraging “we” thinking is often also accompanied by a definition of exactly who “we” are.  
Public-interested views of deliberation commonly require that particular forms of argument are required 
in order to aid learning about the common interest: “Appeals to deliberation amount to demands for a 
certain type of discourse in democratic political settings; reasonable, foresighted, steady, and oriented to a 
common, not sectarian, problem” (Sanders, 1997: 356). Phillips draws on a similar principle to critique 
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some deliberative views (1995:155). It is, she contends, the precepts of these of these kinds of approaches 
which can reflect majority orthodoxies and thus stifle the ability of minorities to contribute legitimate 
views to public discourse.  
 
One effect of appeals to the public interest can be to constrain the types of reasons to which individuals 
may appeal, thus invoking “connotations of rationality, reserve, cautiousness, quietude, community, 
selflessness and universalism” (Ibid: 348). These ideas might, in the abstract, be devoid of the influence of 
class, gender, power, or race. However, their implementation in the real world can be a very different 
story. There is therefore a danger in relying on the terms of public deliberation to reach the public interest: 
public-spirited parameters for interaction can so easily be usurped by existing social cleavages. It is for 
this reason that critics of deliberative democracy worry about how abstract deliberative principles can be 
put into action, and suggest that proponents of some deliberative theories “seem to live on another 
planet... they are devoid of race, class, and gender and all the benefits and liabilities associated…with 
these features” (Sanders, 1997: 353). Rawlsian public reasoning is an obvious example of this kind of 
approach (Rawls, 1997). 
 
We have seen that Posner has pointed towards a similar danger. He suggests that perhaps “what motivates 
many deliberative democrats is… a desire to change specific political outcomes, which they believe they 
could do through argument, if only anyone could be persuaded to listen, because they are masters of 
argumentation” (Posner, 2004). So, the demand to orientate deliberation to the public interest creates 
standards for justification or expression of arguments. To different degrees, these have the potential to be 
exclusionary. The criteria established for encouraging citizens to preclude certain types of reasons from 
debate can be exploited by elites in support of their favoured outcomes; to effectively exclude some 
members of the community.  
 
Public-interest-orientated theories often state that properly conducted deliberation excludes no one; but 
patterns of exclusion may in fact be insidious (Sanders, 1997: 353). Deliberative views often address this 
concern by requiring “equal access to decision-making assemblies or substantive equality in resources and 
power” as part of the ideal they strive to realise (Phillips, 1995:154). Without a more detailed practical 
account of how these conditions might be realised, however, real world deliberation where decisions are 
required within reasonable timeframes and from people grounded in existing social and cultural 
conditions, may give too little weight to some voices and too much to others.  
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Of course, well conducted deliberation is designed to prevent that happening. These principles are 
typically intended to prevent any substantive bias in debate. Facilitation should also ensure that seldom 
heard voices have the impact they deserve. Note, however, that none of these deliberative principles 
must—by definition—be directed at the public interest. Information, substantive balance, diversity, 
conscientiousness, and equal consideration all apply to individuals’ considering their own interests as 
much as those considering the public interest (Fishkin, 2009:34). The hybrid Benthamite view is thus 
compatible with measures suggested by deliberative democrats to protect against false consensus and 
exclusion. It could even be seen as an extension of those measures. By accepting principles like these, and 
directing citizens to consider self-interest rather than the public interest, it may be possible to safeguard 
against manipulation through effective facilitating and appropriate conditions without exposing 
participants to the dangers of exclusion which some public-interested deliberative views create. The 
relevant comparison is not thus between a jury and deliberative polling, but between deliberative polling 
focused on the public interest or on self- interest; on an object shared between all members of the group, 
or different objects held by each as an individual. 
 
In contrast, deliberation aimed at something beyond self-interest will be more susceptible to exclusion. As 
Phillips suggests, deliberation of this sort (which I have termed “stronger”) often endorses an idealised 
form of discussion. This encourages “oppressed groups” to “put their own partial interests aside—to 
address the shared concerns of all humanity, to think beyond their own interests and needs”. Of course, 
this is something that no self-interested view of deliberation would want to encourage. A move away from 
self-interest would not be necessary, for example, under the conventional Benthamite, or some social 
choice, approaches. Phillips’ critique is that requiring oppressed groups to move towards consideration 
and expression of wider, even universal, interests can in reality “lock them into the very structures they 
are trying to dislodge” (Phillips, 1995:147). Thus, an acceptance of prejudice or bias into the assumptions 
which undergird deliberation itself protects that bias from being effectively challenged, because when 
“disregard based in prejudice goes unrecognised by both those who are subject to it and those who are 
prejudiced, prejudices cannot possibly be challenged” within a debate framed by those very assumptions 
(Sanders, 1997: 353). The influence of such exclusionary practices, placing less weight on the views of 
some than others, may also be insidious, thus difficult to identify and eradicate through deliberation. We 
have seen that one deliberative response to this, from Fishkin, puts forward principles to ensure that all 
have a reasonable input into collective decisions. Indeed, the hybrid Benthamite view complements those 
principles, and perhaps extends them.  
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Salience 
Finally, I contend that self-interested public reasoning is less liable to manipulated outcomes because it 
induces discussion on issues of higher salience to individuals. These, in turn, are less likely to be the 
product of manipulation. Critics of deliberative democracy sometimes lament the high-minded, public 
spiritedness it requires of citizens, and argue that “People who vote on the basis of their self-interest are at 
least voting about something they know at first-hand, their own needs and preferences. Beware the high-
minded voter” (Posner, 2003:113) 
 
There is some research on deliberation which suggests that deliberation on higher salience issues is less 
likely to produce significant preference change. I believe that self-interested deliberation could be 
understood as “high salience” deliberation. It follows from this that self-interested deliberation is likely to 
have a less significant effect--in whichever direction—on participants’ expressed preferences. Now it is 
possible, of course, that changes provoked by deliberation could be either positive or negative; they could 
produce a better or worse reflection than preceding views of the interests and reasons at stake. A 
difference in salience is therefore itself normatively inconclusive. 
 
It is important, however, to remember that different accounts ask public reasoning to play different roles 
in the democratic process. The participatory Benthamite, and some contemporary deliberative views, for 
example, suggests that public reasoning helps to make votes cast at the ballot box a better reflection of the 
public interest. In contrast, the conventional Benthamite and some social choice views instead wish 
individual votes to reflect individual interests, and rely on the aggregation of votes to produce decisions 
which serve the public interest. This, in turn, means that a conventional Benthamite view could 
conceivably produce decisions which serve the public interest without the need for public-interested 
deliberation, if a subsequent aggregation of interests through voting can take place successfully. The 
hybrid Benthamite account shares that view. 
 
Why might that be an advantage? A public-interested account needs the benefits of the changes to 
preferences created by deliberation in order to produce “good” (public interest-reflecting) decisions. To 
achieve those benefits, it must also accept the greater risk of manipulation that lower salience deliberation 
implies. In contrast, a self-interested account does not rely on this change in preferences during 
deliberation. Thus, achieving good decisions through a public interested deliberative view implies more 
risk of manipulated outcomes than achieving good decisions through a self-interested deliberative view, 
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like the hybrid Benthamite account. Assuming the success of both views, the former requires lower 
salience deliberation to produce good outcomes; the latter assumes higher salience deliberation. 
 
This is important. Various studies on deliberation show that preferences tend to change less when a highly 
salient issue is being considered. There is some evidence that deliberation produces less preference 
change for “high salience” issues (Farrar et al, 2010). List et al., for example, showed that “deliberation 
increases proximity to single-peakedness...at least on low- to moderate-salience issues where there has not 
been much prior deliberation and where proximity to single-peakedness is not already high” (List et al, 
2013:90-91).  
 
Studies like this generally measure salience by the amount of coverage an issue has received in relevant 
media. List, for example, distinguishes between high and low salience issues by reference to the amount 
of “public attention” received before deliberative polling: 
“Electric utility policies in Texas and revenue sharing in New Haven had received little public 
attention...The Monarchy in Britain, the airport in New Haven, and the Constitutional 
Referendum in Australia had received incomparably more. These latter three were highly salient” 
(List et al, 2013:86)  
 
There are fewer studies of explicitly self-interested deliberation. It is plausible to suppose, however, that 
viewing a question with regard to one’s self-interest renders it of higher salience for an individual than 
regarding it by reference to the public interest, particularly since familiarity or proximity to an issue is 
usually used as a proxy for salience. If this is the case, then it follows that, in line with the claims of 
deliberative democrats, we should expect a greater degree of preference change during public-interested 
deliberation than during self-interested deliberation. This concurs with the greater emphasis given to 
preference change by a variety of deliberative democrats than by non-deliberative theorists (Elster, 1986). 
 
If it is true that a self-interested view of public reasoning promotes less change in preferences then it may 
be true that such a view also presents less opportunity for preferences to change for the worse as well as 
the better. The potential high salience of self-interested reasoning thus reduces the potential gains and 
losses associated with deliberation. If this is the case, it might be reasonable to believe, by extension, that 
deliberation on matters of self-interest rather than public interest should cause less change in stated 
preferences. 
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The three suggested advantages of self-interested over alternative views of deliberation are therefore 
contingent on the assumption that aggregation of votes can subsequently reach the public interest, as some 
aggregative democrats like Bentham suppose.  
 
Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to consider two separate areas of debate in Bentham scholarship and political 
theory to discern what the latter might learn from the former. Chapter 1 explored two challenges for a 
Benthamite account of public reasoning: providing an account of effective discussion before voting, and 
reducing opportunities for manipulated outcomes from discussion. These demands flow from a division 
made in contemporary writing on public reasoning: between “aggregative” and “deliberative” democracy. 
The former is often accused of neglecting the role of pre-voting discussion, but could offer fewer 
opportunities for manipulated outcomes. The latter provides a rich account of pre-voting discussion but 
perhaps—in doing so—create more potential for outcomes to be manipulated. 
Chapter 2 outlined a “simple” or “conventional” view of Bentham. This is often suggested by 
contemporary public reasoning theorists. The conventional view suggests that Bentham did little to 
provide an account of effective discussion before voting. Rather he was content to allow the aggregation 
of “raw” preferences to produce collective decisions. 
 
In the third chapter, we examined more “participatory” views of Bentham. These go further to understand 
his views on the role of pre-voting discussion. In doing so, they respond better to the challenge of 
explaining the value of discussion. For different reasons, however, participatory views are often lacking as 
interpretations of Bentham’s work. Some depart from crucial themes in his wider corpus (Ben-Dor); while 
others focus on parliamentary rather than public deliberation.  
 
Chapter 4 analysed some important principles in Bentham’s democratic theory. From these, it suggested 
that a “hybrid” view of Bentham was possible. Like the participatory view, this provides an explanation of 
the value of pre-voting discussion. Unlike the participatory view, however, it maintains a self-interested 
orientation to debate. This kind of participation fosters “public aptitude” from citizens. This is the quality 
required from them to nurture official aptitude from their political representatives.  
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Finally, in this chapter, I have considered some objections to the hybrid Benthamite view. Many of these 
can be answered from within the principles Bentham himself laid out; others are more problematic. 
Overall, I have tried to show that the kind of participation that Bentham wished to encourage from 
citizens was more than simply “aggregative” (i.e. reliant solely on the aggregation of votes). Rather, he 
wanted to see an active and critical engagement from citizens which could serve as a security against 
misrule by officials. The principles outlined therefore inhabit a territory between aggregative and 
deliberative contemporary theories. They also have some important advantages. The hybrid view explains 
why pre-voting discussion should be considered an important component of democratic procedure. It does 
so, however, by relying on self-interest rather than the public interest. As a result, it is potentially less 
susceptible to criticisms made of deliberative democracy: that it enables a paternalism about citizens’ 
preferences—and the conditions in which they are formed—which could facilitate their manipulation. 
 
Like some aggregative theories, the hybrid view is focused on the self-interest of participants rather than 
the public interest, and reflects existing preferences rather than transforming them. Like some deliberative 
theories, the hybrid view provides an account of how citizens should interact with one another and reflect 
before voting. The hybrid view therefore illustrates that there is far more common ground between 
aggregative and deliberative democratic theory than proponents of each view often suppose. This 
interpretation thus clarifies our understanding of Bentham in relation to contemporary writing on public 
reasoning. It also strengthens the view that aggregative and deliberative democracy should be seen as 
compatible, rather than competing types of approach. 
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